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Statistical evidence shows that non-compliance with excise duty on cigarettes, liquor, 
and imported vehicles by importers is the key issue faced by the Royal Malaysian 
Customs Department (RMCD). However, studies in Malaysia rarely highlighted excise 
duty non-compliance. This study is the first attempt to examine the excise duty non-
compliance determinants. It aimed at investigating the direct relationship between tax 
rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, corruption and 
excise duty non-compliance. This study also considered the moderating effect of the 
probability of detection and tax agents. The Deterrence theory and the Fischer model 
were used to delineate the economic and socio-psychological factors. Data were 
gathered from 500 useable respondents scattered throughout Malaysia via a survey 
questionnaire using the disproportionate stratified random sampling technique. 
Findings from the partial least square analysis revealed that the R2 value achieved a 
substantial amount of variance of 63% for the direct effects on excise duty non-
compliance, increased to 65% for the indirect effects of tax agent, and 66% for 
probability of detection. Further, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge 
and corruption were significantly and positively related to excise duty non-compliance. 
Moreover, the relationship of tax audit and tax fairness became weaker for individuals 
with a high level of probability of detection. On the other hand, the significant and 
positive relationship of tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance became 
stronger for individuals with a high level of probability of detection. However, the 
significant and negative relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-
compliance was weaker for individuals with high-level influence of the tax agent. This 
study contributes to the indirect tax non-compliance literature and policy-makers.  
 










Bukti statistik menunjukkan bahawa ketidakpatuhan duti eksais ke atas rokok, 
minuman keras, dan kenderaan yang diimport oleh pengimport adalah isu utama yang 
dihadapi oleh Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia (JKDM). Walau bagaimanapun, kajian 
di Malaysia jarang mengetengahkan ketidakpatuhan duti eksais. Kajian ini adalah 
percubaan pertama untuk mengkaji penentu ketidakpatuhan duti eksais. Ia bertujuan 
untuk mengkaji hubungan langsung antara kadar cukai, kadar penalti, audit cukai, 
keadilan cukai, pengaruh rakan sebaya, pengetahuan cukai, rasuah, dengan 
ketidakpatuhan duti eksais. Kajian ini juga menyiasat kesan penyederhana 
kebarangkalian pengesanan dan ejen cukai. Teori pencegahan dan model Fischer telah 
digunakan untuk menggambarkan faktor-faktor ekonomi dan sosio-psikologi. Data 
dikumpulkan daripada 500 responden yang bertaburan di seluruh Malaysia melalui 
kajian soal selidik dengan menggunakan teknik persampelan rawak berstrata yang tidak 
seimbang. Dapatan daripada analisis partial least square mendedahkan bahawa nilai 
R2 mencapai sejumlah besar varians sebanyak 63% untuk kesan langsung terhadap 
ketidakpatuhan duti eksais dan meningkat kepada 65% bagi kesan tidak langsung ejen 
cukai dan 66% untuk kebarangkalian pengesanan. Di samping itu, audit cukai, keadilan 
cukai, pengaruh rakan sebaya, pengetahuan cukai, dan rasuah berkait secara signifikan 
dan positif dengan ketidakpatuhan duti eksais. Selain itu, hubungan audit cukai dan 
keadilan cukai menjadi lebih lemah untuk individu yang mempunyai tahap 
kebarangkalian pengesanan yang tinggi. Sebaliknya, hubungan yang signifikan dan 
positif antara pengetahuan cukai dan ketidakpatuhan duti eksais menjadi lebih kuat 
untuk individu yang mempunyai tahap kebarangkalian pengesanan yang tinggi. Walau 
bagaimanapun, hubungan yang signifikan dan negatif antara kadar penalti dan 
ketidakpatuhan duti eksais menjadi lemah untuk individu yang mempunyai pengaruh 
ejen cukai yang tinggi. Kajian ini menyumbang kepada kajian ketidakpatuhan cukai 
tidak langsung dan penggubal dasar. 
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Tax non-compliance is a complex phenomenon. Most of past researchers in taxation 
conducted extensive work on taxpayers’ behaviour to establish the relationship between 
economic and non-economic factors in complying with direct taxes (Teik & Meng, 
2011). However, only a few studies had been carried out to examine the behaviour of 
taxpayers in tax non-compliance with indirect taxes despite the escalating cases (Bidin, 
Shamsudin, Shalihen, & Mohd Zainudin, 2011). A number of theories to explain the 
determinants of tax non-compliance behaviour exist, and one of which is deterrence 
theory which proposes that the taxpayers’ compliance level  relies on the cost and 
benefit made in an uncertain situation based on economy factors (Becker, 1968). This 
theory mainly focuses on individual taxpayers; thus, it is not clear whether it is 
applicable to corporate taxpayers, especially importers (Mohd Yusof, Ming Ling, &  
Bee Wah, 2014). Therefore, this study employed deterrence theory associated with 
Fisher’s model by considering economic and socio-psychological variables in 
determining non-compliance behaviour among importers as taxpayers in the indirect 
tax context. 
  
Identifying the determinants of tax non-compliance is important for tax administration 
in maximising tax collections and encouraging taxpayers’ compliance. This study 
examined whether tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax 
knowledge, and corruption as a predictor variables that influence non-compliance 
behaviour of importers in excise duty (import). The excise duty in this study involved 





considered the moderating effect of probability of detection and tax agents in 
determining non-compliance behaviour of taxpayers. The probability of detection was 
selected as the moderating variable because non-compliance offences tend to be carried 
out by importers if they believe that the benefits are greater than if they were to be 
detected by the customs enforcement officers (RMCD Annual Report, 2013). 
Additionally, tax agent was chosen as a moderator because of their important role in 
customs declarations. More than 85% of tax agents were engaged by importers to make 
customs declarations (RMCD Annual Report, 2014). These two variables were 
introduced because they could affect the strength or nature of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables (Dawson, 2014). 
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a common measure of a country’s economic 
performance. The GDP mostly is measured by lawful activities but excludes unlawful 
activities hidden in nature, which lead to a gap between the potential economy and the 
‘second economy’. Numerous terms are used to define the ‘second economy’ such as 
the underground economy, hidden economy, informal economy, and the shadow 
economy. The ‘second economy’ occurs due to the concealment from government 
regulatory agencies such as tax non-compliance (Mohamed, 2012). 
 
Tax non-compliance is a key problem faced by tax authorities around the world and 
Malaysia is not an exception. In Malaysia, the Royal Malaysian Customs Department 
(RMCD) is responsible for collecting and administering indirect taxes such as excise 
duty, import duty, export duty, goods and services tax, and vehicles levy. This study 





three main commodities such as cigarettes, imported vehicles, and liquor. These 
commodities were the focus of this study because the amount of tax loss is quite 
substantial compared to other commodities such as textiles, tiles, and communication 
equipment (RMCD, Annual Report, 2014). 
 
Of indirect taxes, excise duties are the largest component followed by sales tax, service 
tax, import duty, export duty, and vehicles levy. As shown in Table 1.1, excise duties 
contributed approximately 37% (including domestic and imported goods) of the total 
indirect taxes revenue from 2010-2014. Excise duty is becoming more important as a 
source of government revenue with the reduction of import tariffs (Preece, 2008). 
Furthermore, excise duty as a form of taxation plays a vital role in influencing the 
consumption of certain products (Preece, 2008). For instance, by introducing a sin tax 
to cigarettes, it is expected that the cigarette usage will be reduced to encourage a 
healthier way of life (Miskam, Noor, Omar, & Aziz, 2013). Thus, the effectiveness of 
excise duty collections has become a national priority in most countries (Preece, 2008). 
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1.81  6.39    2.09  6.90    1.97   6.10    1.93  5.83      1.90  5.40 
Vehicles 
Levy 
0.15   0.53     0.16  0.53    0.16   0.50    0.17  0.51      0.16 0.45 
Others 
Taxes  
0.52   1.84     1.04  3.43    0.66   2.04    0.30  0.91      0.32 0.90 
Total 28.33 100    30.31 100    32.32 100    33.13 100    35.20 100 





Table 1.1 shows that excise duty (import) increased almost every year. For instance, 
the tax collected from indirect taxes, especially excise duties (import) in the year 2013 
was RM3.30 billion, which increased to RM4.47 billion in the year 2014. However, the 
amount of excise duty (import) collected should be more than an actual collection if not 
due to non-compliance activities as shown in Table 1.2.            
 
At this point, it is worthy of note to know about the standard procedures of import first 
before understanding about non-compliance in Malaysia. The importation process is 
based on the Customs Act (1967) and Customs Regulations (1977). According to the 
Act and Regulations, an importer can either act personally or engage tax agents in 
making a written declaration in customs form No.1. The form asks about tariff 
classification, valuation, origin rules, and Customs facilitation. Once the form is filled, 
Customs officers will verify the tariff classification of imported goods to determine the 
tax rate and calculate the tax payable. This calculation is based on the Harmonized 
System, which is the international system of tariff classification gazetted by the World 
Customs Organization (WCO). At this point, the customs taxes are assessed based on 
Customs Duties Order (2012). The importer is required to pay the amount of tax once 
the tax is calculated based on the tax rate. After the payment is made, the importer can 
claim the goods from the port. 
 
However, in the importation process, numerous opportunities are available that can lead 
to non-compliance with the payment of excise duty. Various definitions exist of non-
compliance. In Malaysia, the Excise Act (1976) defines non-compliance as follows: 
(i) Under-declaration of the true value of goods. In both exporting and importing 





preparing double invoices. This involved procedures of local importers and 
foreign exporters divide per unit cost between two invoices and used the altered 
invoice and other altered supporting documents such as bill of lading, packing 
list and purchase order for declaration to pay lower taxes.  
(ii) Tariff category is misclassified intentionally to pay lower duties/tax or none at 
all when in fact, it is dutiable/taxable based on the actual and correct tariff 
classification. For example wrong or vague description of goods declared to 
mislead assessment officers from imposing the correct tariff code and tax rate. 
(iii) Correct declaration of value and tariff classification but underpayment of excise 
duty on a false assessment of tax liability. 
(iv) Country of origin concealed. The goods are shipped direct to intermediate 
country with slight alteration before transferred to the importing country. The 
name of intermediate country stated as country of origin even though the goods 
are not originated from intermediate country. 
(v)  Smuggling and illegal trade activities, where goods are imported without going 
through the Customs procedures. 
 
Among the developing countries, Malaysia was listed as one of the top five countries 
that had the highest amount of illicit financial flows between 2012 and 2014 (Global 
Financial Integrity, 2012-2015). The total amount of illicit trade flows rose from USD 
370.38 billion for the period of 2002-2011 to USD 394.87 billion for the period of 2003-
2012 and USD 418.54 billion for the year 2004-2013. The illicit trade flows were 
caused by money flows through illicit network and trade mispricing. Further, the Global 
Financial Integrity (2014) estimated that up to 60 to 65% of fund flowing illegally 





compliance (Kar & Freitas, 2012). Indeed, the Malaysian government attested that tax 
non-compliance is the fundamental cause for illegal capital flows (Bernama, 2011). 
Moreover, for the past few years, the collection of RMCD have been stagnant and 
hovering around RM 30 billion (USD 10 million) caused by non-compliance behaviour 
by some taxpayers (“Malaysia: Customs audit,” 2012). Non-compliance with excise 
duty on cigarettes, imported vehicles, and liquor led to tax losses (RMCD Annual 
Report, 2014). For instance, 8 million sticks of white cigarettes of Luffman brand 
amounted approximately RM4 million were seized at West Port, Port Kelang, Selangor 
which were declared as plastic products (Mansor, 2015). The number of cases, the 
collected excise duty, and potential excise duty detected for the three commodities for 









Additional Taxes Recovered from Double Invoicing, Misclassification, Country of Origin Concealed, Undervaluation, Illegal Trade 
Activities and Smuggling Offences for Cigarettes, Imported Vehicles and Liquor, 2010-2014 
Source: RMCD Annual Report 2010-2014






















































2010 3,170.98 2,690 310.75 8.93 11,127.76 285 32.58 0.29 1,555.90 812 30.39 1.92 
2011 3,418.04 2,788 359.65 9.52 10,650.34 298 20.80 0.19 1,659.70 908 23.62 1.40 
2012 3,515.75 3,377 254.73 6.76 11,778.74 418 74.04 0.62 1,602.28   1,015 29.79 1.83 
2013 3,594.90 3,294 212.34 5.58 11,965.26 893  137.72 1.14 1,707.18 883 24.57 1.42 
2014 3,620.12 2,512 283.77 7.27 12,810.34 698 48.91 0.38 1,720.20   1,044 27.61 1.58 





Table 1.2 shows excise duty (import) non-compliance for the three commodities. If 
non-compliance is not addressed, it will tarnish the reputation of RMCD as the indirect 
tax administrator. However, the non-compliance phenomenon ostensibly exists yearly 
despite the penalty and fines imposed by the RMCD. Indeed, non-compliance is the 
main problem encountered by RMCD (Bidin et al., 2011). For example, it was reported 
that additional excise duty detected from non-compliance offences approached almost 
more than RM 1,800 million from the year 2010 to 2014 from the total of 14,661 cases 
for cigarettes, 2,592 for imported vehicles, and 4,662 for liquor as shown in Table 1.2. 
The number of cases detected for cigarettes decreased from 3,294 to 2,512 from 2013 
to 2014. However, the additional total amount of excise duty detected increased from 
RM212.34 million in 2013 to RM283.77 million in 2014. Likewise, for imported 
vehicles the number of cases was 893 in 2013 and 698 in 2014, and the total amount of 
additional excise duty detected from these cases was RM137.72 million and 
RM48.91million for the year 2013 and 2014, respectively. While, the number of cases 
for liquor increased from 883 in 2013 to 1,044 in 2014 with the total amount of excise 
duty detected was RM24.57 million, an increase to RM27.61 million from 2013 to 
2014. Although the cases and the total amount of excise duty detected fell for imported 
vehicles, but they still signified the losses in excise duty (import) revenue. This trend 
seems to continue and provides a reasonable ground for examining excise duty (import) 
non-compliance.  
 
The phenomenon of non-compliance will hamper the government effort to accomplish 
the goal of a developed nation status in the year 2020 as non-compliance reduces the 
government’s revenue. In fact, the Second Finance Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Husni 





depress the country’s economic growth (Hamid, 2011). Furthermore, the existence of 
informal activities or shadow economy in Malaysia has become a critical problem that 
needs to addressed so that the economic agenda of the country is not affected 
(McKerchar & Evans, 2009a).  
 
Tax system efficiency relies on the principles of neutrality, equity, and fairness (Palil, 
2010). Taxpayers should be able to understand these principles so that they would not 
engage in non-compliance or evasion. Tax non-compliance is a severe issue that exists 
globally including Malaysia (Hai & See, 2011b). Non-compliance signifies a failure to 
meet tax declaration requirements or failure to engage tax responsibilities intentionally 
or unintentionally (Kinsey, 1988a). Various terms are used to explain tax non-
compliance including tax evasion, errors, misreporting, and cheating (Long & Swingen, 
1987). Tax non-compliance enlarges tax gaps in Malaysia (Kasipillai, Baldry, & Rao, 
2000). Tax gap and tax evasion are linked to a tax system (Miskam et al., 2013). A tax 
gap is a difference between taxpayer's liabilities to the government and the actual 
amount paid.   
 
Due to the difficulty in inferring and observing tax non-compliance behaviour has 
resulted in the scarcity in the empirical analysis of this phenomenon (Fox, Luna, & 
Schaur, 2014). Indeed, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) commented that more studies are needed in tax evasion and avoidance. Most of 
the tax compliance and non-compliance research focused on income and corporate 
taxes although there is a possibility for evasion and avoidance involving all types of 
taxes as highlighted by Robinson (2012). For instance, in developed countries Murray 





avoidance. Dutt and Traca (2010) investigated the relationship between tariff collection 
at the border and corruption by employing a structural model to examine tax evasion in 
international commodity flows. Fox et al. (2014) examined tax evasion on commodity 
flows in sales tax. Fox et al. (2014) found that trade distance induced tax evasion in the 
United States. 
 
Prior literature on non-compliance with indirect taxes in developing countries is still 
minimal. Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova (2008) examined tax evasion caused by 
tariff rates after the tax reform in India in 1991. Kubo and Lwin (2010) examined the 
reporting discrepancies between import and export records which caused tax evasion 
of the import duties through smuggling activities in Myanmar. While in China, Liu 
(2013) studied tax avoidance through re-imports in value-added tax. Liu’s study was 
based on credits or rebates claimed by firms which are not claimable in China. 
However, the products were re-imported as inputs to obtain the tax rebate. 
 
Studies on tax non-compliance in Malaysia are available even though the number is not 
big. These studies mainly focused on income and corporate taxes behaviour, excluding 
the studies by Tayib (1998) and Nor Aziah (2004) on local government taxes. However, 
studies on indirect tax non-compliance in Malaysia are still scarce (RMCD Annual 
Report 2014). For instance, Rohaya and Ezdiani (2011) studied service tax evasion, one 
of the components in indirect taxes while Miskam et al. (2013) researched tax evasion 
involving imported vehicles by associating it with smuggling activities in Malaysia. 
The potential determinants of imported vehicles identified were the car brand, penalty 
structure, tax rate, and car importers’ size of business. On the other hand, Noor, 





tax evasion in the service industry by using variables like size of business, tax rates, 
external auditors engaged by service providers, the level of threshold, the probability 
of detection, and penalty. Further, Bidin et al. (2011) studied the influence of 
behavioural intention in determining local sales tax compliance by using the theory of 
planned behaviour.  
 
Taxpayers are also likely to evade taxes to reduce tariff and other trade regulatory 
barriers. However, non-compliance phenomenon not always highlighted by tax 
authority and researchers (Mashiri & Sebele-Mpofu, 2015). Giles, Tedds, and Werkneh 
(2002) defined non-compliance activities as all transactions, whether legal or illegal, 
market or non-market, done to evade or reduce taxes from the tax authority. The evasion 
of indirect taxes is often related to non-compliance and smuggling offences, especially 
to customs tariffs. The non-compliance offences affect monetary as well as non-
monetary revenues such as embargo (trading ban), product quality and quotas 
(limitations on imported goods) (Stephens, Boddewyn, & Sproul, 1991).  
 
Only a few academic scholars have done research on non-compliance because of the 
difficulties in identifying tax evaders, whether they are involved intentionally or 
unintentionally in tax payments (Hai & See, 2011b). Therefore, this study provides an 
empirical evidence regarding the phenomenon and the determinants of excise duty 
(import) non-compliance among importers as taxpayers in Malaysia. Understanding the 
sources of non-compliance enables the RMCD to tackle the non-compliance 
phenomenon. Further, this study focused on non-compliance by taxpayers (importers) 






1.3 Problem Statement 
RMCD has introduced various transformation programmes to improve the collection of 
indirect taxes, but non-compliance still exists every year. For instance, from the year 
2010 to 2014, the amount of excise duty (import) collected for three commodities was 
RM83,897.49 million. However, the additional potential excise duty (import) detected 
amounted to RM1,871.27 million with an increasing number of excise duty (import) 
non-compliance offences cases (Table1.2). The additional excise duty detected was 
from producing double invoices, misclassification of products, concealing the country 
of origin, undervalue products, illegal trade activities and smuggling offences involving 
taxpayers (importers) as shown in Table 1.2 (RMCD Annual Report, 2010-2014). This 
indicates exist a gap between the actual collections performance with possible 
collections of excise duty (import). 
 
This study provides empirical evidence of deliberate excise duty (import) non-
compliance problem in Malaysia. The Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission, Datuk Seri Mohd Shukri Abdull, also pointed out that the 
analysis done on the customs and free trade zone forms showed the amount of branded 
liquor imported in 2011 was RM1.67 billion. However, only RM420 million was 
declared in Port Klang free trade zone, signifying that RM1.25 billion excise duties not 
paid ("MACC: Smuggling Syndicate Cost,” 2014).  
 
Despite the sanctions and punishments imposed by the Excise Act (1976), non-
compliance by taxpayers (importers) exists on a yearly basis. Mansor, Tayib, and Yusof 
(2005) revealed that the revenue collected from indirect taxes by the RMCD is 





compliance among importers occur because the number of opportunities available to 
evade taxes through underreporting and misclassification of the value of imports 
(Fisman & Wei, 2004). Further, it was claimed that a syndicate exists involving customs 
agents, lorry drivers, and company owners (importers) transporting smuggled cigarettes 
and alcohol without going through the RMCD’s procedures, resulting in a loss of excise 
duties collection amounting to hundreds of millions of ringgit (Zolkepli, 2014). This 
phenomenon is further exacerbated with the involvement of customs officers in 
corruption and abuse of authorization given to them in the declaration. For instance, in 
2013, 72 customs officers were caught for corruption and power abuse and one officer 
for not following the customs procedures (RMCD Annual Report, 2013). Hence, 
identifying the factors of non-compliance among importers will enable the RMCD to 
enforce criminal proceedings for the excise duty offenders and undertake tax reform by 
introduce strategies needed to overcome this problem (Singh & Bhupalan, 2001). 
 
There are various reasons identified in previous literature that indicated reasons for non-
compliance. According to scholars, tax authorities could use fear as a means to ensure 
taxpayers’ compliance with tax laws (Mohdali, Isa, & Yusoff, 2014). The use of fear 
hypothesis was developed by Becker (1968) to fight illegal behaviour of taxpayers. A 
tax structure comprises tax rates, tax audits, and penalties, which are used as a 
punishment to deter taxpayers (Mohdali et al., 2014). However, according to Bayer 
(2006), higher tax rates will induce tax evasion. Voluntary compliance relies on the tax 
knowledge in the existing law and provisions (Saad, 2014). Hence, the tax expertise of 
tax agents makes taxpayers rely extensively on them to handle matters related to tax 
(Hamid, 2014). Other scholars argue that higher tax compliance could be achieved if 





(Hai & See, 2011a; Mustafa & Hanefah, 1996). Moreover, if taxpayers believe other 
taxpayers are evading taxes, and such behaviour is tolerable, then the taxpayers will be 
motivated not to comply (Ho Juan, Ern, & Kwee, 2006). Tax non-compliance will 
worsen when customs officials are involved in corruptions because, according to Rose-
Ackerman (1997), goods clearance procedures are under the control of customs 
officials.  
 
Most of the prior literatures explaining compliance behaviour of taxpayers focused on 
direct taxes. While, understanding of indirect tax compliance by integrating economic, 
socio-psychology determinants in one conceptual framework still scarce. The factors 
identified in the basic model of Becker (1968) expanded in Fischer’s model. Based on 
these model, 14 key variables identified. Among the factors selected for this study was 
tax rate, penalty rate, probability of detection, tax fairness and peer influence. Jackson 
and Milliron (1986) argued tax non-compliance decision might be affected by other 
factors not considered in the basic model. Other factors might be relevant in explaining 
non-compliance behaviour. Despite, various expansion done to the basic model nothing 
is known empirically about the influence of tax audit, tax knowledge, corruption or the 
moderating effect of probability of detection and tax agent as in this study to investigate 
on why importers resist to pay excise duty in Malaysia. 
1.4  Research Questions 
This study focused on non-compliance behaviour of importers with tax declaration 






1. What is the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax 
audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption) with excise 
duty non-compliance by importers?    
2. To what extent the probability of detection has a significant moderating effect 
on the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, 
tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption) with excise duty 
non-compliance by importers? 
3. To what extent tax agents have a significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax 
fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption) with excise duty non-
compliance by importer 
1.5  Research Objectives 
In line with the research questions above, the present study intended to meet the 
following objectives: 
1. To examine the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, 
tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption) with 
excise duty non-compliance by importers.  
2. To examine the moderating effect of the probability of detection on the 
relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax 
fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption) with excise duty non-
compliance by importers. 
3. To examine the moderating effect of tax agent on the relationship between 
predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, 





1.6  Significance of the Study 
The findings from this study will have significant contributions to both theory and 
practice in a number of ways as explained below. 
 
1.6.1  Theoretical Contributions 
This study contributes theoretically to the literature in several ways. This study is one 
of the studies that attempted to understand the determinants of excise duty non-
compliance by specifically focusing on importers as taxpayers. Further, this study 
focused on deterrence theory associated with Fisher’s model (1992). Deterrence theory 
on tax non-compliance was pioneered by Becker (1968), who developed a model by 
associating the cost and behaviour relationship in an economic perspective. Many 
scholars showed that deterrence theory alone might be unable to explain tax non-
compliance behaviour (Hanefah, 2007). The poor explanation of the Becker’s model 
led to the development of the A-S model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Deterrence 
theory only focuses on economic factors and ignored social and psychological factors 
(Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013). 
Also, the inconsistent findings on the determinants of tax compliance suggest some 
moderating effects (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
 
Based on the limitations of previous works, this study expanded deterrence theory and 
Fischer’s model by focusing on economy, social and physiological factors in 
determining tax non-compliance behaviour. Further, the application of deterrence 
theory associated with the Fischer’s model in indirect tax non-compliance environment 
in Malaysia is one of the contributions to existing theory. New variables such as tax 





Fischer’s model. The moderating effects of the probability of detection and tax agent 
in influencing non-compliance behaviour among importers are also new contributions 
of this study. In deterrence theory and Fischer’s model, the probability of detection was 
tested as an independent variable. In this study, it was considered a moderating variable. 
Moreover, previous studies tended to examine tax agent as an independent or dependent 
variable. This study pioneered the indirect tax non-compliance study by using tax agent 
as a moderating variable. By studying seven independent variables (predictor variables) 
and two moderating variables, this study will provide evidence of the determinants of 
importers’ tax non-compliance. Furthermore, the present study focused on a developing 
country to answer to a call that more explorations are needed to bridge the gap between 
developed and developing countries (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Chau & 
Leung, 2009; Fuest & Riedel, 2009).  
  
1.6.2  Practical Contributions 
This study will assist the RMCD by providing information about how to understand 
non-compliance behaviour of importers. This information is needed to determine the 
allocation of the resources in the budget presentation by the Finance Minister so that 
the tax audit could establish efficient measures to enforce laws and develop strategies 
to tackle non-compliance behaviour. Furthermore, the findings will provide input to 
reform the current tax system. Finally, information is needed to identify whether the 
close relationship between customs assessment officers and importers will lead to tax 
non-compliance behaviour. To curb the smuggling offences which are rampant on the 
three main commodities, this study is important as it offers recommendations on how 
to enhance voluntary compliance rather than enforce compliance to improve the federal 





1.7  Scope of the Study 
To meet the research objectives, this study focused on the operational zones used by 
importers that committed non-compliance offences. They are Pasir Gudang Port 
(Johor), West and North Port (Port Kelang), and North and South Port in Butterworth, 
Penang. These five ports are known as the major commercial ports in Malaysia that 
cater all types of cargoes by the sea. However, tax non-compliance occurs all over 
Malaysia by three modes of transportation of goods, i.e., sea, air, and roads. Hence, the 
non-compliance cases as illustrated in Table 1.2 covered three modes of transportation 
in Malaysia. Therefore, all states in Malaysia are more attractive for the purpose of 
retrieving the information and data required for this study. Therefore, respondents were 
drawn from all over Malaysia including Sabah and Sarawak. The data collection started 
from December 2015 to March 2016 involving excise duty offenders for cigarettes, 
liquor and imported vehicles for the year 2014. 
 
1.8  Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis has six chapters. The thesis begins with an overview of the study, followed 
by the background of the study which explains the importance of tax in developed and 
developing countries. Then, the problem statement that illustrates the practical and 
theoretical gaps was introduced. This chapter also includes research questions, research 
objectives, and the significance of the study as well as the scope of the study. An 
overview of tax administration in RMCD is discussed in chapter two. This chapter also 
presents the history of RMCD, types of taxes imposed, and the definition of tax agents 






In chapter three, non-compliance literature is reviewed. Then, the determinants of non-
compliance behaviour of tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, 
tax knowledge, and corruption are explained. The probability of detection and tax agent 
as moderating effects on excise duty non-compliance are discussed next. Deterrence 
theory and Fischer’s model are also elaborated here. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the research framework and hypotheses, which were developed 
from prior studies. This chapter also explains in great detail the research methodology. 
Issues such as the research design, sampling techniques, research instrument, data 
collection procedures, and data analysis are discussed. Chapter five presents and 
discusses the results. Chapter six concludes the research and highlights policy and 



















OVERVIEW OF INDIRECT TAX SYSTEM 
2.1    Introduction 
This chapter discusses the indirect tax system and its administration in Malaysia by 
focusing on excise duty. The background of indirect taxes since the era of Malacca 
Sultanate and during the British occupation in Malaya is discussed in the early part of 
this chapter. Next, the types of taxes imposed by the Royal Malaysian Customs 
Department (RMCD) are highlighted, followed by an in-depth discussion on the 
background of excise duty since the British occupation in Malaya. Finally, the rate of 
excise duty, the formula to derive the amount of tax payable, and offences and penalties 
for non-compliance as stipulated in the Excise Act (1976) are elaborated. The relevance 
of this chapter is to show that importers should make the correct excise duty 
declarations and payments according to rules and regulations to curb the non-
compliance phenomenon.   
 
2.2 The Historical Background of Malaysian Indirect Taxation System 
A taxation system and tax collection exist since the Malay Sultanate of Malacca (1400-
1511) and Johor Riau Empire (17th century). These duties were entrusted to the 
Syahbandar and Bendahari appointed by the Sultan. This system continued during the 
Portuguese and Dutch occupations in Malacca and was updated from time to time 
during the British colonial administration.  It was during the British occupation that the 
Customs and Excise Department was established in 1948 with the formation of Malaya 
Federation in Peninsular Malaysia under the Customs Ordinance (1952). At that time 
the Customs Department was under the jurisdiction of Malaya High Commissioner 





in 1957. The Federation Council had jurisdiction on issues about rules and regulations 
of customs under Section 135 of Customs Ordinance (1952). This Ordinance marked 
the beginning of maintaining the free port status of Peninsular of Malaya excluding 
Penang (“Royal Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). 
 
Since the independence on 31st August 1957, the Customs and Excise Department at 
that time underwent a major reshuffle to accommodate the needs of the Malaya 
Federation. At this time, the Customs Department was led by a Comptroller who 
reported directly to Ministry of Finance. To ensure its efficiency, the Customs and 
Excise Department was divided based on three main trading zones. The northern region 
was based in Penang and covered Perak, Perlis and Kedah. The central zone comprised 
Negeri Sembilan, Kelantan, and Terengganu and was based in Kuala Lumpur. The 
southern zone was stationed in Singapore and consisted of Melaka, Pahang, Johor, and 
the Customs Department. A Customs Senior Assistant Comptroller headed each zone 
(“Royal Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). 
 
On 16th September 1963 with the presence of Sarawak and Sabah into the Malaysia 
Federation a second reshuffle took place. At this time, the Customs and Excise 
Department was headed by a Customs and Excise Regional Comptroller. The 
Department was divided into territories consisting of Peninsular Malaysia (at that time 
known as West Malaysia), Sarawak, and Sabah. However, the Customs Ordinance and 
duty order were imposed independently in this three territories. Such decision affected 
the transit of goods from one state to another. Due to this difficulty, a meeting was held 
among the three Comptrollers from the three territories. The Customs Act No. 62 (1967) 





in Malaysia under this law. In 1972, the Government Gazette legislated was 
implemented on 29th February 1972 known as the Sales Tax Act 1972. The Sales Tax 
exempted the products that fall under the Sales Tax (Exemption) Order 1972 and from 
being licensed under this order. This tax was imposed on all local and imported products 
(“Royal Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). 
 
Another law known as the Service Tax Act was introduced in 1975. The service tax law 
enabled the Customs Department to collect service tax revenue which was collected 
under the Second Schedule of Service Tax Regulations, 1975 especially from the 
businesses that provided services and goods. Since 1st April 2015, the sales and service 
tax was substituted by goods and service tax. In 1976 the Excise Act was imposed to 
levy a tax on locally manufactured goods. Since the British occupation, this tax existed 
in the Straits Settlement consisting of Malacca, Penang, and Singapore (“Royal 
Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). 
 
2.3  Types of Indirect Taxes Imposed in Malaysia  
The obligations to administer indirect taxes in Malaysia lie with the RMCD. There are 
various types of indirect taxes imposed and collected by the RMCD to generate tax 
revenue, which are bound to the Excise Duty Act (1976), Customs Act (1967) and 
Goods and Services Tax Act (2014) (“Royal Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). 
The overview of taxes is explained below. 
 
2.3.1 Import Duty 
Under Section 2 of Customs Act (1967), import is defined as “to bring or cause to be 





into Malaysia by individuals or a commercial entity. In Malaysia, the import duty 
imposed is based on the CIF valuation method (cost, insurance, and freight) (Customs 
Act, 1967), which means that the import duty is levied not solely on goods but based 
on the total shipping value of the goods including the cost of freight and insurance 
during the shipment (Customs Act, 1967). However, some duties are calculated based 
on value and weight. 
 
Imported goods should be landed at a legal landed place and time as prescribed in 
Section 2 of Customs Act, (1967). This importation is effected due to the permission 
granted from a proper customs officer. Exemptions will be given to land the goods on 
other days rather than as declared provided they are granted by the proper customs 
officer. It is the duty of every importer to declare their goods personally or through tax 
agents as prescribed in the customs tax system. The full detail of the declaration with 
the true accounts must be submitted. The details of the declaration consist of the number 
of packages, the description of packages, and the description of goods to be imported, 
weight, measurement or quantity of value and country of origin (Customs Act, 1967). 
 
The declaration of customs goods and duties is based on the classification of goods as 
prescribed under Section 11 of Customs Act (1967). Customs duties levied on imported 
goods are fixed by the Finance Minister in the budget and should be paid by the 
importers. The customs officers are given the power to determine the rate according to 
the tariff classification as prescribed in the Customs Duties Order (1977). The tariff 
classification is based on the code established by the World Customs Organization. The 
tariff classification is to ensure that the RMCD clients make payment on customs 





The system of goods classification imposed in Malaysia is referred to as the 
Harmonized System. The goods classification of the Customs Duties Order (1977) 
stipulates that every item has its classification and should not be classified more than 
one tariff code. The duties will be levied after the classification is effected. Under the 
Customs Duties Order (1977) the guidelines of the classification are highlighted by the 
schedule and appendices.  
 
2.3.2 Export Duty  
Section 2 of the Customs Act (1967) defines export duty as “to take or cause to be taken 
out of Malaysia by land, sea or air or to place any goods in a vessel, conveyance or 
aircraft for the purpose of such goods being taken out of Malaysia by land, sea or air”.  
The valuation of products for export is based on a free-on-board (FOB) basis. The price 
of the products would be determined on the open market sale while the time is based 
on the payment of the duty when goods are released by the customs proper officer at 
various customs export points. This is done after the computation of export duty based 
on the value. The rates imposed varies for different products. The rate for the customs 
export duties is determined by the Customs Duties Order (1977). 
 
2.3.3 Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
In many other countries, the goods and services tax is also known as a value-added tax, 
which is a multi-stage tax levied based on the goods and services consumed. The 
standard rate of GST imposed is 6%. In the supply chain, GST is levied from the 
supplier up to the retail level on the supply of services and goods of each stage. The tax 
paid under GST on the businesses input is not considered a product cost because at each 





is an immaterial number of stages the particular services and goods go via the supply 
chain. The input tax incurred in the earlier level is subtracted by the business people at 
the following step in the supply chain of the goods (Goods and Services Tax Act, 2014). 
 
The GST covers all sectors of the economy in Malaysia as a broad-based consumption 
tax. For instance, services and goods produced locally by a taxable person in the course 
or furtherance of business in Malaysia and also for imported goods are subject to the 
GST payment. The specific goods and services exempted are determined by the Finance 
Minister and the Gazette known as the Goods and Services Tax Act (2014) and 
categorised under zero rated and exempt supply orders. Further, the GST is levied if the 
businesses is registered under the Goods and Services Tax Act (2014) only. The liability 
of the registered person is based on the annual turnover of taxable supplies that reaches 
the threshold of RM500, 000.00 (Goods and Services Tax Act, 2014). 
 
The registered person is the business person who produces taxable supplies of services 
and goods and is the only person allowed to collect and charge GST. The charge 
imposed is based on the value or selling price of the products. In the process of 
producing the products, whatever amount subjected to input (input tax) will be 
subtracted from the amount of the GST imposed (output tax) solely to those registered 
for the GST. In the circumstances where the total amount of the output tax is greater 
than the input tax in the appropriate GST taxable period, the differences incurred should 
be paid to the RMCD. However, if the input tax incurred is greater than the output tax 






2.3.4 Excise Duty 
Excise duty is a tax imposed on imported and locally manufactured products. The 
Excise Act (1976) is a related law gazette for excise duty. The goods subject to excise 
duty comprise liquor, cigarettes, tobacco, tobacco products, motor vehicles, playing 
cards, and mahjong tiles. This kind of tax formally originated from the Straits 
Settlements in the 1890s during the British occupation of Malacca, Penang, and 
Singapore. At that time, there were two important justifications for the excise duty to 
be imposed. The first was to collect revenue of intoxicating liquors which were 
manufactured and sold. Secondly, the urge of British administrators to have jurisdiction 
on distilling and brewing intoxicating liquor involving all types (“Royal Malaysian 
Customs Department”, n.d.). 
 
In 1932, the Enactment of Excise duty was legislated and implemented until 1961 when 
the Excise Act was enforced and implemented all over Malaya. The 1961 Excise Duty 
Act was sustained in Peninsular Malaysia until Malaysia was formed in 1963, but with 
the accordance of the excise laws of West Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak, but the Excise 
Act (1976) was enforced as a substitute to all existing legislations in 1976. The excise 
duty stipulated in the Excise Duties Order (2012) was imposed on certain locally 
manufactured and imported goods. There are two types of excise duties imposed in 
Malaysia: excise duty (domestic) levied on goods manufactured and sold in Malaysia 
and excise duty (import) payable to goods imported into Malaysia (Excise Act, 1976). 
 
The Finance Minister has jurisdiction from time to time, by order printed in the Gazette, 
in fixing excise duties to be imposed and payable on any imported goods or locally 





according to such duties which shall be levied and paid to the RMCD. The goods are 
subjected to excise duty on imported and locally manufactured goods. Imported goods 
such as motorcars/other motor vehicles, tobacco/cigarettes, intoxicating liquors, 
mahjong tiles, and playing cards are subjected to excise duty. The laws and regulations 
on excise duty in Malaysia consists of Excise Act (1967), Excise Duty Order (2012), 
Excise Regulations (1977), Excise Duties (Exemption) Order (2013), and Excise Duties 
(Motor Vehicles) (Payment) Order (2012). 
 
2.3.4.1 Licensing (Excise Regulations 1977) 
In Malaysia, the excise licensing system was emulated from the British system and was 
implemented since the British occupation in Malaya. Excise duties were imposed on 
the manufacturers to ensure the amount of excise duties collected were correct. This 
applies to the manufactured goods based on specific duty rates imposed.  Manufacturing 
is defined in Section 2 Excise Duty Act (1976) as follows: 
(a) For the intoxicating liquors, “distilling, brewing, fermenting, bottling of 
intoxicating liquor, including the addition of any substance (other than water) to 
any intoxicating liquor and the blending, compounding and varying of 
intoxicating liquors with intent that the compound so formed shall be sold for 
human consumptions, but does not include any such compound prepared at the 
order of the purchaser and for his immediate consumption”. 
(b) For tobacco, any method that involves modifying raw or tobacco leaf into tobacco 
for the purpose of smoking, chewing and snuffing which includes producing 
cigarettes from the manufactured tobacco; 






(d) For other cases, involves converting organic or non-organic materials by 
manually or using mechanical means to produce new products by altering the 
composition, shape, size and the originality or quality of materials as well as 
fixing of parts into piece of machinery or other commodity or other commodities 
but excluding fixing of equipment or machinery for the construction purposes.   
 
The excise license granted to the manufacturers is solely the discretion of the Director 
General of Customs. The issuance of a license is subject to the manufacturers’ 
compliance with the requirements of the rules and regulations relating to the 
construction and plan of the factory site. 
 
2.3.4.2 Application of Excise License  
The application for excise license is done by the owner, partners, or director of the 
company and forwarded to the State Director of Customs where the factory is located. 
The application must be supported by the following information (Excise Act, 1976). 
(i) The exact locality and address where it is intended to build the factory premises. 
(ii) Company’s capital and number of workers. 
(iii) Main raw materials used. 
(iv) The formula of raw materials mixture in producing end products. 
(v) Three copies of Business Registration Certificate or copies of Memorandum and 
Articles. 
(vi) Plan and drawing certified by the applicant and the gazette architect showing the 
site, layout of premises, the inner locality, layout of the factory and layout of 






2.3.4.3 License Fee 
The prescribed annual fee for a license to manufacture dutiable items is stated in the 
Third Schedule, fees for licenses (Regulation 50) of Excise Duties (Amendment) 
(Payment) Regulations (2014), and Excise Act (1976). The list of fees imposed is 
illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  
The License Fee under Excise Act (1976) 
The Excise Act 1976 Sections which the 
license is issued 
Fee 
Section 20: 
(a)   For cigarettes manufacturing  
(b)   For tobacco manufacturing  
        (apart from cigarettes) 
        not exceeding 45 kg per month 
        exceeding 45 kg per month 
(c)   For manufacturing other dutiable goods 
       (Example : passenger motor vehicle,  
mahjong tiles and playing cards) 
 
RM4,800.00 for a year 
 
RM10.00 for a year 
RM720.00 for a year 
RM4,800.00 for a year 
RM4,800.00 for a year 
Section 25: 
(a)   Warehouse Licenses 
 
RM2,400.00 for a year 
Source: Excise Act 1976 
 
The fees imposed on the manufacturer of excise dutiable goods are on a yearly basis as 
shown in Table 2.1. The licenses issued under Section 20 of Excise Act (1976) might 
be suspended, relocated or withdrawn by the Director-General at any time. If the 
licenses are suspended, the fees paid are not refundable. 
 
2.3.4.4 Rates of Excise Duty 
Tax rates play an important role in ensuring the amount is paid by the taxpayers to the 
tax authority. The amount paid will generate tax revenue for the government, which 





(“Royal Malaysian Customs Department”, n.d.). The tax rates on excisable goods such 
as motorcars, four- wheel drive vehicles, vans, multi-purpose vehicles, cigarettes, and 
liquor are illustrated in Tables 2.2 to 2.8. 
 
Table 2.2  
Tax Rates for Motor Cars (Includes Racing Cars and Sports Cars) 
Engine 
Capacity (cc) 
Import Duty Excise 
Duty 
Goods and 
Services Tax  
 CBU CKD CBU & CKD 
Not Exceeding 1,800 cc 30% 10% 75% 6% 
 1,800 - 1,999 cc 30% 10% 80% 6% 
 2,000 - 2,499 cc 30% 10% 90% 6% 
 Above 2,500 cc 30% 10% 105% 6% 
Source: Excise Duty Order 2012 
 
Table 2.3  
Tax Rates for Four Wheel Drive Vehicles 
Engine 
Capacity (cc) 
Import Duty Excise 
Duty 
Goods and 
Services Tax  
CBU CKD CBU & CKD 
Not Exceeding 1,800 cc 30% 10% 65% 6% 
 1,800 - 1,999 cc 30% 10% 75% 6% 
 2,000 - 2,499 cc 30% 10% 90% 6% 
 Above 2,500 cc 30% 10% 105% 6% 
Source: Excise Duty Order 2012 
 
Table 2.4  
Tax Rates for Others (VAN and Multi-Purpose Vehicle (MPV) 
Engine 
Capacity (cc) 
Import Duty Excise 
Duty 
Goods and 
Services Tax  
CBU CKD CBU & CKD 
Not Exceeding 1,500 cc 30% Nil 60% 6% 
 1,500 - 1,799  30% 10% 65% 6% 
 1,800 - 1,999 30% 10% 75% 6% 
 2,000 - 2,499 30% 10% 90% 6% 
 Above 2,500 cc 30% 10% 105% 6% 






The excise duties are imposed on vehicles based on completely built-up (CBU) and 
completely knock down (CKD). These terms are normally practised in countries like 
Malaysia, China, India, and Thailand. These countries impose excise duty on imported 
vehicles. The terms CBU and CKD are used to describe the form used to import vehicles 
into the country (Excise Duty Order, 2012). 
 
A CBU-imported vehicle means a vehicle imported into the country as a completely 
built-up vehicle from the origin country. This vehicle is considered an end product and 
can be driven when it lands on the shores. If the imported vehicles are quoted as CBU, 
it indicates that the vehicle is 100% built from the origin country (Excise Duty Order, 
2012). For instance, an imported CBU Honda Civic into Malaysia might be from 
another plant such as Indonesia and Thailand or fixed in Japan (the original country of 
Honda). However, usually, the importation takes place from the neighbouring country. 
For example, a large number of imported Hondas in Malaysia are from the 
neighbouring country like Thailand due to their nearest geographical location. The 
status of the car produced relies on the quality control of the plant from the original 
country (Excise Duty Order, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, a CKD motor vehicle is assembled locally by using most of the 
technology, main parts, and components which are from its original country (Excise 
Duty Order, 2012). The high tax rates on CBU vehicles imposed excessively by the 
government is to inspire foreign motorcar manufacturers to produce their vehicles and 
build factories in Malaysia, hence boosting the country’s economy and increasing the 
employment rates. The major differences between CBU and CKD are based on the 





Order, 2012). The tax rates imposed on vehicles are as illustrated in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 
2.4. 
 
An optimal cigarettes tax determination is necessary for the government to ensure the 
price of cigarettes after tax is high enough to reduce the consumption and leads a 
healthier life while generating tax revenue for the federal government (Nora, Abdullah, 
Rampal, & Mohd Noor, 2013). This kind of tax imposed is known as a sin tax. The 
excise duties on cigarettes are imposed on the cigarettes manufacturer or cigarettes 
importers. The taxes imposed on excise duty are based on the total number of sticks as 
shown in Table 2.5 (Excise Duty Order, 2012). The details of cigarettes calculation will 
be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
The higher alcoholic beverages prices and taxes result in lower consumption 
(Chaloupka, Grossman, & Saffer, 2002). Hence, the Malaysian government imposes 
higher tax rates as shown in Table 2.5 to reduce the consumption of alcoholic beverages 
among Malaysians. The excise duty is imposed based on the quantity of the liquor 
purchased contrary to the goods and services tax. These tax depend on the price of 
purchased liquor (Chaloupka et al., 2002). Table 2.5 shows the tax rates for cigarettes 
and liquor. 
 
Table 2.5  





































Source: Excise Duty Order 2012 
 
2.3.4.5 Formula for Calculating Excise Duty (Import) 
Excise duty is one of the main contributors to the indirect taxes components in Malaysia 
as shown in Table 1.1. The excise duties are imposed on locally manufactured products 
and imported goods as stated by Section 6 of Excise Act (1976). The computation of 
excise duty is based on the specific rates or ad-volerm of the value or quantity of the 
products or goods (Excise Duty Order, 2012). The high excise duty levied on cigarettes, 
tobacco, and alcohol is to reduce the consumption of unhealthy products (Hoe, 2010). 
The formula for calculating the excise duty on cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles 
are as follows:  
 
Example 1 Calculation for Cigarette “John Black” Brand. 
The price includes the cost of insurance and freight. One carton/slop contains 10 
packets while each packet has 20 sticks of cigarettes.  
The value of cigarettes sticks = 10 packets x 20 sticks= 200 sticks. Each stick cost 










Table 2.6  









= RM0.28 per stick + value + Import Duty and 20% 
(a) = RM0.28 x 200 sticks 
(b) = (RM160.00 + RM40.00) x 20% 
 
RM56.00 
RM40.00   
Total Value =RM96.00 
GST 
Rate 
= (Value + Import Duty + Excise Duty) x 6% 
= (RM160.00 +RM40.00 + RM96.00) x 6% 
 
RM= RM17.76 
Total duty to be paid = RM40.00 +RM96.00+RM17.76 = RM153.76 
Source: Excise Duty Order 2012 
 
According to Table 2.6, the import duty is RM0.20 per stick, excise duty imposed 
RM0.28 per stick and 20% while the GST rate is 6%. The total payable duty depends 
on the number of sticks imported and the rate of customs duties at that time. For the 
above calculation, one carton of John Black contains 200 sticks. The value of tax 
imposed on import duty, excise duty, and GST is stipulated by the Excise Duty Order 
(2012) as shown in Table 2.5. The total duty payable for this importation will be 
RM153.76. 
 
Example 2 Calculation for Liquor Chivas Regal 
One bottle of Chivas Regal contains 4.5 litres, and the value of one bottle including the 
















= [Quantity x % Volume (alcohol content)] x RM58.00 
                  100 
=      4.5 x 40     RM58.00 








= (Quantity x % Volume) x RM30 
                   100 
=     4.5 x 40     RM30.00 
           100 
= (Value + Import Duty) x 15% 











(Value + Import Duty + Excise Duty) x 6% 
= (305.00 + 104.40 + 115.41) x 6% 
 
RM31.49 
Total duty to be paid = RM104.40 + RM115.41 + RM31.49 = RM251.30 
Source: Excise Duty Order 2012 
 
Table 2.7 shows the total tax payable for liquor. The taxes imposed on the excise duty 
are based on the content of the alcohol whereas the tax rates imposed are based on the 
Excise Duty Order (2012). Based on Table 2.5, the Chivas Regal brand is categorised 
under brandy or whiskies which carry RM58.00 import duty, excise duty is RM30.00 
and 15% while the GST is 6%. The volume of the alcohol content of this brand is 40, 
and the amount of duty payable is as shown in Table 2.7. 
 
Example 3 Calculation for New Bayerische Moteren Werke (BMW) Imported Vehicle  
The price of a new BMW imported car (completely built-up) with cost, insurance, and 









Table 2.8  







(CIF in RM) 
BMW 4395 750Li Limousine RHD (YE82) 
Import Duty: 
= CIF value x 30% 
= 257,570 x 30% 
Excise Duty: 
= CIF value + Import Duty x Excise Duty 
= 257,570 + 77,271 x 105% 
GST: 
= CIF value + Import Duty + Excise Duty x GST 
= 257,570 + 77,271 + 351,583.05 x 6% 
Total tax payable: 
= (a) + (b) + (c) 
Total duty to be paid 
= 77,271.00 + 351,583.05 +  41,185.44 
 257,570.00 
 












Source: Customs (Values of Imported Completely Built-up Motor Vehicles) (New) 
(Amendment) (No.2) Order 2013 
 
Table 2.8 indicates the excise duty payable for a BMW car. The reference is made to 
the rates provided by the Excise Duty Order (2012) while the value of the CBU car is 
stipulated in the Customs (Values of Imported Completely Built-up Motor Vehicles) 
(New) (Amendment) (No.2) Order (2013). According to the two references, the excise 
duty payable is RM470,039.49. 
 
2.3.4.6 Removal of Excisable Goods (Section 28 Excise Act 1976) 
No dutiable goods shall be relocated from any premises which are licensed except:  
(a)   Upon payment of excise duty. 
(b) Under bond for locating to the other licensed warehouse. 
(c)  For export or consumption in a place outside Malaysia, such as free trade zones 





A relevant form for the removal of excisable goods from a licensed premise must be 
applied to the nearest customs office with the excise duty duly paid. The release of the 
vehicles from a licensed assembly plant is allowed after the payment of duty is made 
by using the relevant customs forms. The vehicles released from the assembly plants 
must be stored in a showroom approved by the State Director. Passenger vehicles are 
to be registered not later than four years after the release from assembly plants. The 
duties are paid by the owner (Excise Act, 1976). 
 
2.3.4.7 Refund and Remission (Section 11A, 13 and 14 of Excise Act 1976) 
The excise duty and other charges overpaid are refundable. A refund is allowed if it is 
made within a year after the tax payment made. The refund of taxes and charges may 
occur due to incorrect calculation of duties, incorrect classification of goods that caused 
higher tax rates imposed, the incorrect addition of figures, and over a collection of 
specified rates. Furthermore, the Director General of Customs has power in remitting 
the whole or part of excise duty. This can be done due to damage of any taxable goods, 
destroyed by inevasible accident, or the goods are lost before removal from excise 
control (Excise Act, 1976). 
 
2.3.4.8 Offences and Penalties      
Any excise duty licensee who ignores his liabilities stipulated in the Excise Act (1976) 
commits an offence and is liable to the penalty imposed. The relevant sections are as 
outlined below. 
(a)   Section 71 of Excise Act (1976) provides that, whoever, 
(i) Prepares in writing or oral, or signs in any of the statement, other document 





(ii) Prepares in writing or oral, or signs any document or statement, prepared 
for judgement of any officer of the excise on any application presented to 
him, which is falsified; 
(iii) Forges or falsifies, or uses when counterfeited or falsified, any document 
which is needed under Excise Act (1976); or 
(iv) Fraudulently modifies any document or imitates the signature, initials and 
seal, or other marks of any customs officer of Excise Act (1976) done for 
the confirmation of any such document or for secured the goods or for any 
other intention in the business transactions pertaining to Excise Act (1976); 
If convicted, is subject to imprisonment for a period, not more than 12 months or 
to a fine not more than RM5,000 or both fine and imprisonment. 
 
(b) Section 71 of Excise Act (1976) provides that, whoever: 
(i) Acts contrarily against the Excise Act (1976) provisions, accepting or 
possessing, control or have custody of any excise dutiable goods by law but 
not have any evidence to prove that the duty have been paid or which have 
been illegally manufactured, fermented or distilled, otherwise; or 
(ii) Collaborate otherwise involved with illegal activities in removing or 
withdrawing of any excise dutiable goods from any brewery, distillery, or 
other manufacturing places of excise dutiable goods or from any licensed 
warehouse or security place which excise dutiable goods may have 
transferred; or 
(iii) With the knowledge, harbouring, hide or possessing, or allows harbouring, 





(iv) With the knowledge and intention of excise dutiable goods and purposely 
have the intention to defraud the Government of excise duty or have the 
intention to evade of any Excise Act (1976) provision; or  
(v) With the knowledge involved in fraudulent activities to evade any excise 
duty; or  
(vi) With the knowledge involved in manufacturing excise dutiable goods, or 
tobacco, which contradicts the provision of Section 20; or 
(vii) Unless with authority by law, alters, breaks, opens, or in any way get 
involved with any mark, seal, lock or other fastening placed by a proper 
customs officer; or 
 
(c) Purposely involved in matters related to the instrument, aircraft, vessel and 
vehicles or other methods concerning excise duty, if found guilty of offence will 
be liable to: 
(i) A fine not less than ten times if convicted at the first time of the amount of 
excise duty involved or RM10,000 whichever is lower on the first 
conviction, to be fined not less than 20 times of the excise duty or the 
amount involved is RM10,000, either both or whichever is higher. If 
uncertain with the amount of duty and no duty involves can caused penalty 
imposed not more than RM10,000; and  
(ii) The fine not lower than twenty times of the excise duty involved or 10,000 
or whichever is lower will be imposed for the second time and following 
convictions or the amount of duty involved is RM20,000 or higher than 
forty times of the amount, or whichever is higher may cause the jail term 





While, if the prosecution carried out related to excise dutiable goods, the 
defendant would be deemed to have knowledge on the offences committed unless 
proved otherwise by the defendant. 
 
(d) Section 75 of Excise Act (1976) stated that individual with knowledge 1) on 
possession of dutiable goods but not pay taxes; 2)keeping apparatus or utensils 
meant for fermenting; 3)distilling machines used for the manufacturing tobacco 
considered as committed an offence under Excise act. They are liable for 
imprisonment not more than 3 years  or imprisonment upon conviction of fined 
RM2,000 but not exceeding RM10,000 or both based on the merit of the case.  
 
2.4 The Role of Tax Agent 
The role played by tax agents is different from that of accounting professionals (Hamid, 
2014). For example, auditors are expected to be independent while tax agents perform 
as advocates for their clients (Tan & Sawyer, 2003) while concurrently staying 
objective in their professional behaviour. Tax agents also perform an intermediary role 
in the tax system between the RMCD and importers (Excise Act, 1976). 
 
Prior literature in tax compliance indicates that taxpayers rely on tax agents because of 
the latter’s expertise to deal with tax matters (Hamid, 2014). Further, Doyle, Hughes, 
and Glaister (2009) maintained that tax agents determine the amount payable by their 
clients. Marshall, Armstrong, and Smith (1998) proposed that tax agents also represent 







The code of ethics for tax agents is stated in Section 90 of Customs Act (1967). To 
become a tax agent, three requirements are to be met as follows: 
(a) Attend the courses as specified by the Director-General on matters related to 
customs and pass the examination. 
(b) A written approval should be produced from the person that the tax agents are 
representing in customs declaration. 
(c) An assurance is given to be faithful and avoid corrupt conduct of tax agents and 
his clerks acting for him to the senior officer of customs.  
 
Further, any application for permission to act as an agent for business transactions is 
related to import and export matters. This kind of transactions should be permitted and 
considered by a senior officer of customs subject to the terms and conditions. Under 
Section 90(4) of Customs Act (1967), if the agent commits any breach of this act and 
regulations, his/her license will be suspended and cancelled. 
 
2.5 Summary  
This chapter presented an overview of the indirect tax system in Malaysia. Indirect 
taxes are imposed and collected by the RMCD while personal tax by the Inland 
Revenue Board of Malaysia. Indirect taxes are currently administered under the 
provisions of the Customs Act 1967, Excise Act 1976, and Goods and Services Tax Act 
2014. However, taxpayers are found to evade the payment of indirect tax particularly 
excise duty, which is a constant problem for the RMCD, resulting in a significant loss 












This chapter reviews the literature related to tax non-compliance by highlighting 
relevant issues of tax avoidance and tax evasion. It also discusses deterrence theory and 
the Fischer’s model used in this study, relevant theories of Fischer’s model, and the 
expanded model of Fischer’s model. Next, a discussion on the independent, dependent, 
and moderating variables of tax non-compliance and the relevant theories is offered. 
The final part of this chapter deals with a summary of prior literature. 
 
3.2  The Definition and Concept of Tax Non-compliance 
Tax authorities play a fundamental role in ensuring tax compliance among taxpayers. 
However, despite the regulations and laws, some taxpayers are still non-compliant. 
James and Alley (2002) described tax non-compliance as a failure of taxpayers to 
accommodate tax responsibilities whether the failure is done intentionally or 
unintentionally. This statement contradicts Kirchler (2007), who argued that when the 
level of compliance diverges, tax non-compliance may not break the law. 
 
Studies on tax non-compliance in indirect taxes are still scarce. In the customs context, 
smuggling activities are one of the important determinants of non-compliance. 
Smuggling is defined as a conduct that violates the law by importing and exporting 
products secretly without paying customs taxes (Alano, 1984). Illegal importation of 
goods from one territory to another  is also a form of smuggling (Deflem & Henry-
Turner, 2001). Merriman, Yurekli, and De Beyer (2003) defined smuggling as excise 





offence because it is committed with the purpose of evading taxes, hence reducing 
government income (Buehn & Farzanegan, 2012). In addition to a loss of government 
income, smuggling also results in productivity damage and fairness. However, due to 
the complexity in discovering or concluding such conduct Fox et al. (2014), Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010) and Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) called for more studies to be 
carried out.  
 
Current researchers usually focus on firms’ income tax even though evasion and 
avoidance involves many different types of taxes. Smuggling activities consist of three 
types which are incorrectly declaring the amount, for instance declaring less quantity 
and price, incorrectly declaring the descriptions of goods, and stating at lesser than 
legally practiced (Cooper & Bhagwati, 1974). The popular smuggling methods and 
customs frauds involve fake invoicing, complicated transactions attempts (using two 
invoices, the false invoices are used for declaration and the genuine invoices are used 
for record purposes (double invoicing), tariff code miss-classification, and over-stated 
and under-stated valuation and shipments (Thanasegaran & Shanmugam, 2007). In 
Malaysia, indirect taxes are avoided by falsifying the declaration, smuggling, or 
customs fraud (Miskam et al., 2013). 
 
Smuggling has negative economic consequences. Dominguez (1975) stated that 
smuggling reflects the failure of government revenue collections and modifies the 
internal system of society by producing influential illegal organizations and modifies 
the consumption trend. Moreover, it also has negative impacts on the distribution of 
income. It is claimed that the supply and demand of primary forces leads to smuggling. 





via trade limitations involving excise duties and customs duties, leading to black market 
actions. Hence, smuggling is an action utilized to generate revenue from transporting 
goods via state border by breaching the current practicing rules. Income is earned by 
smuggling activities via evading the state restrictions, related costs, and regulations. 
Such activity is a criminal nature because it involves corruptions and bribery  
(Farzanegan, 2007).  
 
According to Kinsey (1988b), from the tax legislation perspective, tax non-compliance 
is illustrated as taxpayers’ failure to perform tax responsibilities intentionally or 
unintentionally. Non-compliance occurs due to taxpayers’ negligence, for instance by 
overlooking in paying tax, individual mistakes in tax calculation, and inadequate 
information and tax knowledge. However, tax administrators all over the world strive 
to motivate voluntary compliance of taxpayers even though it is a challenging task. 
Hence, many studies have been conducted to investigate the determinants of tax 
avoidance and non-compliance. Prior research identified that the main factor of non-
compliance was perception (McKerchar, 1995; Smith & Kinsey, 1987; Vogel, 1974). 
Taxpayers’ confidence relies on their perception of fairness in the tax system. 
Taxpayers’ will lose confidence if they have negative perception of fairness in the tax 
system especially on tax rate and penalty impose which will lead towards tax avoidance 
and non-compliance. 
 
Many studies on tax compliance used three theoretical perspectives in explaining the 
phenomenon. They are economic deterrence models, general deterrence theory, and 
fiscal psychology. These theories propose that tax non-compliance can be prevented by 





(Cowell, 1990). While intentional non-compliance occurs when taxpayers purposely 
sabotage the tax rules and regulations for their personal interest, unintentional non-
compliance is the result of taxpayers’ act of unawareness, failure to declare, or 
miscalculation in practicing tax laws. Taxpayers’ non-compliance behaviour that 
causes the underreporting and non-declaration result in underpayment or non-payment 
of taxes known as tax evasion (Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2012a). 
 
Tax non-compliance is treated as a contrary conduct or attitude of tax compliance. Tax 
non-compliance examples are tax evasion and tax avoidance which has negative 
impacts on tax compliance and tax collections. Tax evasion as defined by James and 
Alley (2002) is the attempt to reduce tax liability by illegal means whereas tax 
avoidance is reducing taxation by legal means. Kasipillai, Aripin, and Amran (2003) 
maintained that tax evasion reduces the taxes owed in reality. On the other hand, they 
described tax avoidance as taxpayers declaring their tax affairs creatively according to 
the rules and regulations (any tax law not breached) to lower the tax liabilities, and this 
action is legal in the tax administrator’s point of view. 
 
Tax evasion has existed for a long time. Tax evasion is a constant threat to governments 
and tax authorities. Due to the negative consequences, it has been examined by social 
scientists in different fields such as sociology, political science, accounting, 
psychology, and policy planning (Webley, 1991). Tax evasion is commonly defined as 
techniques used to break the prerequisite of tax code by minimizing tax liabilities. 
Hence, it as an offence if caught and will result in criminal proceeding imposed on the 
taxpayers. Legally speaking, there is a difference between tax evasion and tax 





be defined as using loopholes to reduce the tax liability which involves every attempt 
of legal means (Ronan, 2010). The legal tax avoidance policies in many countries 
involve completely organizing monetary matters to reduce taxes. However, these 
policies furnished with possibilities for tax evasion. However, from the economic 
perspective and the impacts on collections, tax evasion and avoidance are the same 
(Ronan, 2010). Many taxpayers engage the services of tax consultants to avoid tax 
payments where the tax consultants will utilize the ambiguous circumstances to practice 
tax evasion (Ronan, 2010). Therefore, it can be summarized that the tax experts’ 
advices are associated with tax evasion practice. Any policies imposed for tax evasion 
without suggesting a remedial measure to tax experts who motivate evasion do not 
significantly expand the tax base (Ronan, 2010). Any taxable individual who avoids 
paying his/her tax obligations intentionally commits tax evasion; therefore he/she is 
liable to criminal punishments (Engel & Hines, 1999).  
 
Any violations of tax rules and regulations are considered tax non-compliance which 
includes tax evasion and tax avoidance. In this study, tax evasion is related to smuggling 
activities involving the use of false invoice for declaration, of tariff code, and over-
stated and under- stated valuation and shipments of goods. On the other hand, tax 
avoidance is described as using the loopholes in the Excise Act (1976) to lower or 
completely not paying excise duties.  
 
3.3  Deterrence Theory 
A tax compliance model was pioneered by Becker (1968) developed from deterrence 
theory using the economic crime approach. The deterrence effect of tax rate, penalty 





which drives compliance behaviour. The potential costs and benefits usually are 
weighed in monetary terms. This theory assumes that taxpayers choose to evade tax 
whenever the expected gain exceeds the cost needed for legitimate tax declarations. 
This theory also assumes that taxpayers decision to comply with is made in an 
environment of uncertainty based on the fear of being caught and punished. Hence, this 
theory introduces sanctions and threat of punishment to maximise public and private 
policies in curbing unwanted illegal behaviour and motivating tax compliance.  
 
3.4  Fischer’s Model     
The early attempts to link various tax compliance determinants into one comprehensive 
tax compliance model were made by Fischer et al.  (1992). Their model was developed 
based on Jackson and Milliron’s (1986) work that identified 14 key variables practically 
used by most researchers. Fischer further divided these factors into four groups to create 
an expanded model of tax compliance known as the Fischer model. As illustrated in 
Figure 3.1, Fischer divided the economic and non-economic determinants into four 
groups namely (a) demographic (age and gender), (b) non-compliance opportunity 
(education, income level, income source, and occupation), (c) attitude and perception 
(ethics, perceived fairness of the tax system, and peer influence), and (d) tax system 
structure (complexity of the tax system, penalty, probability of detection, and tax rates). 
In essence, this model is a comprehensive model incorporates economic, sociological 







3.5 Theories and Models that Support Fischer’s Model 
The Fischer’s model consolidates economic and non-economic variables to provide a 
better explanation of compliance behaviour (Fischer et al., 1992). The model has 
received empirical support in many studies (Andreoni et al., 1998; Chau & Leung, 
2009; Houston & Tran, 2001; Richardson, 2006a; Ritsema, Thomas & Ferrier, 2003). 
The potential total effects between the variables are also explained in the model (Chan, 
Troutman & O’Bryan, 2000). In previous tax compliance studies, the possible reason 
for inconsistent findings is the failure to identify the total consequences between 
important tax compliance determinants. The Fischer model is established based on tax 
compliance theoretical model consisting of financial self-interest model and the social 
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3.5.1 Financial Self-Interest Model 
The financial self-interest model was developed by Becker (1968) from the economics 
of crime approach (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). This model was derived from 
deterrence theory, expected utility theory, and economic theory. The perceived 
taxpayer’s ultimate goal is to increase the utility of evasion such as in gambling. 
Taxpayers will make an effort to increase their anticipation by evaluating the profit they 
will gain if they succeeded from evasion and the risk of strict penalties and being caught 
(Fischer et al., 1992).  
 
Empirical evidence supported the proposition that taxpayers’ compliance behaviour 
was determined by the penalty structure, detection probability ,and tax rates (Dubin & 
Wilde, 1988; Witte & Woodbury, 1985). However, Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992c) 
criticized the model by arguing that the overall compliance will be lower than what 
have been observed if the model proposes only those determinants, indicating the 
variables are insufficient to assess tax compliance behaviour precisely. Alm (1991) and 
Cowell (1990) further argued that the association between the determinants and tax 
compliance is not straight forward. Further, in the financial self-interest model the 
sociological and psychological variables are not included. In order to create a tax 
compliance model correctly additional variables are required (Fischer et al., 1992). The 






3.5.2 Social Psychological Model 
Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers (1987) established a model with psychological and social 
factors. The social factors of taxpayers are further split into situational instigation and 
situational constraints. The situational instigation comprises social norms and financial 
strains while the impact of non-compliance opportunities, social and legal controls are 
forms of situational constraint. The psychological conditions are grouped into personal 
instigation and personal constraints. Personal instigation is illustrated by personal 
strains and personal orientation while personal constraints are perceived opportunity to 
evade, perceived risk of punishment, and intolerance of tax evasion. One limitation of 
this model is that it neglects the importance of economic variables. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
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The Financial Self-interest Model of Tax Compliance. Adapted from “Perceived 
Detection Probability and Taxpayer Compliance: A Conceptual and Empirical 








3.6  Fischer’s Expanded Models 
Some researchers used the Fischer model as a base by adding one or more variables to 
the original model constructed to match the research objectives. The expanded models 
are as follows. 
 
3.6.1 Mustafa’s Model 
Mustafa (1997) measured complexity, tax law fairness, taxpayer’s perception of the 
assessment system, and the tax administration system in Malaysia. In his study, the 
Fischer model was expanded by adding new variables such as the understanding of tax 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
1. Situational Instigation 
 Financial strains 
 Social norms 
2. Situational constraints 
 Non-compliance opportunity 
 Legal control 
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system and knowledge. Mustafa showed that the understanding of the tax system and 
knowledge motivated taxpayers’ compliance level. A single statement item was used 
to measure the understanding of taxpayers and tax knowledge. The Mustafa model is 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
 
3.6.2 Tayib’s Model 
Tayib (1998) examined the factors influencing the assessment of tax collection in 
Malaysia. The Fischer model was adapted by adding financial information disclosure 
and the quality of service provided by the local government. Tax collection 
performance was the dependent variable, which was proposed to be influenced directly 
by tax compliance behaviour. Tayib, however, did not measure the quality of public 
















Mustafa’s Knowledge Based Model of Tax Compliance. Adapted from “An 
Evaluation of Malaysian Tax Administrative System and Taxpayers Perception 
Towards Assessment System, Tax Law Fairness and Tax Law Complexity” by 







3.6.3 Manaf’s Model 
Manaf  (2004) investigated land tax administration and compliance attitude in 
Malaysia. Manaf (2004) too used Fischer model with modification from Mustafa 
(1997). Type of land and incentives were added as the new variables in the model. She 
also included race as a demographic construct to analyse the effect of taxpayer’s 







Service Quality Attitude & 
perception 








Tayib’s Local Tax Based Model of Compliance Behaviour. Adapted from “The 
Determinants of Assessment Tax Collection: The Malaysian Local Authority 








3.6.4 Chau and Leung’s Model 
Chau and Leung (2009) analysed tax compliance behaviour. They also modified the 
Fischer model by introducing culture as a new variable. They asserted that culture is an 
environmental determinant of tax compliance behaviour. Chan and Leung’s model is 




















Manaf’s Land Based Tax Compliance Model. Adapted from “Land Tax 
Administration and Compliance Attitude in Malaysia” by Manaf, 2004, 







3.7  Tax Rate and Tax Non-compliance 
Tax rate is defined as an effect of the dollar paid for the import/export based on the 
customs’ classification that adheres to the harmonized system-nomenclature, which 
determines tax compliance behaviour (Weerth, 2008). This subsection explains how tax 
rates determine taxpayers’ compliance decision with tax law. Clotfelter (1983) stated 
that “reducing tax rates is not the only policy that has potential to discourage tax 
evasion” (pp.369). Although the real impact is still debatable and vague, tax rates are 
an important factor in determining compliance decision (Kirchler, 2007). Previous 
studies showed mixed results of the association between tax rates and tax non-
compliance. Deterrence theory proposes that marginal tax rates influence taxpayer’s 
compliance behaviour.  
 
However, only a few studies have examined the relationship between tax rate and tax 
non-compliance in an indirect tax environment. From the customs perspective, Fisman 
and Wei (2004) found that the higher the tax rates of the products the greater the revenue 














Chau and Leung’s Culture Based Model of Tax Compliance. Adapted from “A 
Critical Review of Fischer’s Tax Compliance Model: A Research Synthesis” by 






that one percent of an increase in a product tax rate caused an increase in tax evasion 
by three percent, motivating taxpayers to report higher taxed products as being lower 
taxed and under declaring the unit values of import. In India, Mishra et al. (2008) 
examined the effectiveness of tariff policies on customs duties evasion in 1990s tax 
reform. They found a positive association between customs tariffs, import tax evasion 
and the quality of customs institutions or customs enforcement. Kubo and Lwin (2010) 
investigated smuggling offences related to import duties in Myanmar. They 
demonstrated that increasing import duties caused wider variations in the tax rates 
across the trading partners in product classification, which became an attractive avenue 
for smugglers. That is, they found a positive relationship between import duty and 
smuggling; the higher the import rate, the higher will be the smuggling offences.  Bouet 
and Roy (2012) showed a significant and positive relationship between tariff rates and 
evasion in their comparative study between Nigeria, Kenya, and Mauritius. 
 
In Malaysia, few empirical studies analysed the relationship between tax rate and tax 
non-compliance in indirect taxes such as excise duty. Mohd Yusof et al. (2014) studied 
375 audited cases of small and medium sized corporations (SMCs) by using economic 
deterrence theory. They found a positive result; the higher marginal tax rates 
experienced the greater the level of tax non-compliance behaviour. Meanwhile, Md-
Yassin, Hasseldine, Paton, Datt,Tran-Nam, and Bain (2010) examined 1,075 
corporations audited and investigated by the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia and 
showed that tax rates had a significant and positive association with non-compliance 
behaviour. In Pakistan, Awan and Hannan (2014) examined the causes for tax evasion 
from the taxpayers’ and tax collectors’ perspectives. The authors collected data from 





result indicated that tax rate had a significant and positive impact on tax non-
compliance. In Nigeria, Atawodi and Ojeka (2012) surveyed 150 small and medium-
enterprises and showed that tax complexity and higher tax rates were the most critical 
factors in affecting non-compliance in small and medium-sized enterprises.  
 
However, tax compliance did not necessarily increase if lower tax rates were imposed 
(Kirchler, 2007; Trivedi, Shehata, & Lynn, 2003). Also, Nur-tegin (2008) found that 
reducing tax rates would not lower the level of tax non-compliance. Data were collected 
from 4,538 firms in 23 transition economies. These contrasting findings suggest the 
effects of tax rate on tax non-compliance are still vague. Richardson (2006b) performed 
a cross-country survey and found no significant relationship between marginal tax rates 
and tax evasion. Feinstein (1991) found marginal tax rates and tax evasion had a 
negative effect. His 1982 and 1985 data were derived from the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Programme. Mas’ud, Aliyu, Gambo, Al-Qudah, and Al Sharari (2014) 
also used cross-country data from 2012 to 2013 to examine the influence of tax rate on 
Afrikaans’ tax compliance. They found that the tax rate significantly and negatively 
influenced tax compliance behaviour in Africa. 
 
In summary, the effect of tax rates on tax compliance have shown mixed results as 
shown above. According to deterrence theory, a higher tax rate will induce taxpayers 
to engage in non-compliance behaviour.  Allingham and Sandmo (1972) argued that 
taxpayers’ decision to comply or not to comply is determined by the assessment of 
benefits of evading tax and the cost involved in evading tax. The following subsections 






3.8  Penalty Rate and Tax Non-compliance 
Penalty is defined as a deterrent measurement used by the tax authority to improve tax 
compliance (Devos, 2013). Based on previous studies, the relationship between penalty 
rate and tax non-compliance varies. The first systematic non-compliance behaviour 
model was developed by Becker (1968). Becker’s assumption was based on criminal 
behaviour and expected utility. The potential evaders will perform criminal behaviour 
by weighing the rewards and cost, i.e., by considering the severity of penalties and the 
risk of detection. If the rewards are higher than the expected cost, taxpayers are more 
prone to evade taxes. The model was further explored by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Srinivasan (1973) by focusing on tax evasion from the general economic 
theory. They also found that penalty and audit probability increased compliance. That 
is, the higher penalty will deter tax evasion.  
 
Prior literature in the association between penalty rate and tax non-compliance in 
indirect taxes is still minimal. Miskam et al. (2013) examined the determinants of 
smuggling activities and tax evasion in Malaysia involving excise duty as an indirect 
tax of passenger cars in Malaysia. Penalty rate was one of the variables tested apart 
from car brands, tax rate, and business size of car importers. The data were derived 
from smuggling cases investigated from 2009-2011 by the Malaysian tax authority. 
Their finding indicated that penalty had a negative influence on tax evasion on 
smuggling activities for vehicles. That is, the higher the penalty rate, the lower the 
smuggling activities will be. 
 
In a Self-Assessment System (SAS), penalties as a vast deterrence strategy create 





and Hansford (2009) explored individual taxpayers’ behaviour in Malaysia as a result 
of the introduction of SAS. They used a mixed-method design. The quantitative 
methods (experiment and survey) and qualitative method (case study) were done 
simultaneously in three phases from November 2004 to July 2005.  They showed a 
positive relationship between penalties and tax compliance.  
 
Chirico, Inman, Loeffler, MacDonald, and Sieg (2016) asserted that penalty will be an 
effective method to curb non-compliance with property taxes if taxpayers believe that 
it will be enforced. However, taxpayers will assume that the large penalties imposed 
are a sign of ineffective and desperate tax authorities with empty threats (Chirico et al., 
2016). Virmani (1989) found that a higher penalty rate induced people to behave 
dishonestly. Verboon and van Dijke (2012) investigated procedural justice in relation 
to deterrence effects such as severity of penalties. They hypothesised that procedural 
justice has a strong influence on taxpayers’ behaviour and attitudes including 
compliance with tax authorities. If punishments are perceived to be excessive and 
improper, negative attitudes particularly toward taxes and generally authorities will 
develop (Kirchler, Muelbacher, Gangl, Hoffman, Kogler, Pollal, & Alm, 2012). 
Kirchler et al., (2012)  also found that 86% of the respondents preferred fine as a proper 
authorization and jail term as unsuitable for tax evasion in their study on Austrian 
taxpayers. 
 
Devos (2014a) investigated the relationship between individual tax evaders in Australia 
and tax law enforcement such as penalties. He used the mixed-method approach. The 
tax evaders’ data were retrieved from the Australian Tax Office (ATO). A mail survey 





the audited report for the year 2004-2006 which was subject to AUD5,000 and above 
of penalty. Semi-structured interviews were used to ask about sensitive issues. They 
demonstrated that a higher penalty rate deterred tax non-compliance behaviour.  Their 
result corroborated Beck, Davis and Jung’s (1991) and Becker, Büchner and Sleeking’s 
(1987) experimental findings. However, Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992b) stated that 
the laboratory method for a tax compliance research produce minimum outcomes 
compared to the direct observation method.  
 
In addition to the impact of penalty rate on tax compliance behaviour, perceived 
alertness of breach of law has similar effects. The tendency of tax evasion will be 
reduced if taxpayers are alert with the offences and the consequences they have to face 
when committing non-compliance behaviour. If taxpayers are not alert of the possibility 
of being arrested and charged, then they are more prone to commit tax evasion, which 
will motivate them to be dishonest and make them think that they will save some money 
if they are not detected. Hence, disseminating information about the offences and 
punishment to taxpayers if they evade tax is a significant measure that should be given 
due consideration (Modugu & Anyaduba, 2014). 
 
Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) associated the psychological, 
sociological and economy assumption with tax compliance. The interaction between 
taxpayers and the authority may have a significance influence under the slippery slope 
framework. The interaction will determine whether taxpayers will comply voluntarily 
or involuntarily. However, the latest empirical evidence on the dominance of enforced 
compliance and power on tax evasion showed a contradictory result (Wahl, Kastlunger, 





increased with a threatening and strict prosecution. Taxpayers are induced to pay tax if 
they are certain of being caught; however, if they perceived that there is a tendency of 
not being arrested, evasion will occur. The authorization power to implement 
prosecution and punishment will ensure compliance. Tyler (2006b) maintained that 
appropriate and efficient law of behaviour and legitimate power are a focal point in tax 
compliance. 
 
Literature indicates that penalties increase tax compliance (Chau & Leung, 2009). 
However, an increasing number of research found no significant relationship between 
tax compliance behaviour and penalties (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007). Tax 
compliance behaviour could be improved if the tax structure in penalizing tax evaders 
are effective and efficient (Chau & Leung, 2009). Hasseldine, Hite, James and Toumi 
(2007) revealed a significant and positive relationship between the seriousness of 
criminal penalties and tax compliance.  
 
Cords (2005) argued that an individual will likely comply with the requirements of the 
tax laws if the expected cost of tax compliance is less than the expected cost of non-
compliance. He further elaborated that the nature, the size of the penalties, the detection, 
and the expected cost incurred for the non-compliance if caught will determine the 
compliance behaviour. That is, law implications will influence compliance. Snow and 
Warren (2005a) asserted that “to encourage voluntary compliance with the tax code, 
the United States Internal Revenue Service relies heavily on a policy and levying 
penalties when undeclared tax is detected, with penalties linked to the amount of tax 
evasion discovered” (pp.868). Snow and Warren (2005a) claimed that the low penalties 





Witte and Woodbury (1985) conducted a study on a group of self-employed taxpayers 
and found a positive association between strict lawful penalties and compliance. They 
also revealed that intimidation of wrong impression is a stronger hindrance for tax 
evasion than intimidation of lawful penalties. Devos (2004) confirmed the earlier 
finding. He investigated the level of penalty and non-compliance for taxation offences 
in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. He analysed audited and 
investigated data from the Australian Taxation Office, the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions, the New Zealand Revenue Department, the Ministry of Justice, 
and the British Board of Inland Revenue. He found a positive relationship between 
penalty and tax compliance. He concluded that the penalty perceived is greater than the 
actual penalty. He also suggested that a combination of penalties and rewards are more 
effective in maximizing compliance level than penalty alone. 
 
In summary, the findings on the impact of penalties and tax compliance are more 
diverse. The penalty imposed when detected may cause voluntary or enforced 
compliance, which means that whether taxpayers are compliant depends on their 
perception of the tax authority and tax structure. However, many studies found that 
penalties and tax compliance had a positive relationship (Park & Hyun, 2003). The 
following subsection explains how tax audits influence tax non-compliance. 
 
3.9  Tax Audit and Tax Non-compliance 
Tax audit is defined as an examination done on taxpayers to identify whether they have 
fulfilled their tax obligations and assessed tax liabilities correctly (OECD 2006). Due 





Generally speaking, the literature indicates mixed findings of tax audit and tax non-
compliance relationship.  
 
In Malaysia, Mohdali et al. (2014) studied salaried and self-employed taxpayers. They 
explored taxpayers’ compliance and non-compliance behaviour by examining the 
impact of threat and punishment. They found that taxpayers were motivated to avoid 
taxes when they were threatened with tax audits. A similar result was reported by 
Helhel, and Ahmed (2014). Muhammad (2013) studied Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (IRBM) auditors and taxpayers’ compliance. This research applied the 
qualitative grounded theory methodology developed by Glaser and Strauss (2009). The 
in-depth interview involving 49 IRBM tax auditors was done to determine the 
enforcement regulatory styles when conducting audits. Based on the analysis, five 
enforcements regulatory styles were highlighted: firm enforcement, explaining and 
educating, bargaining, threatening, and avoiding. This study also rectified some 
negative perceptions towards auditors. For instance, the result showed that the negative 
perceptions toward auditors as being rigid and always finding fault were incorrect. The 
efficiency of audit as deterrence effect relies on auditors’ roles as educator and 
explainer on the wrong doing rather than punish them. This method further will ensure 
future compliance level through the awareness of tax law disseminated by auditors. 
Therefore, technical knowledge and audit skills are required for tax auditors to perform 
various task given to them (McManus, 2006). 
 
Apart from their crucial role as a detector in preventing non-compliance, tax auditors 
are always recommended to translate the complicated tax laws and conduct thorough 





corporate tax audit experiences to determine tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers. Of 
2,400 surveys sent out, only 59 usable survey were received from members of the 
Chartered Taxation Institute of Malaysia. They found tax audit had a significant and 
positive deterrence impact on taxpayers’ behaviour.  
 
Using the bomb-crater effect, Fochmann and Kroll (2016) proposed that an agent 
expectation of tax compliance depends on audit frequency. The conventional model 
that predicts that an agent has knowledge on tax audit and tax responsibility is not 
always valid due to the complexity of the tax system (Pukeliene & Kažemekaityte, 
2016). The experiment conducted by Kogler, Mittone, and Kirchler (2016) revealed 
that immediate feedback from audits caused taxpayers to evade significantly more than 
those who received audit feedback later. 
 
Thornton and Shaub (2013) investigated audit service performances of public 
accounting firms auditors as assessed by jurors, who were responsible for evaluating 
auditors. Data were taken from 168 court cases in the United States of America. Their 
findings confirmed the current United States tax regulations. Auditors’ quality was 
lower if they chose to implement aggressive tax planning services for tax preparation 
services. This aggressive tax planning in tax system might cause taxpayers losing 
confidence on auditors and induced for tax non-compliance.  
 
Taxpayers’ compliance is determined by tax auditors’ attitude when conducting audit. 
It was found that respectful treatment during audit encourages taxpayers to comply 
voluntarily (Kirchler, 2007). However, taxpayers’ internal motivation will be reduced 





Other scholars such as Jackson and Jaouen (1989) and Shanmugam (2003) found that 
tax audit had a positive effect on tax compliance. The result showed that tax audit had 
played a significant role in enhancing tax compliance among taxpayers. Tax audits have 
an influential impact on tax compliance (Butler, 1993). Similar findings were reported 
by Witte and Woodbury (1985). However, Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1988) found 
contradictory results; they did not found a significant correlation between audit and tax 
evasion. They concluded that audit will be effective to those who exorbitantly under 
declare. 
 
Dubin, Graetz and, Wilde (1987) did not find a significant relationship between tax 
declaration and higher audit rates. Devos (2007) distinguished deterrence between 
general and specific deterrence. According to Devos, general deterrence by audit will 
discourage taxpayers from committing an offence while specific deterrence by audit 
will hinder lawbreakers from repeating their offences. Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) 
asserted that general deterrence has a “spillover effect”. They claimed that whether 
taxpayers will be audited or not the tax collection will increase and will still declaring 
more taxes even if audit increases.  
 
In the game theory and principal agent model, taxpayers have to bear the cost of being 
audited if caught for under declaration (Mohd Isa, 2012). However, Andreoni et al. 
(1998) argued that honest taxpayers will still face considerable costs of audits. 
Furthermore, taxpayers will feel the stress from being audited. Tax auditors are also 
likely to be suspicious of taxpayers because of the assumed selfishness of the latter. 
Thus, when a high audit rate is perceived, the compliance level among taxpayers will 





had a significant and positive relationship. Similarly, Alm (2007) demonstrated that 
higher penalties and audit rates had a significant effect on tax compliance.  
 
The probability of audits negatively varies with the highest magnitude of tax evasion 
as suggested in tax evasion economic models (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). It is still 
controversial whether taxpayers’ oppressive prediction actually determine tax 
compliance. Spicer and Thomas (1982) argued that various audit probabilities 
determine taxpayers’ feedback in line with tax evasion economic model. Moreover, the 
judgments from taxpayer’s subjective perceived probability are crucial compared to 
objective audit probability (Kirchler et al., 2008).  
 
Prior studies on taxpayers’ knowledge on audit probability and their decision whether 
to comply or not have produced mixed results. For instance, Friedland (1982) found 
that taxpayers’ vague knowledge of being audited improved tax compliance. However, 
other scholars like Alm and McKee (2006) and Spicer and Thomas (1982) 
demonstrated that the vague knowledge of audit lowered tax compliance.  
 
Snow and Warren (2005b) argued taxpayers’ compliance determined by the probability 
being audited is not an efficient policy. Research on taxpayers and tax auditors’ 
interactions in determining tax compliance is still scarce (Kinsey, 1991). For instance, 
the personal interactions between the Inland Revenue Service in America and taxpayers 
caused strong readiness to abide with tax law. The experimental result showed that 
respondents audited earlier were motivated significantly to comply in the future (Spicer 






A research done on European tax structures found that countries conducting thorough 
enforcement actions have a lesser tax obedience rate (Feld & Frey, 2007). However, 
research on past audit data showed that taxpayers’ future compliance behaviour was 
not determined much by audit experience (Erard, 1997).  
 
Tax audits and tax compliance were also found to have a negative association. Andreoni 
et al. (1998) argued that audit experience by taxpayers might motivate them to evade 
more audits in the future as an attempt to regain losses for money paid as penalty for 
tax malpractices from tax authority. Furthermore, tax audits are most likely perceived 
as an efficient evasion deterrence for trustworthy taxpayers but inefficient for routine 
and regular evaders (Hessing, Elffers, Robben, & Webley, 1992).  
 
In summary, the economic deterrence model proposes that tax audits have influence on 
tax compliance. Tax auditors have significant influence on voluntary compliance if 
taxpayers are treated in a respectful manner during the audit exercise. Similarly, 
auditors’ tax law knowledge and fairness will motivate taxpayers. The following 
subsection discusses tax fairness and tax non-compliance.   
 
3.10  Tax Fairness and Tax Non-compliance 
Tax fairness in tax compliance can be defined in two different dimensions. The first 
dimension is the benefit received with the dollars paid as tax while the other one is on 
equity and the taxpayers’ burden when referring to other individuals in tax matters 
(Jackson & Milliron, 2002). Hence, tax fairness is the comparison between the tax paid 





comparison of tax feelings of how one is treated compared to others (Kirchler, 2007). 
Studies that explored tax fairness and tax non-compliance had produced mixed results.  
 
To the researcher’s knowledge, limited studies are available that examined taxpayers 
evaluation and tax fairness in indirect taxes. Therefore, the tax fairness variables of this 
study were mostly adapted from direct taxes. The tax fairness variables apply to the 
indirect tax context because tax fairness is determined by taxpayers perception of the 
amount of the tax paid and the benefits received in return. Prior literature indicates that 
fairness has a universal definition. According to Christensen, Weihrich and Newman 
(1994), fairness is difficult to define because “(1) it is multidimensional, (2) can be 
defined at the individual level or for society at large, (3) fairness is intertwined with 
complexity and (4) a lack of fairness may be perceived justification or a cause of non-
compliance” (p.72). Saad (2012a) proposed seven dimensions of fairness perceived by 
taxpayers of tax compliance. They are: 
1. General fairness (the overall tax system evaluation). 
2. Exchange fairness (taxpayers and government’s reciprocal exchange). 
3. Horizontal fairness (taxpayers’ equal treatment of tax in similar economic 
positions). 
4. Vertical fairness (taxpayers’ ability to pay based on tax rate). 
5. Retributive fairness (fairness on punishment imposed). 
6. Personal fairness (judgment on tax system favouring individual). 
7. Administrative fairness (related to the content of tax law’s procedures imposed 






However, Wenzel (2003) proposed three types of fairness perceived by taxpayers from 
the social-psychological perspective. They are: 
1. Retributive justice (looked as applicable penalties when offences committed). 
2. Distributive justice (looked like cost and benefits exchanges). 
3. Procedural justice (looked at the measures of wealth allocation). 
 
Faizal and Palil (2015) examined three dimensions of fairness: distributive fairness, 
procedural fairness, and retributive fairness. They carried out a study to examine which 
dimension is related to tax compliance behaviour in Malaysia involving 82 
academicians as their respondents. They found that distributive and retributive fairness 
were positively associated with compliance but not behaviour to comply. Based on the 
findings, they recommended that compliance behaviour can be better demonstrated if 
the fairness dimension can be distinguished. They also found that the tax authority was 
perceived to have rendered procedural fairness. 
 
Saad (2012a) investigated the influence of fairness perceptions and information 
dissemination on tax compliance using a mixed-method approach. A survey was carried 
out to 2,267 salaried individuals in government and private sectors, but only 852 
responded. The thematic analyses developed by Braun and Clarke (2006) were used to 
analyse interview data. The findings showed that administrative fairness, vertical 
fairness, personal fairness, and retributive fairness had positive relationships with tax 
compliance. They also demonstrated that inadequate dissemination of the tax revenue 






Mustafa (1997) studied fairness perceptions of the former income tax system known as 
the Official Assessment System (OAS) on non-city and city taxpayers. They found that 
non-city taxpayers had higher fairness perceptions than city taxpayers’. Azmi and 
Perumal (2008) undertook a study by adapting Gerbing’s (1988) questionnaire to assess 
fairness perception of Malaysian taxpayers in four tax offices in Kuala Lumpur. They 
proposed that taxpayers’ perception of fairness was related to self-interest, general 
fairness, and the tax structure. Their result showed that perceived tax fairness positively 
influenced tax compliance behaviour. However, their findings on the fairness 
magnitude contradicted Gerbing’s (1988) and Gilligan and Richardson’s (2005) studies 
in Australia and Hong Kong respectively. 
 
Kamala (2008) empirically tested tax fairness perceptions dimensions in determining 
Malaysian taxpayers’ compliance attitude. The respondents were registered taxpayers 
from the IRBM branches from Wangsa Maju, Jalan Duta, Cheras, and Kuala Lumpur. 
She showed that general fairness was significantly and positively associated with tax 
compliance. However, the self-interest dimension was significantly and negatively 
associated with tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Dong and Gu (2007) compared the fairness perception of Malaysian and New Zealand 
taxpayers. They found that New Zealand taxpayers were more tolerant in fairness 
perception than Malaysian taxpayers. However, the fairness perception was relatively 
similar regardless of the economic environment and region. 
 
Brainyyah and Rusydi (2013) tested tax compliance as a dependent variable and tax 





their study among small and medium enterprises (SME) in Malang, Indonesia. They 
showed a significant and positive effect of tax fairness on tax compliance. In another 
study, Daniel, Akowe, and Awaje (2016) assessed the influence of tax fairness on small 
scale enterprises in Bassa, i.e., the local government in Nigeria. They demonstrated that 
perceived fairness in tax system determined compliance behaviour. If the tax system is 
perceived unfairly, then taxpayers are likely to engage non-compliance behaviour. 
Murphy (2004b) used survey data of 2,292 taxpayers detained for tax avoidance. He 
revealed that procedural fairness and tax compliance had a direct and positive 
relationship. Kirchler et al. (2008) found a negative relationship between distributive 
fairness and tax compliance. If taxpayers assume they are imposed with a higher tax 
burden, they are less likely to comply and evade tax (Spicer & Becker, 1980). Also, if 
the society assumes that the tax authority is biased, compliance will decrease, and tax 
evasion will increase. On the contrary, if people assume that the tax authority is fair, 
voluntary compliance will be higher. 
 
Van Dijke and Verboon (2010) investigated trust in tax authorities to moderate the 
effect of procedural fairness on tax compliance behaviour. They conducted a study on 
60 undergraduate psychology students in the Netherlands Open University who 
participated on a voluntary basis. They showed a significant and positive relationship 
between trust in tax authorities and procedural fairness of tax authorities. Again, 
Verboon and van Dijke (2011) analysed 469 employees Dutch working members those 
who had experience with the tax authority. The result indicated that procedural fairness 






Kim (2002) conducted an experiment to investigate tax fairness and tax compliance 
based on two levels of public transfer (PT) versus non-public transfer (NPT). Forty-six 
MBA students participated in the experiment. The result showed no significant 
association between reported income and risk preferences between PT and NPT and 
fairness in determining tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Most of the tax authorities claimed, tax fairness as a significant determinant to spur the 
tax compliance. For instance,  Bobek (1997) claimed that fairness perceptions had been 
highlighted as an attempt to enhance tax compliance by the United States Inland 
Revenue Service (tax authority). Head (1992) affirmed the fundamental principles of 
fairness. When fairness is perceived to be breached by the taxation policy, taxpayers 
are likely not to comply.  
 
Jackson and Milliron (2002) proposed horizontal fairness as another element of 
fairness. Goetz (1978), on the other hand, defined horizontal fairness as equal treatment 
given to individuals in the equal environment. Further, an equal amount of tax paid by 
taxpayers in a similar economic situation suggests horizontal fairness. However, 
Holmes (2001) argued that most tax systems violate horizontal fairness to achieve 
political, economic and social goals.  
 
According to Takenishi and Takenishi (1990), fairness judgment is multi-dimensional, 
and it applies to both direct and indirect taxes. They utilised multiple regression analysis 
and identified positive relationship between procedural fairness among the Japanese 






The previous finding showed that taxpayers in various countries had different level of 
fairness perceptions of their income tax system. For example, Gilligan and Richardson 
(2005) found significant disputes in fairness assumptions especially in terms of self-
interest, general fairness, special provisions, and tax rate structure in Australia and 
Hong Kong. In his survey, McKerchar (2003) found that 60% of the individual 
taxpayers perceived the tax system as being unfair when declaring their tax returns. 
 
In the United States, the tax system was progressively perceived as being unfair as 
revealed by Etzioni (1986) who measured fairness on tax rate from 1961 to 1980. 
Verboon and Van Dijke (2007) did research on Dutch taxpayers. They found that tax 
systems and distributive fairness were perceived to be moderately fair. However, they 
showed a declining fairness perception of the tax system (Verboon & Van Dijke, 2007). 
The contradiction was explained by the different evaluations used, and the study was 
about Dutch workers working for eight hours in a week only. 
 
Tan (1999) conducted a study in New Zealand and concluded that the tax system was 
perceived as being moderately fair by the taxpayers. This finding contradicts 
Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller’s (1994) result where they demonstrated taxpayers 
perceived the tax system to be biased. Tan (1999) identified a biased perception 
between higher and middle wages income earners. 
 
In summary, studies on the effect of fairness in a tax system and the types of fairness 
on non-compliance behaviour are still scarce. However, the perceived fairness of the 
tax system, tax policy, tax law, regulations, and tax burden are purported to determine 





considered contributing factors to tax evasion (Jackson & Milliron, 2002; Richardson, 
2008). Furthermore, due to the differences in tax systems, laws, sample selections and 
methods used in previous studies, fairness in various countries is difficult to ascertained 
(Saad, 2011). The next section discusses peer influence on non-compliance behaviour 
of taxpayers. 
 
3.11  Peer Influence and Tax Non-compliance 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) defined peer influence as pressure from close persons such 
as friends and family who have an influence on an individual decision making. 
According to Kirchler et al. (2008), the group associated with taxpayers influence tax 
compliance behaviour. Further, Prinz, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler, (2014) stated that 
social norm is one of the important factors that determine taxpayers’ actual or perceived 
compliance behaviour apart from particular measures imposed by the tax authority. A 
vast number of researchers argued that social pressure can take place especially to those 
who have faced a loss of prestige, shame and guilt for their misconduct in paying tax 
(Casagrande, Cagno, Pandimiglio, & Spallone, 2015). Individuals are more prone to 
evade taxes if they believe other individuals are evading too (Hashimzade, Myles, Page, 
& Rablen, 2014). 
 
Mixed results were found on other peoples’ influence and taxpayers perceptions of their 
peers on tax compliance (Ali & Raihana, 2013). However, studies on indirect taxes 
context are still minimal. Bidin et al. (2011) found that subjective norm (peer influence) 






Bidin, Idris, and Shamsudin (2009) investigated compliance behaviour of zakah 
(Islamic tithe) on employment income in Malaysia. They found that peer influence 
(subjective norms) was significantly and positively related to intention through attitude 
toward paying zakah. 
 
Most taxpayers believe that tax evasion is tolerable because others perceived as evading 
taxes are acceptable and tolerable (Ho & Wong, 2008). However, Sia, Salleh, 
Sambasivan, and Kasipillai (2008) showed no significant differences between non-
compliant and compliant taxpayers with peer influence.  
 
Pukeliene and Kažemekaityte (2016) found a significant influence of social norms on 
tax non-compliance behaviour in European Union countries. Additionally, Alon and 
Hageman (2013)  examined on a sample of 5,000 firms in Soviet Bloc transition 
economies. They showed that peer influence had a negative effect on tax compliance. 
The higher the level of corruption and a higher level of trust from peers such as friends 
and family reduced tax compliance. Frey and Torgler (2007) also found a negative 
relationship between support from peer influence and tax compliance in their cross-
national study. 
 
Torgler (2012) investigated peer influence and tax compliance in ten Eastern European 
countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Political interest was 
investigated along with trust and institutions to determine tax compliance behaviour. 
Political interest was defined as taxpayers’ interest in talking about political issues with 





relationship between political discussions among peers and non-compliance behaviour 
when individuals were dissatisfied. 
 
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) used the theory of planned behaviour to investigate 
taxpayers’ compliance intention in the United States among students and non-students. 
They found that peer influence had a significant and positive relationship with tax 
compliance. Again, using the same theory, Bobek, Hatfield and Wentzel (2007) found 
that peer influence was significantly related to taxpayers’ tax position. The more they 
accepted the opinion of others the lower the tax compliance. Similarly, Trivedi, Shehata 
and Mestelman (2004) showed that peer influence had a significant and positive 
relationship with intention to comply in Canada. According to Kirchler (2007), 
taxpayers relies on the group of people who are associated with them. In earlier 
research, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) also found support for peer influence in 
determining tax compliance. Moreover, the importance of peer influence was 
acknowledged by Fischer et al. (1992) in their model of taxpayers’ compliance. 
Westerman, Beekun, Stedham and Yamamura (2007) demonstrated that the stronger 
the influence of peers the higher the individualism behaviour in societies. 
 
Hanno and Violette (1996) focused on a group of people consisting of spouse, friends, 
employers and family members to investigate peer influence on tax compliance. 
However, they found that taxpayers were moderately influenced by the referent groups. 
Steenbergen, McGraw and Scholz (1992) found other people were key in determining 






Jackson and Milliron (2002) interviewed 12 tax agents in public accounting firms and 
found that peers created “preparer vulnerability” by giving aggressive advice to 
taxpayers as clients in an ambiguous tax environment. Previous studies reviewed by 
Conference, Salter and Lymer (2003) identified that tax agents’ aggressive behaviour 
in tax compliance was influenced by other people’s opinions. Furthermore, their 
aggressiveness as a tax preparer relied on the demand driven by their clients’ tax 
position.  
 
Westerman et al. (2007) explored the influence of peer in determining ethical decision 
making in Germany, Italy and Japan involving 165 subjects. They made two key 
observations: peers had a stronger influence on individual ethical decision making than 
the national culture, and the high power distance (distance measure) and higher 
individualism had stronger effects on peer and ethical decision making. 
 
In an experimental study by  Kahle and White (2004) involving accounting firms tax 
agents in the United States, they demonstrated that tax aggressive decision making to 
comply was determined by clients. Tax agents were bound by their client’s preferences 
when making decisions. The importance of peer influence on tax agents’ compliance 
behaviour was also reported by Smart (2012). Smart revealed that peer influence had a 
significant and positive influence on tax agents’ compliance behaviour to tax law. The 
study involved members of the New Zealand Institute of Accountants. 
 
In summary, tax compliance decisions made by taxpayers or tax preparers rely on the 





of compliance behaviour of taxpayers. It is one of the constructs in Fischer’s model. 
The next section will discuss tax knowledge and tax non-compliance. 
 
3.12  Tax knowledge and Tax Non-compliance 
Tax knowledge is taxpayers’ ability to understand tax rules and regulations (Palil, 
2010).  However, according to Eriksen and Fallan (1996), tax knowledge of tax law can 
be used as an opportunity to evade taxes. Many scholars showed that tax knowledge 
influenced tax compliance behaviour (Ahmad, Mohd-Hanefah, & Mohd-Noor, 2007; 
Oladipupo, & Obazee,2016). Harris (1989) argued that tax knowledge received via 
formal education by attending courses can be used to evade tax. Previous scholars 
demonstrated that tax knowledge and tax compliance are significantly related (Singh, 
2003).  
 
Prior studies investigated tax knowledge and its effect on taxpayers’ understanding 
(Eriksen & Fallan, 1996; Harris, 1989; Singh, 2003). However, these studies only 
focused on direct tax. Since there are limited studies on indirect tax, the literature on 
direct tax is used as a basis to identify the relationship between tax compliance and tax 
knowledge. The literature shows mixed findings between tax knowledge and tax non-
compliance.  
 
Mazlan (2015) investigated the determinants of import tax non-compliance among 
importers in Malaysia and showed that tax knowledge acquired by importers motivated 
them to evade import taxes. Importers were eager to improve their tax knowledge to 





is, he found a significant and positive relationship between tax knowledge and import 
tax non-compliance.  
 
In other studies, Tan and Chin Fatt (2000) and Loo and Ho (2005) showed a negative 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance. Loo et al. (2009) explored the 
effect of tax knowledge on tax compliance after the introduction of self-assessment 
system in Malaysia.  They showed that tax knowledge had a positive relationship with 
compliance behaviour.  
 
Kasipillai, Noraza, and Zaimah (2003) argued that taxpayers knowledge of tax system 
can increase the tax compliance level. Taxpayers’ knowledge and confidence in the tax 
system will increase when they acquire the essential tax knowledge which motivates 
compliance. Tax authorities play a very important role in educating the public on the 
tax system to accomplish compliance. The compliance cost and the reliance on tax 
agents could be reduced if taxpayers have the ability to understand the tax system. 
Mansor, Saad, and Ibrahim (2004) suggested that the Inland Revenue Board organises 
courses and seminars at a reasonable price to reduce misinterpretation and demoralise 
taxpayers with respect to regulations and tax rules. 
 
Junainah (2002) showed that individual taxpayers in Kota Kinabalu were quite reluctant 
to join the SAS implementation because of the difficulty in calculating and declaring 
tax return. The old system was simpler and hence preferable. Fatt and Khin (2011) also 
revealed that petty traders were not exposed to good tax knowledge of SAS and 
recommended that the IRBM should consider the level of understanding of tax among 





Fauziati, Minovia, Muslim, and Nasrah (2016) assessed the impact of tax knowledge 
on tax compliance on small and medium enterprises in Indonesia and found no impact 
of tax knowledge on tax compliance.  
 
Saad (2014) emphasised the importance of tax knowledge in deterring non-compliance 
behaviour. In his study involving 2,267 potential participants from six different regions 
in New Zealand, he showed that taxpayers had inadequate knowledge of the technical 
parts of the income tax system, rendering them to think that the system was complex 
and motivating them to non-compliance.  
 
Lewis (1982) determined the relationship between tax knowledge and attitude in 
completing tax declarations among taxpayers. He found that changes in attitude through 
increased tax knowledge had a significant effect on tax compliance. He also revealed a 
negative attitude associated with low tax knowledge of taxation. Hence, tax knowledge 
can enhance tax attitudes and will result in lowering the desire to evade taxes and raising 
the compliance level.  Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) found that tax knowledge was 
negatively associated with compliance behaviour among 220 households in the United 
States. However, in an earlier study, Harris (1989) found no direct and significant 
impact on tax knowledge on compliance behaviour. 
 
The absence of knowledge might induce non-compliance behaviour among taxpayers. 
McKerchar (1995) investigated 200 small businesses in the rural community in 
Australia. She found that small businesses in Australia were not aware of tax 





Fallan (1996) showed that tax knowledge was an effective measure to lowering tax 
evasion.  
 
The literature indicates that tax knowledge plays a vital role in ensuring the success of 
a tax system. However, the inconsistent results found might be caused by different tax 
jurisdictions or different measurements used. Voluntary compliance could be achieved 
if taxpayers understand tax law so that they can make a tax declaration correctly and 
completely. However, tax knowledge also has negative impacts on taxpayers because 
they can use it to identify the loopholes of the tax system to manipulate tax declaration 
and hence evade and avoid tax. The next section discusses the impact of corruption on 
non-compliance behaviour. 
 
3.13  Corruption and Tax Non-compliance 
Corruption is the misuse of authority for personal gain (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008). 
Corruption is distinguished into two types namely grand corruption and petty 
corruption (UNDP, 2008). Grand corruption involves high-rank public officers’ misuse 
of their discretionary power such as ministers or senior officers for their attainment. On 
the other hand, petty corruption refers to lower rank public officers accepting bribe on 
a daily basis to smoothen the transaction. The bribe is also known as ‘grease money’ 
(UNDP, 2008). Hence, bribery is “a practice of buying favours from the bureaucrats 
responsible for formulating and administering the government’s economic policies” 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002, p.302). Firms use a bribe to influence decision making and 
gain control over bureaucracy (Melé, 2009). Firms are more prone to bribe if their 
competitors use the same practices (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009). A firm’s 





If taxpayers perceive that the tax authorities are unfair, corrupted and use their 
discretionary power to abuse the tax law, they are likely not to comply (Faridy, Copp, 
Freudenberg, & Sarker, 2014). However, only a few research has investigated the 
relationship between corruption and tax non-compliance in indirect taxes. In Malaysia, 
a few studies have been conducted on corruption. For instance, Mazlan (2015) 
investigated customs officials’ involvement in corruption and import tax non-
compliance. He showed a significant and positive relationship between corruption 
among customs officials and import duty non-compliance. Othman, Shafie and Hamid 
(2014) conducted an interview session with 12 government officials including customs 
officers involved in corruption cases and enforcement. They found that factors such as 
moral impurity, power, and opportunity were contributors to corruption. Aggressive 
informal payment by the firm as a bribe or pressure by civil servants motivates 
corruption (Hodess, Banfield, & Wolfe, 2003). 
 
Antonakas, Giokas and Konstantopoulos (2013) examined corruption in tax 
administration via 12 interviews carried out from January to February in Athens, Greek. 
The first group comprised executives of control from tax and customs services. The 
second group involved customs officers who had committed corruption offences and 
brought to court. The third group was customs agents, businessmen and accountants 
who had related experience. The result indicated that corruption in tax administration 
had a negative effect on the economic performance via the impact on the fiscal deficit 
and tax revenue. 
 
Dutt and Traca (2010) analysed bilateral trade flows and the impact caused by 





accepting a bribe from exporters when tariffs were high caused tax evasion. The result 
showed a positive relationship between tariff rate and corruption for tax evasion. The 
higher the tariff rate, the higher will be the corruption among customs officers, leading 
to tax evasion. 
 
Mishra et al. (2008) examined the trade reform in India in the 1990s and the effect of 
tariff policies on evasion of customs duties. The study involved 40 top trading partners 
who imported a number of products. They found a positive relationship between 
corruption, tariff rates, and evasion. Slemrod (1992) found a significant and positive 
association between the corruption of government and compliance. A perception of 
corruption in the government was related to taxpayers’ trust and fairness and their tax 
compliance behaviour.   
 
Bardhan (2006) argued that the magnitude of regulations in the economy influences 
corruption. He proposed two types of corrupt behaviour. The first one involves civil 
servants demanding bribes for what they are expected to do, privileged through their 
position as a protector. The second one involves civil servants demanding a bribe to 
operate what they are not supposed to do such as permitting firms to break regulations. 
The first explanation is regarding extortion behaviour among civil servants, and the 
other is about evasion. Customs officers involve in both types of corruptions (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997). Further, she mentioned something that firm’s valued control by 
Customs officials in Customs clearance caused the existence of extortion. 
 
Payments made to customs officials to lower regulatory barriers for trade could cause 





the payments of successful tax non-compliance. Kaufmann and Wei (1999)  mentioned 
this aspect is only applicable in the limited and in the poor regulation which aggravates 
the officers to involve in corruption. They revealed that firms’ managers in Uganda are 
paying more bribes on average by spending more time in consulting with public 
officers.  
 
In Philippines, it is a norm for businesses to give a small bribe to the services provided 
by customs to facilitate legalised transactions. Businesses cooperate with corrupt 
customs officials when practising undervaluation, misclassification and misdeclaration 
in formal entry declaration process to evade official trade barriers (Parayno, 1999).  
 
Rosid, Evans, and Tran-Nam (2016) studied the influence of corruption on personal tax 
compliance in Indonesia. A sequential mixed-method was applied. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with three tax officers, three taxpayers, and three tax agents. 
In the second phase, a survey involved 397 respondents composed of 196 self-employed 
and 201 employed taxpayers. The findings indicated that a higher level of corruption 
perception would hinder voluntary tax compliance. 
 
The World Enterprise Survey and the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance showed that tax officials’ involvement in corruption either voluntarily or 
through extortion positively reduced reported sales and tax payments by firms (Alm, 
Martinez-Vazquez, & McClellan, 2016). Jahnke (2017) revealed that individual 







DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) studied illegal corporate activities among foreign 
control corporation in the United States and the corruption culture overseas. This study 
was done to investigate the Inland Revenue Services’ audit data from 1996-2007 of 
foreign-owned corporations by considering their corruption norms in influencing tax 
evasion behaviour. The study also examined the size of the corporation and the effect 
of corruption norms on tax evasion. The results showed that small and medium-sized 
firms with high corruption norms were likely to evade tax. In other words, there was a 
negative relationship between firm size and corruption because small firms’ tax 
planning was directly and strongly influenced by the tax authority. Moreover, 
enforcement efforts decreased tax evasion significantly among foreign-control firms, 
but they did not make any difference on firm’s owners from corrupted countries.  
 
Ahmad and Brookins (2007) found that a higher corruption level in developing 
countries was associated with the inefficiency of government. Kaufmann (1997) 
proposed that increasing industrialisation can control corruption in developing 
countries. However, such hypothesis was not supported because of the discrepancies of 
the corruption level between countries with the same level of development.  
 
In an experimental study involving graduate students, Bilotkach (2005) studied tax 
evasion via underreporting activity in Ukraine. The subjects played a role as 
businessmen who hide 50% of their profit and 50% set as a tax rate of the reported 
profit. The findings showed that 50 of 96 subjects in the government official roles 
indicated their willingness to accept bribes. However, 46 of 96 preferred to hide 50% 






Public officers who demand informal payments reflect more severe organised 
corruptions bribery (Nielsen & Ballas, 2000) because they are pressuring for money or 
gifts they are not entitled to (Melé, 2009). According to Sajo (2003), institution 
pressures happen when the government is the sole provider of the essential services 
needed. Hence, payment made by firms through extortion to avoid bureaucratic delays 
can be camouflaged as bribery (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003) 
or law abiding act that gives opportunities for corrupted officers (Nielsen, 2003). In 
short, informal payments due to pressure will weaken the operations of government 
institutions.  
 
If corruption becomes dominant, a higher tax rate will reduce revenue. Sanyal, Gang, 
and Goswami (2000) examined the association between tax evasion, corruption and 
Laffer curve. The findings showed that the Laffer curve behaviour was a result of 
corrupt administration (low tax revenue due to a higher tax rate). This study further 
found that net income gained from a truth-disclosing audit probability will be higher 
than taxes, audits, and penalties in fraud zone. 
 
Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson and Trevino (2008) studied the association between 
corruption and tax compliance in transition economies from the institutional and 
economic perspectives. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) demonstrated that the lack of 
control over agencies and weak government led to a higher level of corruption. Further, 
Hall and Jones (1999) revealed that corruption deterred economic growth and 
investment. Doing business in a country with a high level of corruption will increase 
cost and investment risk, suggesting that corruption is positively related to cost and 





In summary, previous research showed that corruption had a significant impact on tax 
compliance. The complexity of tax system, and a high tax rate were found to be 
determinants of corruption. From an organisation perspective, corruption occurs when 
there is extortion by government officials in the environment where they have the 
authority to provide essential services needed (Sajo, 2003). The next subsection 
discusses the influence of probability of detection as a moderator of non-compliance. 
 
3.14  Probability of Detection as a Moderator of Tax Non-compliance 
The probability of detection is defined as a likelihood of the tax authority in discovering 
taxpayers’ non-compliance and find the rectification (Jackson & Milliron, 2002). In 
classical economic theories like deterrence theory, taxpayers are assumed in a gambling 
position whether to be compliant or evade taxes. In other words, they have to choose 
either to involve in legal or criminal activities (Castro, & Scartascini, 2015).  In prior 
research, inconsistent findings on tax compliance and their determinants, specifically 
on deterrent factors were reported (Dubin et al., 1987; Dubin & Wilde, 1988). Since 
compliance in many countries cannot be explained by tax compliance theories (Feld & 
Frey, 2002a; Slemrod, 2009; Torgler, 2003c; Torgler, Demir, Macintyre, & Schaffner, 
2008), economic scholars proposed the need for moderators to be introduced (Kirchler, 
2007). Edwards and Lambert (2007) argued that in research involving social situations 
or individual differences, a moderator variable is introduced to see its influence on 
strengthening or mitigating the relationship between the independent variables and a 
dependent variable. The following discusses the probability of detection as a potential 
moderator as it had not given much attention before. Since there is not much literature 






In Malaysia, Noor et al. (2013) examined service tax evasion in the service industry 
among 275 non-compliant service providers from the year 2009 to 2011. They found a 
significant and positive relationship between probability of detection and service tax 
evasion. Kalangi (2014) investigated economic factor (audit rate) and psychology factor 
(perceived audit probability) and their impact on tax compliance in Indonesia. The 
result provided support for a positive and significant influence of tax audit and 
probability of detection on tax compliance. In Nigeria, Modugu and Anyaduba (2014) 
found a positive relationship between probability of detection and tax compliance. 
However, the tax experiment study conducted by Marriott, Randal and Holmes (2013) 
on 2,600 students in New Zealand found no significant effect of probability of detection 
on tax compliance behaviour.  
 
According to Kirchler, Kogler and Muehlbacher (2014), taxpayers are willing to abide 
by the tax law for fear of being detected or fined (enforced compliance) or due to the 
feeling of obligation to contribute their share (voluntary compliance). The study was 
based on a slippery slope framework. A survey was conducted on self-employed 
taxpayers in Austria by analysing the perceived power of tax authority (probability of 
detection and fines) and trust. They demonstrated that strong compliance was 
associated with high power and high trust. In a different study, Ştefura (2012) showed 
that potential taxpayers would report less income if the probability of detection was 
low. However, if the probability of detection was perceived to be high, the higher the 
income would be reported. In a similar vein, Eisenhauer (2008) found that self-
employed individuals had a higher prospect of avoiding tax than other categories of 






Ahmed and Braithwaite (2005) explored perceived deterrence, perceived fairness, work 
practice, and tax morale on 2,040 Australian small business taxpayers. They found that 
small business taxpayers’ perception of the power of tax authority stimulated 
compliance by assessing being caught and its consequences. In their experimental 
study, Slemrod, Blumenthal and, Christian (2001) informed 1,724 personal Minnesota 
taxpayers that their returns would be “closely examined” notified on the letters sent to 
them. They observed that altering the perceived level of detection was significant in 
raising the compliance level and recovered probability of detection and compliance 
behaviour has negative correlation.  
 
Taxpayer’s behaviour relies on the calculation of expected utility maximisation 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), consistent with the economic theory of crime established 
by Becker (1968). The level of sanction if arrested and the probability of being arrested 
relate negatively with tax evasion. If taxpayers perceive that they will be detected 
through an audit in that particular year, they will declare everything accurately. Hence, 
the probability of detection has a significant role in determining taxpayers’ reporting 
behaviour. For instance, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) analysed individual decision of tax 
planning and tax evasion. Data were gathered from 30 countries. The relationship 
between tax law regulations and tax compliance was significant and positive. Riahi-
Belkaoui concluded the most effective way to deter tax evasion is by creating tax morale 
among taxpayers. 
 
Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (1998) tested on the responses of taxpayers and 
their relationship between the probability of being audited. The result from the 





evasion behaviour with the existence of probability of being detected. However, 
Blumenthal et al. (1998) not clearly indicated the direction of relationship whether 
positive or negative. Different level of probability of detection produces different level 
of compliance. For instance, higher probability of detection will lead to higher 
compliance (Bergman, 1998; Eisenhauer, 2008). However, other researchers results 
identified contradict in some environments (Slemrod et al., 2001; Yong, 2005). 
 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) found that increased enforcement had a positive 
effect on compliance. Such result was also reported elsewhere (Alm, 1991; Pforsich, 
Gill, & Sanders, 2010). The probability of detection has greater consequences to most 
individuals compared to anticipated compliance (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). 
Therefore, Fischer et al. (1992) proposed perceived detection risk to influence 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour than actual detection risk. Perceived detection risk in 
their compliance regression models was developed by Klepper and Nagin (1989).  Roth, 
Scholzand and, Witte (1989) suggested that tax law, demographic characteristics, 
individual experiences, and professional tax advice determine an individual’s 
perception of detection risk.  If the assumption of risk rises and taxpayers assume a low 
level of detection risk, their compliance level will increase even though the rise is small 
(Kagan, 1989). 
 
Detection risk has been examined as a possible determinant of compliance. Roth et al. 
(1989) found evidence of the effect of modification in detection risk on compliance. 
Other scholars also demonstrated that detection risk was positively associated with 






In summary, the probability of detection affects the degree of compliance differently. 
However, Bergman (1998), Eisenhauer (2008), and Slemrod et al. (2001) found that an 
increase in the probability of detection led to a higher level of compliance. The next 
section discusses tax agents as a moderator.  
 
3.15  Tax Agent as a Moderator of Tax Non-compliance 
Tax agents under Section 90 of Customs Act (1967) are defined as a person who has 
passed the examination and successfully attended the courses conducted by the RMCD 
on matters related to customs. Tax agents are given written authority to act on behalf of 
importers. Their duties involve preparing importation and exportation forms, advising 
importers and exporters on duties need to be paid, and arranging goods delivery for 
importers (Customs Act, 1967). The literature suggests no one terminology or definition 
that refers to the person hired to offer tax consultations to taxpayers. As a consequence, 
different terminologies have been used including ‘tax agent’ (Mohd Isa, 2012); ‘tax 
practitioner’ (Dubin, Graetz, Udell, & Wilde, 1992; Tan, 1999); ‘tax professionals’ 
(Kahle & White, 2004); and ‘tax preparer’ (Klepper, Mazur, & Nagin, 1991). Tax 
agents in this study include the employees hired by a tax agent's firm.  
 
Previous research indicated mixed results on tax agents and taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour.  Tax agents play a vital role in determining the compliance level of importers 
as taxpayers. In direct and indirect taxes, tax agents are engaged to make tax 
declarations due to their expertise in tax rules and regulations. However, tax agents and 
tax non-compliance were not explored in indirect taxes. Therefore, the present study 






In Malaysia, Hai and See (2011a) investigated whether 195 sole proprietors’ tax non-
compliance behaviour was manipulated by a tax and account preparer. The theory of 
reasoned action model by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) was used. The finding indicated 
that tax agent had a positive association with tax compliance behaviour.  
 
In a different study, Lai and Choong (2009) examined the tax preparers’ perspective on 
Self-Assessment System (SAS) and tax complexity on corporate taxpayers. The sample 
was obtained from 700 tax preparers who attended the “Budget 2008 Tax Seminars” 
organised by the Malaysian Institute of Accountants. They found the implementation 
of SAS increased taxpayers’ compliance cost by hiring tax preparers and benefits the 
tax authority. They concluded that SAS was not introduced efficiently because the 
relationship between the tax authority and tax preparers did not improve as a result of 
the lack of knowledge between tax staffs, especially on complicated business issues.  
 
Choong, Tong, and Tan (2008) investigated Malaysian taxpayers’ opinion towards tax 
practitioners from two perspectives. The first one was related to the present tax 
practitioners and the second on the nature of best practitioners. The sample was drawn 
from the target population consisting of sole proprietors, partnership, self-business 
people, and working adults. A non-probability sampling technique was selected to 
choose 100 respondents. The study showed a significant and positive relationship 
between preferred tax practitioners and tax compliance.  
 
In Germany, Blaufus, Hechtner and Möhlmann (2014) investigated the association 
between the expenses incurred for tax preparation by tax professionals and tax 





estimated tax savings, causing non-compliance. Devos (2012b) studied the impact of 
tax professionals on tax compliance in Australia. He audited taxpayers who had been 
imposed penalty between the year 2004 and 2006. He revealed a statistically significant 
positive association between the advice furnished by tax professionals and taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour.  
 
Shafer and Simmons (2008) examined tax professionals’ readiness to provide violent 
tax avoidance of corporate clients with Machiavellianism effect (tricks and dishonest 
conduct). A survey was conducted on 1,000 tax professionals comprising public 
accounting and private industry in Hong Kong. The result showed that 
Machiavellianism effects influenced tax professionals’ judgments from considering 
corporate ethics and social responsibility. The researchers concluded that corporate 
responsibility mediated the association between Machiavellianism and a social/ethical 
decision made by tax professionals. They also found that Machiavellianism had a 
significant direct effect on social and ethical responsibility in determining corporate tax 
compliance. 
 
Stephenson (2007) examined the conflict between taxpayers’ intention to hire tax 
preparers to lessen the probability of tax audit and increase tax declaration accuracy. 
Data gathered from 510 tax preparers were drawn from the South-eastern University 
Income Tax School mailing list. He found the support that tax preparers were more 
aggressive in tax planning than taxpayers’ preference.  
 
Marshall, Smith, and Armstrong (2006) demonstrated that tax preparers’ unethical 





Niemirowski and Wearing (2003) studied 62 tax agents in Australia and found 
similarities between taxpayers’ and tax preparers’ compliance behaviour. The minimal 
difference was only found in the level of tax knowledge and risk transferred to tax agent 
to minimise tax non-compliance.   
 
Even though tax agents help remove computational and informational obstacles in tax 
compliance, they also have the skills and knowledge to facilitate their customers in 
manipulating chances for tax non-compliance (Murphy, 2004a). According to Klepper 
et al. (1991), tax agents play a dual role. Based on their exclusive information they have 
in tax law, tax agents play a role as ‘enforcers’ and ‘exploiters’ of the tax law. Further, 
Klepper et al. (1991) proposed that tax agents will be enforcers of the law in 
unambiguous situations. In this situation, tax agents will make sure compliance by 
preparing vigilant tactics in tax minimization. On the other hand, they have the tendency 
to become exploiters of the law and encourage tax avoidance in an ambiguous situation.  
Tax agents will manipulate the grey area of the tax law with the expertise and 
knowledge they have. Numerous research has been done to identify whether taxpayers 
who self-prepare tax declarations are more non-compliant than those whose 
declarations are professionally prepared by tax agents. However, professionally 
declared taxes by tax agents are more prone to non-compliance as suggested in findings. 
For instance, a study conducted by Smith and Kinsey (1987) through audit found that 
certified practising accountants and attorneys had saved higher dollar of tax when 
audited the tax returns prepared by them. Erard (1993) also found higher non-
compliance from the tax returns declared by paid preparers. Ayres, Jackson and Hite 
(1989) found tax returns prepared by tax agents in the United States audited in 1979 





prepared by tax agents. Hence, the Australian Taxation Office encountered a serious 
potential loss of tax revenues due to non-compliance.  
 
Tax agents consider their customers as a motivator for the aggressive tax declaration 
(Attwell & Sawyer, 2001; Schisler, 1994). Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) conducted a 
study on 2,040 Australian taxpayers. They found three categories of tax consultations 
needed by taxpayers. The ‘honest and risk-averse’ was the most preferable and 
demanded category. The second demanded category was ‘cautious minimization of 
tax’. Tax professionals prevent hassle and are experienced in determining chances to 
lessen tax. The final category needed by taxpayers was those with ‘creative accountant, 
aggressive tax planning type’. In this category professionals needed by taxpayers are 
those who have strong contacts and aware of the matters related to the tax authorities’ 
objectives at that moment. These is contradict from the second type of professionals; 
the creative professionals are vulnerable with minimizing taxes. Based on the findings, 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) concluded these is less preferable to honest taxpayers.  
 
In summary taxpayers’ preferences in selecting tax preparers rely on they want to 
achieve in declaring tax returns. For instance, if they prefer tax minimization they will 
seek for aggressive tax preparers who have, at the same time, a concern on the risk of 
penalties and audit rate imposed by tax authorities. On the other hand, taxpayers will 
value tax practitioners’ consultations if the former is confused with the tax system. The 








3.16  Summary 
Tax non-compliance is an increasing topic of research in developed and developing 
countries. Each country has its strategies in managing tax compliance. Tax laws, 
regulations and determinants of non-compliance vary from one country to another. 
Economic factors such as tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit and probability of detection 
were shown to both positive and negative relationships with compliance. Social and 
individual factors also play an important role in determining tax compliance among 
taxpayers. For instance, tax fairness, tax knowledge, peer influence, and corruption are 
the factors beyond the tax authority’s control. 
 
The Fischer model was reviewed as a base to develop a proposed model of the present 
study. Based on the review, no single model can integrate the determinants of tax non-
compliance. Hence, a continuous adaptation and expansion of the model are needed to 












4.1  Introduction 
The research methodology from various previous studies adapted to suit the objectives 
of the study is described in this chapter. Details of the theoretical framework, 
hypotheses development based on the research questions of this study are discussed. 
This chapter also describes the research design, the measurements of the variables, the 
data collection procedure, and data analysis. 
 
4.2  Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is developed to formulate testable hypotheses and 
operationalized based on theory (Hair, Money, Samouel & Page, 2007; Kumar, Talib 
& Ramayah, 2013). This study’s conceptual framework is developed based on 
deterrence theory and Fischer’s model. The model has seven independent variables 
comprising tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, 
and corruptions. Probability of detection and tax agents are the moderating variables 

























4.3 Tax Non-compliance Behaviour Based on Deterrence Theory and Fischer’s 
Model  
 
Most tax compliance literature was based on deterrence theory pioneered by Becker 
(1968). This theory is about an individual’s intention to maximise the expected utility 
by engaging in tax non-compliance. In this theory, taxpayers are assumed to gamble by 
weighing the uncertain benefits gained by successful evasion against the risk of being 
caught and punished. Thus, this theory focuses on the potential costs and benefits of 
non-compliance in monetary terms. Further, this theory proposes that tax rate, 
probability of detection, and penalty determine the monetary cost of compliance which 
motivates compliance behaviour. If these were the determinants influencing taxpayers’ 























Jackson and Milliron (1986) reviewed taxpayers’ compliance behaviour literature and 
identified 14 associated key variables. Further, Fischer et. al (1992) categorised these 
variables into four groups. They are demographic variables (age and gender), those that 
proxy with non-compliance opportunity (education, income level, income source, and 
occupation), attitude and perception (ethics, perceived fairness of the tax system, and 
peer influence) and tax system structure (complexity of the tax system, penalty, 
probability of detection, and tax rates). Hence, the Fischer model of tax compliance 
blends economic, sociological, and psychological factors.  
 
4.4  Modification of Fischer’s Model 
The current study used two constructs of the Fischer model, i.e., tax system structure 
and attitude and perceptions. It also added and omitted a few variables to suit the nature 
and environment of tax non-compliance among importers on excise duty. The Fischer 
model was applied to the indirect tax environment based on three similarities: (a) the 
tax amount paid based on self-assessment by taxpayers or through tax agents; (b) the 
tax owed to the tax authority; and (c) the tax law in making tax declaration.  
 
Taxpayers maximise their utility in a gambling situation by evaluating between the 
uncertain profit gained from successful non-compliance and the chance of being 
detected and punished (Fischer et al., 1992). Hence, the tax system structure in the 
Fischer model comprising tax rate, penalty rate, and probability of detection was 
adapted in this study. Compliance behaviour of taxpayers is determined by the 
monetary cost of compliance (Fischer et al., 1992). Tax rate and penalty rate were tested 
as direct determinants of excise duty non-compliance while probability of detection was 





dependent variable relationships (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Further to identify whether 
moderator strengthening the relationship between the independent and dependent 
relationship (Dawson, 2014).   
 
Tax audit was added in the tax system structure based on its significant deterrent effects 
on importers as taxpayers. Previous studies indicated that audit experiences had an 
effect on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour (Isa & Pope, 2011). Tax audit variable was 
included to test the impact of audit experience and the frequency of audit implemented 
by RMCD in the current tax system structure on non-compliance. Therefore, tax audit 
was tested as having a direct effect on excise duty non-compliance.  
 
The expanded Fischer’s model includes opportunity and attitude in evading taxes. The 
tax system structure might affect the attitude and perceptions of taxpayers (Fischer et 
al.,1992). Furthermore, attitude and perceptions produce a positive or negative 
assessment of an object. Taxpayers with a positive attitude towards tax evasion are 
more prone to non-compliance than those with a negative attitude (Barbuta-Misu, 
2011). Taxpayers’ attitude and perception comprising tax fairness and peer influence 
are given an important consideration by Fischer et al. (1992). Hence, tax fairness and 
peer influence were predicted to influence excise duty non-compliance directly. 
 
Taxpayers’ knowledge of the current tax rules, regulations and provisions will enhance 
voluntary compliance (Saad, 2012b). Moreover, tax professionals are employed by 
taxpayers for numerous reasons including to declare accurate tax returns due to the lack 
of tax knowledge and the complexity of the existing tax laws. Furthermore, taxpayers 





knowledge may also be used to manipulate the loopholes in tax laws. Hence, tax 
knowledge is a key element in determining compliance and non-compliance behaviour. 
Tax knowledge variable was added to have a direct effect on excise duty non-
compliance. 
 
The impact of corruption on economic growth has been debated extensively in the prior 
literature. Bribes can be a direct incentive for civil servants to perform or support 
private agents to defeat the tax law burdens (Sequeira & Djankov, 2014). Hence, 
corruption in tax administration exists due to the interaction between a tax authority 
and businesses, which will benefit both but cause losses in tax revenue (Antonakas et 
al., 2013). Therefore, corruption was identified to have a direct effect on excise duty 
non-compliance. 
 
The compliance level of taxpayers relies on the tax preparers’ behaviour. If tax 
preparers prefer to be aggressive in tax declaration, then there is a hidden cost of the 
risk of audit. Further, the burden is transferred to the taxpayers without their 
understanding or approval. Erard (1993) found that tax agents had a significant 
influence on their clients’ compliance. In the context of RMCD, most importers rely on 
tax agents for customs declaration on goods importation (RMCD Annual Report, 2014). 
Hence, a tax agent variable was selected to moderate non-compliance behaviour of 
importers. As a moderator, tax agents could strengthen the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables (Dawson, 2014).         
 
Demographic factors consisting of age and gender might not affect non-compliance 





were observed because most of the importation businesses in cigarettes, liquor and 
imported vehicles are dominated by males (RMCD Annual Report 2012). However, 
since most of the prior compliance studies in developed and developing countries had 
tested demographic factors such as age extensively and found consistent and significant 
results  (Chau & Leung, 2009; Devos, 2008; Ritsema et al., 2003). Therefore, this study 
decided not to consider age and gender. 
 
The non-compliance opportunity constructs comprising education, income level, 
income source, and occupation are dimensions associated with the income tax 
environment. Since excise duty is an indirect tax which is paid based on the value of 
imported goods, tariff code, and tax rates, they were not considered in this study.  
 
4.5  Hypotheses Development 
Hypotheses are formulated based on the research questions derived from the problem 
statement in chapter one and past literature. Hence, hypotheses can be one-tailed 
(directional) or two-tailed (non-directional) (Cohen & Holliday, 1982). In this study, 
directional hypotheses were developed in line with research question, past literature, 
and researcher’s knowledge as practitioner.  
 
For the moderator variables, the existence of an interaction effect not only be predicted, 
but also its form. A moderator increases or decreases the relationship between two other 
variables should be specified as part of the priori hypotheses as formed in this study 
based on Dawson (2014). Hence, the moderators of probability of detection and tax 
agent are hypothesized in a positive relationship for all the constructs except for tax 





one construct moderates the direct relationship between two other constructs will be 
stronger or weaker with a positive or negative moderator relationship.  
 
4.5.1. The Relationship between Tax Rate and Excise Duty Non-compliance in the 
Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
According to the Fischer model, tax rate is one of the factors purported to influence tax 
non-compliance behaviour. Prior studies investigating tax rate and tax compliance 
produced mixed results. For instance, Fisman and Wei (2004) examined the tax rate 
influence on tax evasion of trade flow between Hong Kong and China. They revealed 
that evasion gap was highly associated with tax rates. Products with higher tax rates 
caused a loss in revenue. High tax rates had induced taxpayers to underreport unit 
values and labelled higher taxed products as lower taxed products (mislabelling). 
Additionally, if the marginal tax rate is increased, taxpayers are likely to understate 
their tax returns (Clotfelter, 1983; Skinner & Slemrod, 1985), reflecting non-
compliance (Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012). Also, Mohd Yusof et al. (2014) reviewed tax 
non-compliance among small-and-medium-sized corporations (SMCs) in Malaysia and 
found a positive significant relationship between marginal tax rate and corporate tax 
non-compliance. 
 
Deterrence theory suggests that an increase in tax rate will decrease the compliance 
level (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Clotfelter, 1983). In a cross-national study, 
Richardson (2006a), revealed that tax rates had no significant relationship with tax 
evasion. A similar finding was reported by Wu and Teng (2005) who showed that 
increases in tax rates induced willingness in cheating. Pommerehne and Weck (1994) 





Alm et al. (1992c) found that tax rates increases led to tax evasion. Therefore, the 
current study proposed the following hypothesis: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between tax rate with excise duty non-
compliance.  
 
The impact of a tax rate established if taxpayers are aware of the probability of 
detection. Trivedi et al. (2003) argued that probability of detection will affect taxpayers 
who are intentionally involved in evading tax. Moreover, tax non-compliance will be 
prejudice to those who are paying and complying the tax laws. The probability of 
detection as a moderator is evaluated in monetary terms. Taxpayers will engage in non-
compliance by weighing the successful evasion and risk being detected and punished 
with the cost incurred for lawful compliance. Therefore, a higher tax rate for the three 
commodities in this study will induce more smuggling and illegal trade offences. The 
stronger enforcement measures of high probability of detection might affect the strength 
or nature of the relationship between tax rate and excise duty non-compliance (Dawson, 
2014). Hence, the hypothesis for moderating effect between tax rate and non-
compliance in this present study was formulated below: 
H1b: The positive relationship between tax rate and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger when probability of detection is high.  
 
A tax agent acts as an intermediary between RMCD and importers for the purpose of 
goods clearance. Further, tax agent can directly affect the importers’ level of 
compliance (Devos, 2012b). Tax rate and tax non-compliance are related to monetary 
cost (Devos, 2012b). Most importers rely on tax agents’ expertise and technical 





influence of a tax agent on non-compliance involves risk and potential cost saving of 
importers for their cargo clearance. If importers are aggressive in saving cost by non-
compliance, a tax agent will fulfil the client’s expectations to minimise the cost when 
the tax rate is high. A tax agent as a moderating variable might strengthen the direction 
between the independent and dependent variables (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the 
moderating effect hypothesis was formulated: 
H1c: The positive relationship between tax rate and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger when tax agent’s influence is high. 
 
4.5.2 The Relationship between Penalty Rate with Excise Duty Non-compliance 
in the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
A penalty is correlated with punishment or sanctions. There are mixed findings on the 
impact of penalties on tax non-compliance. A majority of tax compliance literature 
showed a significant association between penalties and tax compliance behaviour 
(Maciejovsky, Schwarzenberger, & Kirchler, 2012). Tax compliance was determined 
by the severity of penalties (Chau & Leung, 2009). Devos (2013) found a positive 
association between penalties and tax compliance. Slemrod (2004) revealed that penalty 
severity deterred taxpayers from reporting accurate tax returns based on the tendency 
of profit is greater than the tendency in losing which indicated the negative relationship 
between penalty rate and tax compliance. Doran (2009) argued that tax penalties play 
a fundamental role in enhancing compliance for two reasons. Firstly, there is an 
assumption that non-compliant taxpayers are frightened with legal sanctions. Secondly, 
complied taxpayers must be assured that non-compliant taxpayers are penalised. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis was proposed: 






The classical model of deterrence relies on the belief of taxpayers. Compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers is shaped by the legal punishment such as penalty and their 
perceptions of probability of detection. The theory assumes that taxpayers will not 
violate tax laws by engaging in tax non-compliance if the predictable penalties are 
higher than the additional savings from tax evasion conduct (Murphy, 2004a). The low 
penalty rate imposed might not efficient compared to the benefit of successful evasion. 
Hence, the probability of detection might strengthen the association between penalty 
rate and excise duty non-compliance (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
 H2b: The positive relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger when probability of detection is high. 
 
Compliance depends on importers’ preferences whether they are ‘risk adverse’ or ‘risk 
seeking’ to non-compliance opportunities (Devos, 2012b). The excise duty law 
ambiguity will motivate tax non-compliance exploitation (Devos, 2012b). Importers’ 
risk preferences determine the type of advice tax agents provide to benefit the 
importers. The positive association between penalty rate and excise duty non-
compliance will be strengthened by a tax agent influence (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis was developed: 
H2c: The positive relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger when tax agent’s influence is high.   
 
4.5.3 The Relationship between Tax Audit with Excise Duty Non-compliance in 
the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
Taxpayers’ non-compliant behaviour will be detected through investigations and tax 





example, Tagkalakis (2013) showed a significant positive correlation between tax audit 
and tax compliance. A similar finding was reported by Isa and Pope (2011) and Beron, 
Witte and Tauchen (1990). However, Frey (2003) found that tax audit reduced 
compliance behaviour.  Alm, Jackson, and, McKee (1992a) found that tax audit effects 
were nonlinear and small, which reduced the deterrent impacts on taxpayers’ 
compliance. A similar finding was reported by Alm, Deskin, and  McKee (2004) and 
Alm and McKee (2006) in their experimental study. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was developed: 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between tax audit with excise duty non-
compliance.  
 
Tax non-compliance among importers will be reduced if RMCD increases probability 
of being detected through an audit. Under section 44 of Excise Act (1976) at all-time 
Customs officers has access to inspect any places or premises, business records, 
containers any goods or materials regarding importers business. This measure only 
effective for importers not willing to take risk of probability being caught and punished 
(opposed ambiguity). However, reduces or motivates non-compliance for those love 
ambiguity (willing to take the risk to gain profit from non-compliance behaviour). 
Therefore, ambiguity preferences about the probability of being detected through audit 
may not be an effective policy for RMCD to increase importers’ compliance. This is 
based on goods classification in Harmonised System nomenclature divided into 21 
sections and 96 chapters based on their usage and what they are made from (Kappler, 
2011). The goods descriptions usually are technical and bound to law only understood 
by experts (Kappler, 2011). RMCD’s auditors categorised or divide goods on their basis 





committed an offence based on their jurisdiction of classification and this act are liable 
for goods forfeiture. This is not a desirable instrument for reducing tax non-compliance. 
Hence probability of detection will strengthen the positive relationship between tax 
audit and excise duty non-compliance (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
H3b: The positive relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger when probability of detection is high. 
 
A tax agent is obligated to provide advice and services to clients by fulfilling various 
compliance regimes regulated by various border agencies and protect them from being 
penalised if audited. In auditing, RMCD expects accurate goods declarations and excise 
duty payment. However, importers as taxpayers try to minimise their tax liabilities by 
exploiting tax rules and regulations (Maclean, 2006; McKerchar, 2007). If RMCD 
increases tax enforcement through audit, tax agents will advise non-compliance based 
on importers’ risk preferences and their audit experience. Therefore, the higher the audit 
rate, the higher will be excise duty non-compliance when tax agents fulfil importers’ 
preferences. Hence, a tax agent might affect the strength of the relationship between tax 
audit and excise duty non-compliance (Dawson, 2014). Hence, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
H3c: The positive relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger if tax agent’s influence is high. 
 
4.5.4   The Relationship between Tax Fairness with Excise Duty Non-compliance 
in the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
Tax fairness has an important role in determining tax non-compliance behaviour. Most 





indicated mixed results. Taxpayers’ attitude and perceptions of a tax system’s fairness 
has been identified as a fundamental determinant that significantly impacts on tax 
compliance behaviour (Alabede, 2012). If taxpayers perceive the tax system to be 
unfair, they are motivated to engage in non-compliance behaviour (Gilligan & 
Richardson, 2005). According to Kirchler (2007) and Wenzel (2004b), fairness can be 
categorised as retributive justice, procedural justice, and distributive justice. Retributive 
justice concerns with the fairness of applicable penalties against individuals who do not 
abide by tax rules and regulations. Procedural justice concerns with the fairness of 
revenue distribution and distributive justice are defined as fairness in the interchange 
of revenue based on costs and benefits.  
 
In relation to distributive justice, comparisons are made based on individual, groups 
and social levels. At the individual level, fairness is mostly related to the tax burden. If 
individuals and groups perceive that their tax burden is greater than other individuals’ 
and groups’, they will be non-compliant. At the social level, if the tax system is 
perceived unfair it may motivate tax non-compliance (Kirchler, 2007). Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976) stated that if taxpayers believe that the tax system is unfair, they are 
more prone not to comply with the tax rules and regulations. According to Porcano 
(1984), the fairness of tax system is determined by the ability to pay and fulfilled needs 
of taxpayers. Additionally, Richardson (2006a) found a significant and negative 
correlation between tax evasion and tax system fairness. Murphy (2004b) revealed 
procedural fairness and tax compliance were directly and positively related. Similarly, 
Verboon and van Dijke (2011) demonstrated that procedural fairness and deterrence 






H4a: There is a negative relationship between tax fairness with excise duty non-
compliance. 
 
The economic theory emphasises deterrence by increasing the probability of detection 
based on punitive and persuasive approaches.  The focus of this section is based on the 
persuasive approach of tax fairness to shaping importers’ non-compliance behaviour.  
Importers’ (taxpayers) ultimate goal is to maximise their utility based on the cost-
benefit approach. Tax non-compliance is viewed from money paid as tax, assumed 
worthwhile if financial gains from taxes paid outweigh the cost needed to comply with 
the tax laws. For instance, if the money paid as tax is used to increase the political, 
economic, and social welfare of people and not spent or invest in non-beneficial 
government projects, the tax paid is fair. It is concluded that perceived fairness will 
contribute to voluntary cooperation in paying taxes. Further, the enforcement measures 
carried out by Customs authorities through probability of detection by inspecting 
imported goods at port. The efficiency and fairness for the traders relies on the 
inspection time and logistics cost which could lead the price increase of the imported 
goods (Han, 2011). Hence, the probability of detection has a strong effect on 
strengthening the relationship between tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance 
(Dawson, 2014). Based on the above explanation of the moderating effect of probability 
of detection, it was hypothesised that: 
H4b: The negative relationship between tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger when probability of detection is low. 
 
The World Customs Organization, the World Trade Organization, and various ASEAN 





Importers’ perceived tax system fairness based on the amount of tax paid evaluated by 
customs assessment officers. If the importers perceive that the tax rate imposed on 
similar goods varies among the states in Malaysia, they are likely not to comply. They 
are likely to go for aggressive tax declarations through tax agents (Hite, Hasseldine, Al-
Khoury, James, Toms & Toumi, 2003).  Tax agents as a moderating variable might 
strengthen the negative relationship between tax fairness and excise duty non-
compliance (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
H4c: The negative relationship between tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger if tax agent’s influence is low. 
 
4.5.5    The Relationship between Peer Influence with Excise Duty Non-compliance 
in the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
Peer influence comprises members of the family, current or future employer, close 
friends, and spouse or significant others (Hanno & Violette, 1996). Peer influence is 
the perception of other people’s action in a particular situation will lead to the approval 
or disapproval of behaviour of an individual (O'Shaughnessy, 2014). Peer influence and 
tax compliance showed mixed results in previous findings. The tax compliance 
literature indicates that taxpayers are more likely to evade taxes if they believe their 
peers are doing so (Grasmick & Scott, 1982; Spicer & Becker, 1980). This phenomenon 
can be explained by the theory of reasoned action which proposes that an individual’s 
intention is formed by attitude and subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Attitude, whether positive or negative, will influence behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980) whereas subjective norms refer to an individual’s belief in referent groups that 
causes him/her to perform a specific behaviour (Bobek, Roberts & Sweney, 2007). For 
instance, if tax evasion is a group norm and expectation, individuals are likely to 





(1978), the knowledge received from peers on taxes and politics will increase tax 
evasion. Alon and Hageman (2013) found a negative relationship between 
particularised trust (belief in peers, family and peers) and tax non-compliance. 
Similarly, Torgler (2012) found that dissatisfied individuals were more prone to discuss 
political issues with peers especially on the tax paid and the benefits received . 
Therefore, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between peer influence with excise duty non-
compliance. 
 
The economic model of compliance focuses increasingly on the probability of detection 
as an enforcement measure to deter non-compliance behaviour. Importers rely on their 
peers to declare goods to the RMCD by comparing the possibility of being caught and 
the cost of getting punished. Importers are influenced by peer behaviour depends on 
peers experience being caught and penalised due to the high probability of detection. 
Therefore, the probability of detection may strengthen the original association between 
predictor variables and non-compliance of excise duty as a criterion variable (Dawson, 
2014).  Hence, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H5b: The positive relationship between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger when probability of detection is high. 
 
Competition forces importers to pay a lower customs duties and taxes because higher 
customs duties and taxes translate into a higher cost of importation. Therefore, tax 
agents are usually engaged to prevent or evade the cost (Weerth, 2009). Tan (2011) 
mentioned that the advice given by tax agents to their clients depends on the client’s 





tax returns was influenced by the opinion given by their peers.  Hence, the positive 
relationship between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance may be 
strengthened by tax agents’ high influence (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
H5c: The positive relationship between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger if tax agent’s influence is high. 
 
4.5.6  The Relationship between Tax Knowledge with Excise Duty Non-
compliance in the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as 
Moderators 
Tax knowledge is needed to ensure voluntary compliance of taxpayers (Saad, 2014). 
Intentional or unintentional non-compliance behaviour among taxpayers is caused by 
the absence of tax knowledge (McKerchar, 1995). Tax knowledge is essential in 
shaping compliance behaviour (Mansor et al., 2004; Palil, 2010). Loo, McKerchar, and 
Hansford (2008) and Loo et al. (2009) found that tax knowledge was an influential 
factor in determining taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. The higher the tax knowledge, 
the higher the compliance level (Kasipillai & Abdul Jabbar, 2003; Kirchler, 
Niemirowski, & Wearing, 2006).  
 
However, Harris (1989) showed no direct and significant influence of tax knowledge 
on compliance behaviour. Collins et al. (1992) found a negative relationship between 
tax knowledge and tax compliance. In sum, the literature shows mixed findings in tax 
compliance studies. Thus, the proposed hypothesis was:   







Importers are assumed rational economic evaders for assessing the cost and benefit of 
tax non-compliance. If they are caught because of the high probability of detection, they 
have to pay more including the penalty. Hence, adequate knowledge can be used not to 
comply. Also, higher probability of detection is likely to encourage importers to apply 
knowledge of tax laws to undervalue, misclassify, and underreport tax declarations. 
Hence, probability of detection might strengthen the direction between tax knowledge 
and excise duty non-compliance variables (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
H6b: The positive relationship between tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger when probability of detection is high.  
 
 Customs declarations need a correct classification of the commodity. The six digit-
concept identified for each 5000 commodity code is accepted universally and applied 
by more than 200 customs administration around the globe (WCO, 2014). There are 99 
chapters under 16 headings in the customs commodity code for product categories. 
Technical knowledge of the classification of goods is needed for customs declarations. 
Therefore, tax agents are assigned to make customs declarations based on their 
understanding and knowledge of suitable customs commodity codes to the correct 
product. If importers’ ultimate goal is to maximise profit by aggressive tax planning, 
their tax agent will advise under-declaration, misclassification of tariff category, 
smuggling and falsifying country of origin (Uzzaman, & Yusuf, 2010).  Tax agents as 
a moderator variable might strengthen the positive direction of the association between 
tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance (Dawson, 2014). Therefore, the 





H6c: The positive relationship between tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance 
will be stronger if tax agent’s influence is high. 
 
4.5.7  The Relationship between Corruption with Excise Duty Non-compliance 
in the Presence of Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
Corruption is an escalating problem in most developing countries (Alabede, 2012). The 
mixed findings are indicated pertaining corruption and tax non-compliance. Uslaner 
(2010) argued that corruption will deter taxpayers from paying taxes. Torgler (2003a) 
claimed that overcoming corruption will restrict taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. 
Similarly, Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) maintained that taxpayers would feel deceived 
if they perceive their tax burdens are not spent fairly. The successful control of 
corruption is positively related to tax compliance (Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006). 
Uslaner (2010) revealed the greater compliance level could be achieved with fewer 
corruptions. Akdede (2011) found a negative relationship between corruption and tax 
evasion. Also, Alon and Hageman (2013) found that trust as moderator weakened the 
negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance. 
 
Customs officers are responsible for determining the value of imported goods and the 
total tax paid for the imported goods through classification (Flatters & MacLeod, 1995). 
Taxpayers true tax liabilities rely on the assessment made by the customs officials. 
Customs officers’ involvement in corruptions is related to misclassification of imported 
goods, lower rating to the restricted categories of goods, and understating the volume 
of shipments (Flatters & MacLeod, 1995). Hence, the suggested hypothesis was: 







Corruption among customs officers involves unlawful consideration to serve importers 
as taxpayers. That is, the misuse of official powers is in the process of implementation 
and enforcement of the existing tax laws in importation procedures. It is proposed that 
the involvement of corrupted customs officers will be high when probability of 
detection is high. That is when there is an increasing number of inspections of 
containers at entry ports, road blocks and routine inspections at the smuggling-prone 
places such as rivers at Kelantan, Perlis, Bukit Kayu Hitam, Thailand, and Indonesia 
borders, corruptions are likely to be higher. Importers perceive excessive non-
compliance cost is needed with existing tax laws when caught and penalised . Further, 
Çule and Fulton (2009) concluded that increases in corruptions and tax non-compliance 
in a business environment, if acceptable, will lower compliance cost. Hence, the 
positive relationship between corruption and excise duty non-compliance will be 
strengthened when probability of detection is high. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
was proposed: 
H7b: The positive relationship between corruption and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger when probability of detection is high. 
 
Customs officers have discretionary powers and interact daily with tax agents who 
represent importers for goods declarations and clearance from ports. Almost every duty 
carried out by customs officers is vulnerable to corruption. These include valuation and 
classification; cargo examination; exemptions and drawback schemes; and licenses 
issuance. Potential corrupted customs officers will be involved with tax agents through 
bribery to reduce trade barriers imposed for importation. Tax agents will perform 
aggressive tax consultations for the taxpayers if an ambiguous tax environment exists 





excise duty non-compliance will be strengthened with high tax agents’ influence. The 
following hypothesis was proposed: 
H7c: The positive relationship between corruption and excise duty non-compliance will 
be stronger if the tax agent’s influence is high.  
A summary of the hypotheses developed is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Hypotheses and Research Questions  
Research Questions Hypotheses (H) 
1. What is the relationship between predictor 
variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax 
fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, 
corruption) with excise duty non-compliance by 
importers? 




2.  To what extent the probability of detection have a 
significant moderating effect on the relationship 
between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, 
tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax 
knowledge, corruption) with excise duty non-
compliance by importers? 
H1b, H2b, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b 
and H7b 
3.  To what extent tax agent have a significant 
moderating effect of tax agent on the relationship 
between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, 
tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax 
knowledge, corruptions) with excise duty non-
compliance by importers? 
H1c, H2c, H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c and 
H7c 
 
4.6 Research Design 
In social science research, there are two different philosophical paradigms known as 
positivism and interpretivism. According to the positivist approach, the researcher 
views the social world objectively and confirms it by using a systematic process  
(McKerchar, 2010). Practically, the positivist approach is associated with quantitative 
research. On the other hand, the interpretivist approach are based on face to face 





(Carroll & Swatman, 2000). In this study, a survey method was used based on the 
quantitative research approach. According to Richardson and  Sawyer (2001), a survey 
method is commonly used by most tax compliance researchers. Similarly, Torgler 
(2007) stated that the preference in using a survey method is to assist a researcher in 
acquiring data pertaining attitude and socio-economic variables of the taxpayers. In 
developed and developing countries, this method was used vastly in tax compliance 
studies (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001;  Kasipillai & Abdul-Jabbar, 2006; Nor Aziah, 
2004; Saad, 2011; Verboon & van Dijke, 2011). Creswell (2013) further maintained 
that in a complex study with many variables, a quantitative method is the most suitable 
approach. 
 
4.7 Questionnaire Design 
Questionnaires were prepared in both Malay and English languages. Despite the Malay 
language being the national language in Malaysia, the English language is widely used 
in commerce (Foo & Richards, 2004). Therefore, the questionnaires were prepared in 
both languages. The questionnaire had eight sections (refer Appendix A). Section A 
asked demographic questions of importers, such as gender, age, race, the level of 
education, and current position. Section B was related to non-compliance of excise duty 
while Section C had questions on the tax system structure. Questions like tax rate, 
penalty rate, and tax audit were asked. In Section D, questions were about attitude and 
perceptions of tax fairness and peer influence. Section E was about excise duty tax 
knowledge, Section F corruption in RMCD and Section G was probability of detection. 






A seven-point Likert scale was used to indicate the degree of agreement and 
disagreement to the statements given. The scale ranged from 1= strongly disagree, 2= 
disagree, 3= disagree somewhat, 4= neutral, 5= agree somewhat, 6= agree to 7= 
strongly agree. The seven-point Likert scale was chosen because it provides sufficient 
choice to evaluate participants’ opinion.  
 
4.8  Operational Definition of Variables 
The model of this study has seven independent variables, two moderating variables, 
and one dependent variable. The independent variables are tax rate, penalty rate, tax 
audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, and corruption. Probability of 
detection and tax agent are the moderating variables. Excise duty non-compliance is the 
dependent variable. The dependent, independent and moderating variables were 
acquired from prior literature, defined in numerous dimensions, and measured using 
different items. The items were measured using an interval scale (Kumar et al., 2013).  
 
4.8.1  Dependent Variable 
Various terms used to define a dependent variable namely criterion or outcome variable 
(Kumar et al., 2013). The researcher’s goal is to explain the variability, describe or 
predict the dependent variable. A dependent variable is the key theme of research 
(Kumar et al., 2013). Excise duty non-compliance as the dependent variable is 
explained in the next paragraph. 
 
4.8.1.1 Excise Duty Non-Compliance 
Excise duty non-compliance is defined as customs fraud, which involves (a) producing 





declaration); (b) misclassification of products (tariff or duty of the products rely on 
which classification it falls, importers improperly describe the product for lower tariff); 
(c) concealing the country of origin (country of origin misstated to avoid quotas, 
embargoes or anti-dumping laws); (4) undervaluing products (declaring lower value 
than the actual value of goods); and (5) smuggling (Excise Act,1976). Tax non-
compliance also involves failure to fulfil tax liabilities, whether those failures are 
intentional or unintentional. For example, sometimes taxpayers’ unintentional mistakes 
are misinterpreted as tax evasion by tax authorities. Therefore, the non-compliance 
outcome might be legal tax evasion or avoidance of tax rules and regulations (Kirchler, 
2007). Tax evasion is defined as an illegal behaviour involving the violation of tax law 
directly to avoid tax payment (Richardson, 2008). In line with this, Webley (2004) 
maintained that tax evasion is an illegal behaviour as it involves breaking the law 
intentionally by undervaluing, understating and falsifying tax declaration to reduce the 
payable amount. Therefore, tax compliance and non-compliance are associated with 
ethical and non-ethical decision-making process in tax declaration (Singh, 2003). 
Indirect tax evasion is regularly correlated with smuggling offences on customs tariff. 
Tax evasion from importation and exportation of commodities to evade Customs duties 
is done by mis-declaration and under-invoicing (Miskam et al., 2013). 
 
Tax rules and regulations are ambiguous (Kirchler, 2007). According to Slemrod, 
Blumenthal and Christian (2001), even though there is a legal borderline that 
differentiates between tax evasion and tax avoidance, practically these two terms are 
still vague. Again, they explained that the tax laws itself are ambiguous; at times the 
rules and regulations are clear, but taxpayers are not aware or misinterpret it. Now and 





by the administration. Hence, tax non-compliance in the present study refers to under-
declaration, double invoicing, falsifying documents, incorrect statements such as under-
value of goods and misclassification of tariff codes and goods that do not pass through 
customs clearance to evade excise duty.  The offences on excise duty are detected 
through audit, investigations on companies’ profiles, and information received from the 
public on smuggling and illegal trade offences of three main commodities.  
 
In measuring non-compliance variable, items were adapted from  Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010). Tax non-compliance was measured with nine items to identify the actual 
behaviour and the acceptability of excise duty non-compliance. For example, the 
intention was measured by items such as “There is no problem in under declaring in 
Customs declarations” and “I will attend a course which informs me about the current 
possibilities for evading tax (1 = strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree). A total score 
was calculated as an index of excise duty non-compliance. 
 
4.8.2  Independent Variables 
Independent variable is known as a ‘predictor’ or ‘explanatory’ variable (Kumar et al., 
2013). This variable influences a dependent variable in either a positive or negative 
direction (Kumar et al., 2013). The variance of a dependent variable is estimated by an 
independent variable. In other words, an increase of each unit in the independent 
variable will cause an increase or decrease in the dependent variable (Kumar et al., 






4.8.2.1 Tax Rate 
Tariff (tax) rate is defined as the rate levied on import or export goods for raising 
revenue (Customs Act, 1967).  A tax rate is operationally defined as the rate imposed 
on cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles bound under Excise Act (1976) and Customs 
Duties Order (2012). A tax rate is determined by the class of goods under the 
Harmonised System. The classification of goods is developed and maintained by the 
World Customs Organization via the International Convention on the Harmonised 
Commodity Description and a coding system known as the Harmonised System (WTO, 
2014). The five items to measure tax rates were adapted from Alabede (2012b). The 
questions asked whether participants believed the tax rates are the cause of smuggling 
activities. The total score of the five items was taken as an index for the tax rate. 
 
4.8.2.2 Penalty Rate 
Punishment is imposed for breaking the Excise Act (1976) for providing incorrect or 
untrue documents and statement, falsifying documents, fraudulently altering 
documents, and failing to make declarations on dutiable imported goods. Previous 
literature indicates that a higher penalty rate was imposed to reduce tax evasion (Borck, 
2004). Penalty rate in the current study is the penalty rate imposed under the Excise Act 
(1976) to deter taxpayers from evading tax. Penalty severity was measured by five items 
using a hypothetical scenario. Participants indicated on a seven-point Likert scale 
whether they agreed or not with a particular penalty rate imposed for tax non-
compliance. Two items were about paying tax with a fine while the remaining three 
items asked willingness to pay fine or face the risk. All items were adapted from Devos 






4.8.2.3 Tax Audit 
From the customs perspective, the audit is defined as a systematic examination of 
books, records, businesses system and commercial data stored by importers directly or 
indirectly involved in the payment of tariff or taxes (Excise Act, 1976). RMCD 
performs the audit to ensure taxes paid are correct and accurate, detect customs fraud 
and take appropriate action, and motivate awareness and compliance with the customs 
laws and regulations (Excise Act, 1976). Tax audit involves an examination of customs 
declaration forms, supporting documents for importation such as invoice, bill of lading, 
packing list and relevant permits and other financial affairs. The audit is carried out to 
detect whether the actual tax payable is in accordance with tax laws provisions (Excise 
Act, 1976). The tax audit in the present study is based on taxpayers’ experience, and 
the impact of an audit carried out by customs auditors. Five items to measure tax audit 
were adapted from Isa and Pope (2011). The items measured taxpayers’ attitude and 
perceptions of audit and audit experience conducted by customs auditors. The total 
score was taken as an index for a tax audit. 
 
4.8.2.4 Tax Fairness 
Tax fairness is the comparison between the taxes paid and benefit or contributions 
received by taxpayers in return. It also involves the comparison of tax feelings of how 
one is treated compared to others (Kirchler, 2007). Tax fairness perception is important 
to ensure tax compliance (Bobek, 1997). Accordingly, tax fairness was operationally 
defined as the fairness in excise duty system in RMCD and taxpayers’ perception of the 
government especially the benefits received as a return from the excise duty paid. Tax 
fairness was measured by seven items. Three items asked about the fairness of tax 





questions asked the fairness received from the government in exchange for the tax paid. 
The seven items were derived from Gilligan and Richardson (2005). The total score 
was taken as an index for tax fairness. 
 
4.8.2.5 Peer Influence 
Peer influence is mostly correlated with the person close to an individual such as 
friends, business partners, colleagues and relatives (Hai & See, 2011b). Peer influence 
is the perception of the social pressure whether to execute or not to execute the desired 
behaviour  (Ajzen, 1991). In the context of this study, peers refer to family members, 
counterparts (other importers), tax agents, friends and society. To measure this variable, 
five items were adapted from Bobek et al., (2007). The total score was taken as an index 
for peer influence. 
 
4.8.2.6 Tax Knowledge 
Tax knowledge is defined as taxpayer’ ability to understand tax rules and regulations 
and calculate the tax liabilities (Ahmad, & Brookins 2007). Many past studies in 
Malaysia measured taxpayers’ tax knowledge by the understanding of concepts and tax 
law (Manaf, Hasseldine, & Hodges, 2005). However, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
evaluated taxpayers’ knowledge on tax laws and the ability to compute tax liabilities 
on their own. For the purpose of the current study, tax knowledge was measured by tax 
law particularly the rules, regulations and procedures on the importation of cigarettes, 
liquor and imported vehicles under the Excise Act (1976). Participants were asked 
about the current tax rate, license renewal, procedures for importation, examination of 
importers’ premises without a search warrant, and sanctions imposed to those 





of Eriksen and Fallan (1996). Seven questions were asked. A sample item was 
“Customs officers can search without a warrant in any premises and vehicles if they 
have reasonable cause to believe that goods are concealed or deposited goods therein 
against Excise Act (1976)”. The total score was taken as an index for tax knowledge. 
 
4.8.2.7 Corruption 
Corruption is defined as giving a bribe to corrupted customs officers to facilitate and 
evade official trade barriers through undervaluation, misdeclaration and 
misclassification (Parayno, 1999). Corruptions are most attractive in tax administration 
based on their monopoly power which will be an incentives for taxpayers to involve in 
tax non-compliance. Corruptions in tax administration involve tax authority and 
businesses (Antonakas et al., 2013), leading to losses of tax revenue and genuine 
entrepreneurs. When businesses face tax complexity and other customs procedures, 
they are likely to offer bribes to the tax authority (Antonakas et al., 2013). 
 
Corruption in this study is defined as customs officers’ involvement in accepting bribe 
by allowing firms to avoid tax laws, especially in customs clearance procedures. They 
misuse the authority given to them for personal gains. Eight items to measure corruption 
were adapted from Collins et al. (2009). Participants were asked about how often their 
firm is involved in corrupt transactions through “commissions” or “gifts-in-kind”. The 
total score was taken as an index for corruption. 
 
4.8.3 Moderator Variables 
A moderator or moderating variable alters the direction or strengthens the association 





noted that the strength or nature of two variables affected by a moderator variable is 
known as an interaction effect. The following subsections discuss probability of 
detection and tax agent as moderator variables. 
 
4.8.3.1  Probability of Detection 
Probability of detection is defined as uncertainty of undeclared goods that will be 
detected by investigations and examinations of customs declarations documents and 
containers (Excise Act, 1976 ). Uncertainty might increase tax non-compliance 
(Scotchmer & Slemrod, 1989). Tax evasion will be worse if the current penalty rates 
are relatively low. From the RMCD’s perspective, probability of detection involves the 
information given by an informer on the misconduct of importers in evading taxes by 
underreporting, misclassification and under-value. Based on this information, the 
containers and customs forms will be inspected thoroughly. Moreover, the routine 
inspections conducted as a prone area for smuggling offences will be carried out.  
 
Probability of detection was measured by six items, which covered probability of 
detection after under-reporting and the risk taken by considering the cost involved when 
committing non-compliance behaviour. The six items were adapted from Wenzel 
(2004b). The total score was taken as an index for probability of detection. 
 
4.8.3.2 Tax Agent 
Tax agents are defined as external professionals engaged based on their expertise and 
superior knowledge in handling tax matters on behalf of taxpayers (Sapiei & Kasipillai, 
2013). Tax agents act as advocates for their clients (Tan & Sawyer, 2003). Due to the 





2014). Mohd Isa (2012) revealed that many corporate taxpayers in Malaysia relied on 
tax agents for tax compliance and a tax planner. According to Devos (2012a), three vital 
factors why tax agents are engaged in tax declaration: tax complexity, to get a legal 
reduction in tax, and to avoid making mistakes.  However, tax agents are also used for 
aggressive tax planning to avoid taxes (Lubbe & Nienaber, 2012). Many importers 
hired tax agents for their goods clearance from the landed ports (RMCD’s Annual 
report, 2013). In this study, tax agents were defined as tax agents engaged by importers 
for customs declarations. The tax agents appointed by importers had been attended 
course on matters pertaining Customs and pass the examination as stated under Section 
90 of Customs Act (1967). 
 
To measure tax agents, five items adapted from Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) were 
used. The questions asked participants to interpret tax agents’ influence on tax non-
compliance. The total score was taken as an index for tax agent. 
 
4.9 Data Collection Procedure 
Data for analysis could be obtained from the primary (first-hand information received 
by the researcher based on the interest of the study) or secondary sources (sources that 
already exist such as government report, organisational report and accounting 
documents) (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Further, the data can be collected either by 
quantitative or qualitative method (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The quantitative method 
involves the collection of information from respondents such as questionnaires while 







Data in this study were obtained from primary sources using a quantitative survey 
method. Questionnaires were distributed personally to improve the response rate. Also, 
this technique of data collection was used because the researcher had access to the 
mailing address of respondents. The other alternative to approach this targeted groups 
are through the RMCD’s database.  
 
The questionnaires distributed to the potential respondents with the support from the 
RMCD’s Head of Enforcement Division in every state. Before that, the researcher 
directly met the Enforcement Division to explain the nature of the current study and 
discuss the potential number of respondents required. The potential respondents were 
provided with questionnaires attached with the covering letter from ‘Universiti Utara 
Malaysia’ (refer Appendix B). The letter emphasised the purpose of the study and that 
the respondents’ anonymity would be maintained.   
 
4.10 Population 
Population refers to the whole group of people, things or events that a researcher is 
interested in investigating (Kumar et al., 2013). For the purpose of this study, 
population (offenders) refers to the list of all importers (companies) of cigarettes, 
imported vehicles, and liquor who committed offences under the Excise Act (1976) 
which are kept confidentially in the RMCD office. The list of offenders for the year 









Table 4.2  
The number of Population for Cigarettes, Imported Vehicles and Liquor in Malaysia 
for the Year 2014 
Commodity 
 
Number of Companies 
Committed an Offence 
N 
Cigarettes 552 
Imported Vehicles 320 
Liquor 403 
Total                 1,275 
Source: RMCD Annual Report 2014 
 
4.11 Unit of Analysis 
A unit of analysis refers to a single member of the sample studied (Kumar et al., 2013). 
The unit of analysis in the current study was companies registered under Companies 
Commission of Malaysia (Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia) and have committed an 
offence for cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles under Excise Act (1976). To 
represent the company, managers were recruited to respond to the survey because they 
occupy strategic positions in their companies and were directly involved in ensuring 
tax compliance of their companies and statutory laws. They were also directly involved 
in operations and customs declarations.  
 
4.12 Sample Size Determination Using Gpower Analysis 
In research, it is a common practice to use samples to generalise the population involved 
(Saad, 2011). A model and its characteristics should be considered when determining a 
sample size (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). Cohen (1992) argued that an effective 
technique to determine a sample size is by using power analysis to achieve reasonable 
power. Hence, Gpower software was used for the said purpose. Since the model has 11 
predictors (7 direct predictors, 2 moderators predictors and 2 interactions), the effect 





power analysis recommended by Lowry and Gaskin (2014) and Hair, Hult, Ringle and, 
Sarstedt (2016). Based on the analysis, the minimum sample size required was 123 as 
shown in Figure 4.2. The researcher set out to collect data which was equal to or larger 
than the required number. To collect sufficient data, it was recommended that 
researchers increase the sample size to compensate for low or non-response rate and 
outliers (Israel, 2009; Kotrlik & Higgins, 2001). Hence, the sample size for the current 
study was increased to 600 to overcome the possibility of low or non-response rate. The 
minimum sample size required is shown in Figure 4.2 and the sample size drawn for 
offenders for each commodity is shown in Table 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.2 





Table 4.3  














Cigarettes 552 260 43.33 
Liquor 403 190 31.67 
Imported Vehicles 320 150 25.00 
Total 1,275 600      100.00 
Source: RMCD Annual Report 2014 
 
4.13 Sampling Techniques 
This study used a disproportionate stratified random sampling technique to select the 
sample. According to Kumar et al. (2013), the disproportionate sampling technique is 
selected when there is more variability within the stratum. The population in this study 
was homogeneous and divided into subgroups based on commodities known as strata. 
A simple random sampling was used to draw the sample from each stratum (Kumar et 
al., 2013). For the purpose of this study, there were three strata of offenders divided by 
commodities, i.e., cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles. From each commodity 
group, samples were drawn using simple random sampling, which was carried out by 
using SPSS version 22.  
 
4.14 Pilot Study  
Before the main study, a pilot study or pre-testing was carried out to test the adequacy 
and improve a survey instrument (Saad, 2012a). Further, the pilot test was done to 
ensure both content validity and face validity (Kumar et al., 2013). In pretesting some 
of the questions were reconstructed and rewritten to suit the research objectives. Here, 





(Synodinos, 2003). Experts in taxation and methodology from Tunku Puteri Intan 
Safinaz School of Accountancy, Universiti Utara Malaysia were asked to review and 
comment on the questions. The questionnaire was improved by integrating their 
suggestions and comments. The reliability and validity of the translated instruments 
were pretested among potential participants (Synodinos, 2003). The questionnaires 
were then distributed to 45 offenders for cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles from 
Penang State Enforcement Division. The response rate from the study was 100%. 
However, only three questionnaires were not useable because the offenders did not 
assign tax agents for their tax declaration. 
 
The reliability analysis was conducted to test the internal consistency of the 
measurement (Nunnally, 1978). The reliability was analysed using SPSS Version 22. 
The closer the reliability coefficient to 1.0 the better it would be. Sekaran and Bougie 
(2013) maintained that a reliability coefficient of more than .80 is good, but a 
coefficient in the range of .70 is acceptable and less than .60 is poor. The result of the 
reliability analysis for the pilot study is ranging from .93 to .64 considered acceptable 
as shown in Table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4 
The Reliability Test Results for Pilot Study (n=42) 
Latent Variables Number of Items Cronbach Alpha 
Excise Duty Non-compliance 9 .719 
Tax Rate 2 .814 
Penalty Rate 4 .772 
Tax Audit 3 .934 







Corruption 8 .887 
Probability of Detection 6 .735 





The feedback from the pilot study received was used to conduct the reliability test on 
the instrument as shown in Table 4.4. This pilot study highlighted the difficult, 
unnecessary and ambiguous questions. As a result, a penalty rate question number 4 
was removed to increase the reliability coefficient .44 to .77.  
 
4.15 Data Analysis 
This section explains the statistical technique to analyse the data collected. 
 
4.15.1 Partial Least Square (PLS) Structural Equation Modelling Approach 
The most two common approaches performed in structural equation model (SEM) to 
estimate the relationships are covariance-based SEM (AMOS and Lisrel) and variance-
based SEM (partial least squares) (Hair, Balck, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Hair et al., 
2011). The main difference between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM is that CB-SEM mainly 
focuses on theory testing confirmation while PLS-SEM on theory prediction (Hair et 
al., 2011). The consideration whether to use CB-SEM or PLS-SEM relies on the study 
objectives and the characteristics of data (Hair et al., 2016). 
 
Nowadays, PLS-SEM is commonly used by researchers due to its ability in handling 
convergence issue (Henseler, 2010). Secondly, it is considered a “silver bullet” because 
it has the potential to explain the causal relationship between multiple independent and 
dependent variables in theoretical models (Hair et al., 2010). Furthermore, PLS-SEM 
performs well in non-normal data distribution, and it can examine the theory and its 
measures simultaneously (Chin & Newsted, 1999). As this study is prediction 
orientation, PLS-SEM was chosen. Also, PLS-SEM is appropriate for complex models. 





Another reason for selecting PLS-SEM is that it has two dominant unification 
approaches. PLS-SEM can examine the measurement model (outer model) and 
structural model (inner model) (Lee, Petter, Fayard, & Robinson, 2011) simultaneously. 
The relationship between the latent variable and its manifest variables is explained in 
the measurement model while the unobserved variables and their relationships are 
explained in the structural model. The constructs in this study were reflective. The PLS 
algorithm was performed to obtain the results for loadings between the reflective 
constructs and their indicators in the measurement model. 
 
PLS-SEM tools are rarely applied in indirect tax non-compliance studies. The use of 
PLS-SEM was to show that PLS-SEM tools can be successfully applied to indirect tax 
non-compliance model also. SmartPLS version 3.2.4 was used to explain the 
relationships between the variables.  
 
To test moderation, Dawson (2014) model was used. Dawson (2014) explained that a 
moderator variable would affect the strength or nature of the association between 
independent and dependent variables. The effect of a moderator is described as a two-
way interaction plot.  In this plot, the simple slope analysed slope differences are tested 
(Dawson, 2014). 
4.16 Summary 
This chapter presented explained the methods and procedures to achieve the objectives 
of the current study. The conceptual model was developed based on deterrence theory 
and extended Fischer model (1992). The model has seven independent variables, two 
moderating variables, and one dependent variable. Based on the model, 21 hypotheses 





Survey questionnaires were used to collect data. Disproportionate sampling technique 
was used to select the sample. PLS-SEM was employed to analyse the data. Before the 
main study, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 22 was used to 
test the reliability of the data collected for the pilot test. In the next chapter, the results 











This chapter presents the results of the survey. This chapter comprises 11 sections. The 
first section is the introduction followed by preliminary data analysis. Section three 
covers the estimation technique for missing data and outliers. The next section provides 
non-response bias analysis. Section six focuses on the assumptions of multivariate tests 
whole the next section elaborate the participants’ profile. Section eight describes the 
characteristics of the data. The structural model to test the research hypotheses for a 
direct relationship and indirect relationship, the estimation of the coefficient of 
determination (R2), the effect size (f2), and predictive relevance (Q2) is assessed in 
section nine and ten. The importance of performance map analysis (IPMA) is presented 
in section eleven. Finally, section twelve summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Data Editing and Coding 
The raw data were edited to ensure their completeness after they were collected. After 
the data had been entered into SPSS, the editing process began. There are two ways of 
editing: precoding and post coding (De Vaus, 2013). This study employed the 
precoding technique whereby all items in the questionnaire were pre-coded with 
numerical values. Otherwise, it cannot be counted or manipulated for analysis (Sekaran 
& Bougie,2013). 
 
To ensure the less favourable of low value and more favourable in high value, the 





indicators with negative statements were recoded in a positive direction. The indicators 
recoded involved tax rate item number 1, penalty rate item number 4, tax agent item 
number 8, the probability of detection item number 1, 2, 3, and 6, and excise duty non-
compliance item number 2 and 3. 
 
5.3 Analysis of Missing Values 
Before the analysis, data screening was conducted to check for missing values to meet 
the requirement of the SEM analysis (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Furthermore, the 
data organisation and conversion into the appropriate form ensure the quality of data 
for analysis (Kristensen & Eskildsen, 2010). The participants’ failure to answer one or 
more questions caused missing data (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). An observation was 
removed from the data file if the missing data exceeded 15% (Hair et al., 2016). A 
statistical package like PLS requires missing data remedied by a mean value 
replacement. Hair et al. (2016) suggested the indicator variable’s missing value is 
replaced with the mean of indicator’s valid values. The mean replacement applied in 
this study was based on the rule of thumb recommended by Hair et al. (2016). The mean 
value replacement is used if the missing value per indicator is less than 5% (Hair et al., 
2016). In this study, the missing value represented less than 5% per indicators as 
illustrated in Table 5.1. The rule of thumb recommended by Hair et al. (2016) suggested 








Number and Percentage of Missing Data 
Construct Missing Value 
Excise Duty Non-compliance 8 
Tax Rate - 
Penalty Rate 7 
Tax Audit 9 
Tax Fairness 3 
Peer Influence 2 
Tax Knowledge - 
Corruption - 
Probability of Detection - 
Tax Agent 7 
Total 36 
No of Data Points Observed variables-  
66 indicators x 521 respondents 
= 34,386 
Percentage of Missing Data 36/34,386 x 100 = 0.10 percent 
 
Thirty-six missing data indicated 0.10 percent of the overall 34,386 data entries. Even 
though the result of missing data is small but could lead errorneous to the result and 
should be remedied. Hence, the Expectation Maximisation (EM) or mean value 
replacement  method available in SPSS version 22 was performed to estimate the value 
of each mean and covariance evaluation (Little & Rubin, 2014). The missing value of 
an indicator variable replaced with the valid values of that indicator which reduces the 
variability in the data (Hair et al., 2016).  The EM method was applied because it has 
less bias and fewer convergence problems with randomly missing data condition.  
 
5.4 Analysis of Outliers 
Hair et al. (2016) defined outliers as extreme answers to certain questions or the entire 
questions. Outliers occur due to data entry error. For instance, “77” is typed instead of 
“7” in the seven-point Likert scale. Hair et al. (2010) stated that outliers occur if the 
values in the data stand out from the observation due to unusually high or low values. 





(2013) noted that “to avoid biased results, the data must be checked for both univariate 
(outliers on one variable alone) and multivariate (outliers on a combination of variables) 
outliers” (p.168). This study used regression procedures to identify univariate and 
multivariate outliers. Univariate outliers were analysed by looking at the z-score 
calculated in the survey data set. Univariate outliers happen when the z-scores are 
greater than ±3.0 as suggested by Coakes and Steed (2003). In this study, only one case 
was deleted based on the guideline. For multivariate outliers, the Mahalanobis Distance 
(D2) approach was applied. The approach evaluated every observation’s distance point 
from the mean centre of the entire observations (Hair et al., 2010). Any Mahalanobis 
Distance (D2) or degrees of freedom greater than ±1.96 or ±2.58 was removed from the 
data. In this regard, 20 companies were identified having degrees of freedom greater 
than ±1.96 or ±2.58 and removed. From 521 companies, 500 companies remained after 
outliers were removed. 
 
5.5 Non-Response Bias 
Non-response bias could mislead statistical analysis and bias on research outcomes 
(Araña & León, 2013). The non-response bias was tested by comparing early and late 
responses. In this study, early responses referred to those who had responded within 
December 2015 and January 2016. On the other hand, late participants were those who 
responded after multiple reminders and follow-ups from February to March 2016. An 
independent sample t-test was carried out to check the mean between the two groups. 
A p value of less than 0.05 was used to determine significance differences in the mean 
values in the two groups (Gaur & Gaur, 2006; Pallant, 2013). The result of the 






The Independent Samples t-Test Results for Non-Response Bias 
Construct Response n Mean SD Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality 
of Means 
     F Sig. 
(p-value) 
t Sig.  
(p-value) 
(2tailed) 































































































































Table 5.2 shows two sets of results. The first was the Levene’s test equality of variance 
and the second t-test equality of mean. The Levene’s test was used to verify whether 
there was any equal variance between the early and late groups before determining the 
appropriate t values in the independent t-test. This was done by checking whether the 
F value was significant at 0.05 or not. If the F value was greater than 0.05, equal 
variances assumed were accepted. Conversely, if F value was less than 0.05, the 
variance of two groups was significantly different. Hence, the equal variances not 
assumed should be used (Gaur & Gaur, 2006; Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 2014).  
 
Based on the above procedure, 500 participants were classified as early (247) and late 
responders (253). The Levene’s test equality of variance showed that the variance 
between the groups was not significantly different on all variables. The t-test results 
indicated no significant differences in all variables between the early and late groups 
because the p values displayed were greater than 0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that 
both groups were not significantly different. 
 
5.6 Assumption of Multivariate Tests 
Certain conditions must be fully filled before performing a multiple regression analysis 
to ensure that the interpretation of regression model is valid. Four main assumptions of 
multiple regression tests were checked, i.e., normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and 
homoscedasticity issues. 
 
5.6.1 Normality Test 
Previously, it was argued that an accurate model estimation of SmartPLS could be done 





Sarstedt, Ringle and Mena (2012) suggested that normality test should be performed by 
researchers as an important test in structural equation modelling. They argued that 
bootstrapped standard errors could be inflated by extreme non-normal data (Hair et al., 
2011). Moreover, the statistical significance of the path coefficients will be 
underestimated (Dijkstra, 1983). In this study, three measures were used to check for 
normality namely skewness and kurtosis, histogram, and normal probability plot. 
 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), skewness relates to the distribution 
symmetry. On the other hand, kurtosis provides information on the peakedness of the 
data distribution. Data are considered reasonably normal if the skewness values are 
within the acceptable range of +3 to -3 as suggested by Kline (1998). Similarly, the 
kurtosis values ranging from +3 to -3 are considered acceptable (Coakes & Steed, 









Statistic Std. Error 
Excise Duty Non-compliance -0.104 0.109 0.313 0.218 
Tax Rate -1.100 0.109 0.782 0.218 
Penalty Rate -0.009 0.109 -0.731 0.218 
Tax Audit -0.294 0.109 -0.172 0.218 
Tax Fairness 0.293 0.109 -0.366 0.218 
Peer Influence 0.039 0.109 -0.660 0.218 
Tax Knowledge -0.799 0.109 -0.101 0.218 
Corruption -0.644 0.109 -0.307 0.218 
Probability of Detection 0.416 0.109 -0.652 0.218 








As shown in Table 5.3, the minimum and maximum skewness values for all the 
variables were -1.100 and 0.416 respectively, which were lower than 3. As for kurtosis, 
the values of all variables ranged from -0.731 to 0.782, which were lower than 3. Based 
on the skewness and kurtosis values, the normality assumption was not violated. The 
histogram of residuals was also performed to check the normality assumption. As 




Histogram of Residuals 
 
The normal probability plot also assessed to establish normality. Figure 5.2 shows the 
cumulative distribution of data values with the cumulative distribution of theoretical 





distribution not deviant and closely followed the straight diagonal line for all the 
variables and individual variable as shown in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 5.2 
Normal Probability Plot  
 
5.6.2 Homoscedasticity Test 
According to Hair et al. (2010), homoscedasticity is the assumption that the dependent 
variable exhibits equal levels of variance across the range of predictor variables. Each 
predictor variable value must be equally dispersed as the dependent variable values 
(Hair et al., 2010). Homoscedasticity can cause the coefficient estimates to be 
underestimated. Furthermore, in some cases, the insignificant variables could be 
significant. In this study, homoscedasticity and the independence of error terms were 





developed by plotting standardised residual values (*ZRESID) against standardised 
predicted values (*ZPRED). The scatter plot for homoscedasticity test is illustrated in 






As indicated, no relationship between the residual and predicted values was revealed. 
According to  Hair et al. (2010), if the scatter plot failed to demonstrate any non-linear 
shaped pattern, triangle, and diamond-shaped, then homoscedasticity or independence 
of residuals is established.  
 
5.6.3 Linearity 
Linearity test refers to examining the linear association between a dependent variable 





obtain this point, the common method performed is the normal P-P plot of regression 
standardised residual plot. The standardised predicted value (*ZPRED) was plotted 
against the standardised residual value (*ZRESID). Figure 5.3 shows the scatters for 
each regression model in the analysis. The scatter plot exhibited no evidence of a non-
linear pattern of the residuals, and there was no sign of a curved pattern of residual 
dispersion (read from left to right), which might imply a non-linear relationship. The 
graph also shows that the residual scores were concentrated at the centre of the zero 
point, suggesting that the linearity assumption was met. 
 
5.6.4 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity exists when the independent variable is highly and significantly 
correlated with another independent variable and distorts the regression results (Hair et 
al., 2010). A multicollinearity issue can be detected when the correlation value is 
greater than 0.90 (Hair et al., 2010). The multicollinearity test was conducted by 
examining the variance influence factor (VIF) and the tolerance values. 
 
The VIF value is the amount of variability of the selected independent variable which 
is explained by other independent variables. On the other hand, the tolerance value is 
the inverse of VIF (Hair et al., 2010). The VIF value must be lower than 10 while the 
tolerance value higher than 0.1 is acceptable (Hair et al., 2010). A VIF value closer to 
1.00 represents little or no multicollinearity issue.  
 
Table 5.4 shows the VIF and tolerance values.  While the tolerance values ranged from 
0.332 to 0.827, the VIF values ranged from 1.209 to 3.01, indicating that 










Tax Rate 0.759 1.317 
Penalty Rate 0.705 1.419 
Tax Audit 0.332 3.013 
Tax Fairness 0.567 1.763 
Peer Influence 0.390 2.564 
Tax Knowledge 0.430 2.326 
Corruption 0.520 1.922 
Probability of Detection 0.827 1.209 
Tax Agent 0.574 1.742 
 
5.7 Respondents’ Profile 
Table 5.5 to Table 5.11 describes the profile of 500 respondents who committed 
offences under the Excise Act (1976). 
 
5.7.1 Gender 
Table 5.5 shows that male respondents committed excise duty offences more than 
female, i.e. 80% as opposed to 19.4%.  
 
Table 5.5 
Respondents by Gender 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 401 80.2 
Female                 97 19.4 
Missing                   2   0.4 
Total               500                100 
 
5.7.2 Race 
Table 5.6 shows that Malay (39.4%) and Chinese (39.2%) respondents were almost 
equally represented. While 13.4% of the respondents were Indians and 7.4% other races 






Respondents by Race 
Race Frequency Percent 
Malay 197 39.4 
Chinese 196 39.2 
Indian   67 13.4 
Others   37   7.4 
Missing                    3   0.6 




Those who were between 30 and 39 (32.8%) years old and 40 and 49 (33.4%) years old 
equally committed excise duty offences. Meanwhile, only three respondents were 60 
years old and above as illustrated in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 
Respondents by Age 
Age Frequency Percent 
20-29  74 14.8 
30-39 164 32.8 
40-49 167 33.4 
50-59   87 17.4 
60 and above     3   0.6 
Missing                    5   1.0 
Total                500                 100 
 
5.7.4 Education Level 
Respondents who had Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) and diploma holders or Sijil 
Tinggi Pelajaran Malaysia were more likely than other educational groups to commit 










Respondents by Education Level 
Education Level Frequency Percent 
SPM  197 39.4 
Diploma / STPM 172 34.4 
Degree 110 22.0 
Others   16   3.2 
Missing                    5   1.0 
Total                500                100 
 
5.7.5 Nature of Goods Imported 
Table 5.9 shows the biggest group of offenders was those who committed an offence 




Respondents by Nature of Imported Goods 
Nature of Imported 
Goods 
Frequency Percent 
Cigarettes  218 43.6 
Liquor  156 31.2 
Imported Vehicles  107 21.4 
Missing                 19   3.8 
Total                500                100 
 
5.7.6 Current Position in the Firm 
As shown in Table 5.10, the biggest group of offenders was managers (48.0%), 
followed by senior managers (14.2%), assistant managers (11.6%) and partners 
(11.2%). Only 5% of the offenders were probation managers. 
 
Table 5.10 
Respondents by Current Position in the Firm 
Current Position in 
the Firm 
Frequency Percent 
Probationary Manager   25  5.0 





Table 5.10 (Continued)   
Current Position in 
the Firm 
Frequency Percent 
Manager 240 48.0 
Senior Manager   71 14.2 
Partner 
Others 
  56 
  41 
11.2 
  8.2 
Missing               9   1.8 
Total            500                 100 
 
 
5.7.7 State of Offence Committed 
As shown in Table 5.11, the offenders came from all over the country, with Johor Bahru 
leading in the survey (13.6%), followed by Kuala Lumpur (12.6%), and Sabah 60 
companies (12.0%). The least number of offenders was from Perlis.  
 
Table 5.11 
Respondents by State of Offence Committed 
State of Offence 
Committed 
Frequency Percent 
Johor Bahru 68 13.6 
Kuala Lumpur 63 12.6 
Sabah 60 12.0 
Sarawak 48   9.6 
Melaka 48   9.6 
Terengganu 36   7.2 
Pulau Pinang 35   7.0 
Selangor 32   6.4 
Pahang 30   6.0 
Kelantan 27   5.4 
Ipoh 20   4.0 
Alor Setar 15   3.0 
Negeri Sembilan  10   2.0 
Perlis  8   1.6 
Total 500 100 
 
 
5.8 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were performed to describe the basic features of each variable. 





values for each item. Table 5.12 to 5.21 show the range and variance in each item and 
construct. 
 
5.8.1 Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Table 5.12 shows taxpayers’ non-compliance behaviour on excise duty. The 
participants were required to express their opinion on excise duty non-compliance 
behaviour from items EDN1 to EDN9. The result showed higher mean values ranging 
from 5.34 to 5.67 for items EDN1, EDN5, EDN7, and EDN8, which represented 
unintentional non-compliant indicators with standard deviations of 1.34, 1.41, 1.22 and 
1.33 respectively. EDN9 showed a mean value of 5.33 and a standard deviation of 1.73. 
EDN2 had a mean value of 4.68 with a standard deviation of 1.88. However, the mean 
values for EDN3 and EDN4 were 2.73 and 3.51 respectively and a standard deviation 
of 1.53 and 1.83 respectively. Overall, the result suggested that the participants might 
not comply with their tax obligations when there is a possibility to do so. 
 
Table 5.12 
Descriptive Statistics on Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Excise Duty Non-compliance       
I pay excise duty as required by 
the Excise Regulations because 
of a sense of responsibility. 
EDN1 500 1 7 5.34 1.337 
It is NOT everyone’s 
responsibility to pay the correct 
amount of excise duty. 
EDN2 500 1 7 4.68 1.883 
I am paying excise duty as 
required by the Excise 
Regulations because I do not 
know exactly how to evade these 
taxes. 
EDN3 500 1 7 2.73 1.525 
There is no problem in under 
declaring the value of goods in 
Customs declaration. 
EDN4 500 1 7 3.51 1.832 





Table 5.12 (Continued)       
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
I pay my excise duty as required 
by Excise Regulations after 
considering into how I could 
legally save taxes. 
EDN5 500 1 7 5.40 1.412 
If everyone paid the correct 
amount of excise duty we would 
receive better public facilities. 
Excise Duty Non-compliance 
EDN6 500 1 7 4.69 1.886 
I ensure the excise duty 
declarations are correct because I 
fear that my reputation would be 
ruined if I were to get caught for 
not following the Excise 
Regulations. 
EDN7 500 1 7 5.67 1.219 
Under-reporting the excise duty 
declaration is not ethical for me 
EDN8 500 1 7 5.62 1.330 
I will attend a course which 
informs me about the current 
possibilities for reducing tax. 
EDN9 500 1 7 5.33 1.726 
 
5.8.2 Tax Rate 
The views of the participants on the tax rate imposed on cigarettes, liquor and imported 
vehicles are presented in Table 5.13. The results of the descriptive statistics in the table 
revealed that the majority of the respondent strongly agreed concerning the higher tax 
rate caused the smuggling activities. These views are convened in items TR2 to TR5 
with high mean values ranging from 5.83 to 5.93 and the standard deviation ranging 
from 1.07 to 1.16. However, the mean score for TR1, 4.43 with standard deviation 1.84 











Descriptive Statistics on Tax Rate 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Tax Rate       
The current tax rates imposed on 
cigarettes, liquor and imported 
vehicles are too high. So it is not 
cheating when you find ways to 
pay less tax than you suppose to. 
TR1 500 1 7 4.43 1.837 
The amount of excise duty paid is 
too high for cigarettes, liquor and 
imported vehicles. 
The higher the tax rate for 
cigarettes, liquor and imported 


























The high excise duty rates for 
cigarettes, liquor and imported 
vehicles will increase the cost of 
importation. 
TR4 500 1 7 5.87 1.116 
The high excise duty rates 
imposed on cigarettes, liquor and 
imported vehicles motivates 
smuggling activities. 
TR5 500 1 7 5.93 1.103 
 
5.8.3 Penalty Rate 
The penalty rate illustrated in Table 5.14.  This scores obtained based on the 
hypothetical scenario related to the penalty imposed for falsifying the Customs 
declarations. The mean value for all the items measuring penalty quite high which are 
ranging from 4.43 to 5.20 with a standard deviation ranging from 1.54 to 1.95. Based 
on the close examinations all of the participants were aware of the consequences and 










Descriptive Statistics on Penalty Rate 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Penalty Rate       
Importer X deserves the harsher 
punishment. 
PR1 500 1 7 4.80 1.788 
X should be personally 
responsible for receiving the 
penalty. 
PR2 500 1 7 4.73 1.906 
X knew the probable 
consequences of his / her 
evasion. 
PR3 500 1 7 4.91 1.849 
X should ignore the penalty and 
take the risk of being caught and 
prosecuted in Court. 
I pay taxes as required by the 
Excise Regulations because the 



























5.8.4 Tax Audit  
Table 5.15 provides an overview of the taxpayer's audit experiences carried out by 
Customs Auditors in items TAU2 to TAU5. Whereas, item TAU1 on their compliance 
level based on the frequencies of an audit carried out which showed the high mean 
value of 5.30 and with standard deviation 1.30. This is an indication that taxpayers are 
more compliant if tax audit conducted quite often. For the items TAU2 to TAU5 the 
higher mean scores ranging from 4.72 to 5.60 with a standard deviation ranging from 
1.24 to 1.83. These indicate that strong agreement that auditors are showing interest  in 
finding fault in their declarations rather than educate them to perform the proper 
Customs declarations. Furthermore, they are forced to accept the audit results even 









Descriptive Statistics on Tax Audit 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Tax Audit       
I pay taxes as required by the 
Excise Regulations because 
Customs Department often 
carries out tax audits. 
TAU1 500 1 7 5.30 1.298 
I accepted decisions made by 
Customs Auditors even if I 
disagreed with them. 
TAU2 500 1 7 5.14 1.379 
The Audit findings are accurate 
and clear. 
I am confident that the Customs 
Auditors will not reveal my 
confidential business 



















Customs Auditors are more 
interested to find fault and 
penalised the company for the 
wrong doings, than helping the 
company to do the right things. 
TAU5 500 1 7 4.72 1.826 
 
5.8.5 Tax Fairness 
Tax fairness was expressed through items TF1 to TF7. The higher the mean represent, 
the fairer perception on tax system structure as in Table 5.16. Items TF1, TF2, TF4 and 
TF5 have mean scores above 5 with standard deviation 1.34, 1.37, 1.12 and 1.15 
respectively. These descriptive statistics suggests that the participants were 
overwhelmingly agreed the excise duty tax system structure is fair. However, the 
participants indicate the mean value of 4 for items TF3, TF6 and TF7. This confirmed 
that participants perceived the government moderately spending taxpayers’ money with 









Descriptive Statistics on Tax Fairness 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Tax Fairness       
Generally, I feel that excise duty 
is a fair tax. 
TF1 500 1 7 5.16 1.337 
I believe that excise duty tax 
system is a fair system that the 
government uses to collect 
revenue. 
TF2 500 1 7 5.23 1.372 
From the excise duty that I paid, 
I get enough return in the form 
of public services. 
Customs Officers tries to be fair 
when making their decisions on 

























The Customs Officers respect 
the taxpayer’s rights as a citizen. 
TF5 500 2 7 5.48 1.147 
The government is NOT being 
transparent in spending 
taxpayer’s money. 
TF6 500 1 7 4.92 1.850 
I believe that the Malaysian 
government is spending public 
fund wisely. 
TF7 500 1 7 4.03 1.883 
 
5.8.6 Peer Influence 
The participants view on tax non-compliance, and peer influence was expressed 
through item PI1 to PI5 and presented in Table 5.17. The participants had an opinion 
that people who are important to them highly influenced their tax declarations with the 
mean values greater than 5 with the standard deviation of these items to range from 
1.25 to 1.37. However, only item PI3 and PI5 has the mean score of 4.00 and 4.84. This 
expressed that they are moderately sure that people who are important to them declared 









Descriptive Statistics on Peer Influence 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Peer Influence       
Most people who are important 
to me think that I should 
declare all my imported goods 
accurately. 
PI1 500 2 7 5.36 1.179 
In general, I want to do what 
most people who are important 
to me think that I should do 
with regard to excise duty. 
PI2 500 2 7 5.32 1.251 
Most people who are important 
to me would not declare their 
goods accurately when 
importing goods. 
PI3 500 1 7 4.00 1.714 
I would be deterred from under-
reporting if I believe that I will 
lose respect of most people who 
are important to me. 
PI4 500 1 7 5.23 1.366 
I usually make decisions to pay 
taxes based on my friends’ 
experiences or suggestions. 
PI5 500 1 7 4.84 1.747 
 
5.8.7 Tax Knowledge 
The descriptive statistics with regard the respondent’s knowledge and understanding of 
tax rules and regulations as in Table 5.18. The result shows that the mean scores 
concerning the participants’ knowledge range from 5.23 to 5.59 together with standard 













Descriptive Statistics for Tax Knowledge 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Tax Knowledge       
I am aware of the current tax rate 
of taxes imposed on the 
cigarettes, vehicles and liquor 
when doing importation. 



















The license issued to the 
taxpayers’ under Excise Act 
1976 should be renewed yearly 
or every 2 years. 
TK2 500 1 7 5.29 1.524 
In my opinion, I know all the 
procedures required for 
cigarettes, vehicles and liquor 
importation. 
As far as I am concern, non-
compliant taxpayers can be 
































Similar to other criminal 
offences, I believe that 
individuals can also be 
prosecuted for not complying 
with the Excise Act 1976. 
TK5 500 1 7 5.59 1.269 
All imported goods will be 
seizure if there is reasonable 
cause that the goods were 
connected to an offence that has 
been committed against the 
Excise Duty Act 1976. 
TK6 500 1 7 5.54 1.276 
Customs Officers can search 
without a warrant in any 
premises and vehicles if they 
have reasonable cause to believe 
that goods are concealed or 
deposited goods therein against 
the Excise Act 1976. 
TK7 500 1 7 5.48 1.385 
 
5.8.8 Corruption 
The perception of the participants towards corruption was evaluated with items CRP1 
to CRP8, and the descriptive analyses of these items are shown in Table 5.19. This item 





corruption with a mean score above 4 and close to 5 and standard deviation of 1.57 to 
1.87. These imply that the participants agreed with the Customs officers’ involvement 
in accepting a bribe in declarations and customs clearance procedures. 
 
Table 5.19 
Descriptive Statistics on Corruption 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Corruption       
Personal payments to Customs 
Officers are required to “get 
things done”. 
CRP1 500 1 7 4.59 1.869 
Businesses generally engage in 
various types of corruption in 
order to compete effectively. 
CRP2 500 1 7 5.04 1.639 
Engaging in various types of 
corruption is a normal part of 
doing business in Malaysia. 
CRP3 500 1 7 4.96 1.567 
Provide “gifts-in-kind” as a 
method for improving the 
responsiveness of Customs 
Officers. 
CRP4 500 1 7 4.73 1.739 
Bribery to the Customs Officer is 
one of the most important 
considerations when doing 
importation business. 
CRP5 500 1 7 4.64 1.840 
Engaging in corruption is one of 
the ways to get things done. 
CRP6 500 1 7 4.81 1.805 
Firms which do not engage in 
corruption will be at a 
competitive disadvantage 
compared to firms that do. 
CRP7 500 1 7 4.91 1.769 
Providing “commissions” is one 
of the, method for 
enhancing/maintaining your 
relationship with Customs 
Officers. 
CRP8 500 1 7 4.78 1.851 
 
5.8.9 Probability of Detection 
Table 5.20 shows the views of the participants on the probability of detection in items 





suggest that participants viewed that uncertainty of undeclared goods will be detected 
are moderate. Comparatively, the participants agreed with mean scores 5.17 and 5.32 
for items POD4 and POD5 that probability of examining the customs declarations 
documents is very high with standard deviation 1.34 and 1.31 respectively. 
 
Table 5.20 
Descriptive Statistics on Probability of Detection 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Probability of Detection       
It is worth paying small tax 
penalties rather than paying the 
actual taxes because the 
likelihood of being caught is 
minimal. 
POD1 500 1 7 4.13 1.712 
The RMCD rarely finds out if 
someone has under-declared his 
tax by intentionally 
misclassifying the tariff code to 
pay less excise duty. 
POD2 500 1 7 4.17 1.684 
It is unlikely for taxpayers to be 
discovered and punished by the 
RMCD if they evaded excise 
duties. 
POD3 500 1 7 4.39 1.680 
Customs Officers will detect if 
your firm has not kept the 
importation documents as 
required in the Excise Act 1967. 
POD4 500 1 7 5.17 1.342 
I ensure the tax declaration is 
correct because there is a high 
probability that I may get caught 
if I did not follow the Excise 
Regulations. 
POD5 500 1 7 5.32 1.311 
I believe that the probabilities of 
being detected by RMCD for not 
declaring the exact amount of 
taxes are low. 








5.8.10 Tax Agent 
The descriptive statistics of items TA1 to TA8 for tax agent as presented in Table 5.21. 
The results indicate that the tax agents engaged by participants are not an honest person 
in item TA1 with a low mean value of 3.76 and the standard deviation is 1.65. 
Moreover, for item TA8 the mean value score of 4.08 and standard deviation 1.90 
shows that the tax agents are not well informed about Customs Regulations 
requirements and they are not complying with them. For the items TA2 to TA7 the 
majority of the participants strongly agreed with mean scores more than 5 and standard 
deviation ranging from 1.01 to 1.40. Tax agents appointed are legalised person under 
Section 90 of the Customs Act (1967). Moreover, they performed aggressive tax 
planning to avoid taxes. 
Table 5.21 
Descriptive Statistics on Tax Agent 
Measure Code n Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Tax Agent       
My tax agent is a very honest 
person. 
TA1 500 1 7 3.76 1.652 
My tax agents help me to 
interpret ambiguous or grey 
areas of the tax law in my 
favour. 
TA2 500 1 7 5.02 1.281 
I have a tax agent who is clever 
in the way he/she arranges my 
affairs to minimise tax. 
TA3 500 1 7 5.07 1.306 
My tax agent has suggested 
complicated schemes that I 
could get into to avoid tax. 
TA4 500 1 7 5.06 1.402 
My tax agent has good 
relationship with Customs 
Officers. 
TA5 500 1 7 5.50 1.105 
My tax agent has attended and 
has passed the Customs Agent 
Basic Course conducted by 
RMCD. 
TA7 500 3 7 5.67 1.012 
My tax agent is aware of the 
Customs Regulatory 
requirements and is very 
compliant with them.  





5.9 Model Evaluation 
The measurement and structural models were examined (Hair et al., 2016). A 
measurement model is also known as an outer model validated by the indicators of the 
respective latent variables. On the other hand, a structural model is also known as an 
inner model which evaluates the relationships between the latent constructs. The 
evaluation of the measurement and structural models is discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
 
5.9.1 Assessing the Measurement Model (Outer Model) 
Reliability, convergent and discriminant validity of the model were checked to evaluate 
the measurement model. All the constructs in this study were measured by multiple 
items. Hence, it is necessary to categorise them as reflective or formative measures 
before assessing the measurement model. Misspecification of the measurement model 
can cause measurement error which will affect the construct’s content validity and the 
structural relationship between them (Coltman, Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2008). 
All multiple items were conceptualised as reflective measures where the indicators are 
highly correlated (Hulland & Business, 1999). These values were used to confirm the 
item’s internal consistency to the respective constructs as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was to examine two types of validity, i.e. 
convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity of a measurement model is 
confirmed by assessing the outer loadings of the indicators, average variance extracted 
(AVE)l and composite reliability (Gholami, Sulaiman, Ramayah, & Molla, 2013). The 











Measurement Model for the Current Study 
 
5.9.1.1 Convergent Validity 
The reliability of individual indicators or measures is assessed by the correlations or 
loadings of the respective constructs and their indicators (Barroso, Carrión, & Roldán, 





0.70 or greater, which indicates that a higher shared variance exists among the 
constructs and their measures are better compared to the error variance (Barroso et al., 
2010; Götz, Liehr-Gobbers, & Krafft, 2010). However, loadings of 0.50 and below are 
also acceptable especially if involving newly developed measures (Hair et al., 2010; 
Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). In fact, Chin (2010) explained that the weak 
indicators might increase a model’s predictiveness as the PLS algorithm helps to 
minimise residual variance issues, provided other reliable indicators exist. This is in 
line with the argument of Hair et al. (2011), where sometimes poor indicators are 
retained to establish composite reliability and content validity. 
 
The internal consistency is measured by the composite reliability of the constructs, 
which is done after the indicator’s reliability is satisfied. For a reflective construct, the 
threshold value suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) of 0.70 is acceptable and 
retained in the study model.  The reliability of the reflective constructs is also measured 
by the AVE scale. An AVE value of 0.50 or greater is acceptable (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981). An AVE that measures 50 percent or more should be explained by the construct 
than its indicator variance. If the value is lower than 0.50, more variance is retained in 
the item’s errors compared to the variance explained by the constructs in the model 







The Results of Measurement Model (Convergent Validity) 




Average       
Variance 
Extracted 
Corruption CRP1 0.853 0.952 0.960 0.750 
 CRP2 0.798    
 CRP3 0.806    
 CRP4 0.894    
 CRP5 0.918    
 CRP6 0.902    
 CRP7 0.876    
 CRP8 0.874    
Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
EDN1 0.822 0.851 0.893 0.627 
 EDN5 0.744    
 EDN7 0.852    
 EDN8 0.792    
 EDN9 0.742    
Peer Influence PI1 0.893 0.800 0.883 0.716 
 PI2 0.881    
 PI4 0.758    
Probability of Detection POD4 0.917 0.808 0.912 0.839 
 POD5 0.915    
Penalty Rate PR2 0.604 0.767 0.770 0.542 
 PR3 0.584    
 PR5 0.959    
Tax Agent TA2 0.722 0.825 0.872 0.532 
 TA3 0.770    
 TA4 0.694    
 TA5 0.793    
 TA6 0.734    
 TA7 0.652    
Tax Audit TAU1 0.793 0.768 0.851 0.589 
 TAU2 0.726    
 TAU3 0.812    
 TAU4 0.735    
Tax Fairness TF1 0.841 0.886 0.921 0.746 
 TF2 0.880    
 TF4 0.877    
 TF5 0.855    
Tax Knowledge TK1 0.875 0.925 0.940 0.694 
 TK2 0.828    
 TK3 0.820    
 TK4 0.661    
 TK5 0.897    
 TK6 0.886    
 TK7 0.842    
Tax Rate TR1 0.517 0.750 0.833 0.504 





Table 5.22 (Continued)      




Average       
Variance 
Extracted 
 TR3 0.820    
 TR4 0.726    
 TR5 0.734    
 
 
Table 5.22 shows the scores obtained from the reflective analysis of the measurement 
model. The loadings for all reflective items surpassed 0.50 and were retained even 
though they did not meet the threshold 0.70 to assure the composite reliability and 
content validity (Hair et al., 2016).  However, the penalty rate item number 1 and 4, the 
tax audit item number 5, the tax fairness item number 3, 6, and 7, the peer influence 
item number 3 and 5, the probability of detection item number 1, 2, 3 and 6, the tax 
agent item number 1 and 8, and the excise duty non-compliance item number 2, 3, 4 
and 6 were below 0.40, hence were dropped from the model. All AVE values were 0.5 
and greater, in support of Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) recommendation that the cut-
off value for  AVE should be 0.5 or higher.  The values indicated that each construct 
shared greater overall amount in the variance with its measurement items as compared 
with other constructs in the model. According to Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau (2000), 
the composite reliability values of factors should exceed the suggested rule of thumb of 
0.70. Moreover, the Cronbach’s alpha values exceeded 0.60 which met the rule of 
thumb requirements of Hair et al. (2010). Thus, from the overall results, it can be 
concluded that the items in this study’s model had adequate convergent validity. 
 
5.9.1.2 Discriminant Validity 
The outer model’s construct validity is established by discriminant validity. 





differentiates between the own respective construct and not related to other constructs 
(Hair et al., 2016). The cross- loadings and the Fornell-Larcker criterion are two 
measures to assess discriminant validity. 
 
5.9.1.2.1 Cross Loadings 
Discriminant validity is established by comparing the indicator loadings with cross-
loadings (Chin, 1998b). The outer loading of the respective construct should be higher 
than other constructs’ cross-loadings (Chin, 1998b). Table 5.23 presents the entire 

















Discriminant Validity Analysis (Cross Loadings) 
Indicator 
Construct 
   CRP EDN  PI POD PR TA TAU TF TK TR 
CRP1 0.853 0.309 0.296 0.204 -0.041 0.479 0.252 0.187 0.244 0.242 
CRP2 0.798 0.392 0.320 0.330 -0.006 0.429 0.332 0.272 0.167 0.176 
CRP3 0.806 0.365 0.315 0.353 0.029 0.430 0.323 0.259 0.105 0.224 
CRP4 0.894 0.327 0.321 0.256 -0.016 0.486 0.254 0.187 0.245 0.219 
CRP5 0.918 0.287 0.308 0.225 -0.056 0.462 0.282 0.184 0.133 0.252 
CRP6 0.902 0.257 0.299 0.206 -0.085 0.476 0.232 0.166 0.134 0.248 
CRP7 0.876 0.292 0.372 0.206 -0.070 0.458 0.261 0.177 0.192 0.259 
CRP8 0.874 0.316 0.349 0.181 -0.065 0.475 0.275 0.198 0.256 0.243 
EDN1 0.196 0.822 0.576 0.503 0.407 0.356 0.610 0.579 0.536 0.260 
EDN5 0.418 0.744 0.443 0.321 0.172 0.379 0.448 0.366 0.454 0.255 
EDN7 0.225 0.852 0.649 0.541 0.392 0.394 0.667 0.607 0.564 0.374 
EDN8 0.308 0.792 0.532 0.535 0.240 0.382 0.537 0.507 0.551 0.292 
EDN9 0.386 0.742 0.453 0.461 0.147 0.385 0.482 0.417 0.459 0.120 
PI1 0.210 0.621 0.893 0.513 0.375 0.397 0.642 0.649 0.627 0.283 
PI2 0.325 0.596 0.881 0.453 0.275 0.409 0.617 0.594 0.588 0.315 
PI4 0.447 0.495 0.758 0.369 0.111 0.428 0.525 0.529 0.478 0.285 
POD4 0.307 0.556 0.498 0.917 0.303 0.343 0.585 0.541 0.503 0.315 
POD5 0.228 0.549 0.473 0.915 0.434 0.298 0.554 0.495 0.475 0.281 
PR2 -0.187 0.101 0.190 0.085 0.604 0.086 0.202 0.145 0.291 0.042 
PR3 -0.238 0.043 0.154 0.050 0.584 0.067 0.163 0.093 0.274 0.020 
PR5 0.027 0.387 0.300 0.448 0.959 0.187 0.448 0.371 0.323 0.167 
TA2 0.498 0.286 0.216 0.204 0.006 0.722 0.224 0.141 0.161 0.035 
TA3 0.554 0.352 0.253 0.263 0.013 0.770 0.267 0.184 0.204 0.072 
TA4 0.619 0.313 0.276 0.267 0.032 0.694 0.280 0.198 0.129 0.089 
TA5 0.416 0.261 0.359 0.194 0.104 0.793 0.280 0.220 0.348 0.222 





Table 5.23 (Continued)            
Indicator 
Construct 
CRP EDN PI POD PR TA TAU TF     TK TR 
TA7 0.115 0.377 0.454 0.281 0.276 0.652 0.405 0.397  0.546 0.327 
TAU1 0.167 0.632 0.552 0.529 0.569 0.328 0.793 0.585  0.485 0.276 
TAU2 0.404 0.492 0.541 0.372 0.125 0.425 0.726 0.535  0.442 0.239 
TAU3 0.273 0.532 0.553 0.505 0.348 0.328 0.812 0.629  0.532 0.304 
TAU4 0.176 0.472 0.521 0.493 0.238 0.285 0.735 0.556  0.367 0.390 
TF1 0.188    0.480 0.539 0.408 0.228 0.227 0.581 0.841  0.374 0.287 
TF2 0.226 0.549 0.571 0.469 0.287 0.253 0.634 0.880  0.406 0.301 
TF4 0.211 0.558 0.624 0.529 0.356 0.381 0.685 0.877  0.581 0.399 
TF5 0.208 0.595 0.671 0.536 0.343 0.385 0.684 0.855  0.622 0.396 
TK1 0.167 0.559 0.617 0.456 0.326 0.429 0.557 0.506  0.875 0.220 
TK2 0.219 0.526 0.581 0.420 0.268 0.398 0.502 0.476  0.828 0.252 
TK3 0.248 0.538 0.594 0.424 0.266 0.447 0.569 0.533  0.820 0.234 
TK4 0.047 0.409 0.363 0.304 0.218 0.125 0.274 0.288  0.661 0.215 
TK5 0.184 0.621 0.602 0.503 0.360 0.408 0.540 0.555  0.897 0.304 
TK6 0.187 0.579 0.585 0.487 0.387 0.450 0.535 0.521  0.886 0.328 
TK7 0.243 0.540 0.540 0.493 0.268 0.385 0.470 0.473  0.842 0.302 
TR1 0.099 0.288 0.294 0.244 0.039 0.185 0.259 0.347  0.319 0.517 
TR2 0.189 0.186 0.189 0.165 0.101 0.172 0.240 0.231  0.159 0.718 
TR3 0.225 0.226 0.230 0.242 0.135 0.192 0.266 0.246  0.220 0.820 
TR4 0.282 0.184 0.194 0.246 0.113 0.182 0.284 0.231  0.172 0.726 











The result in Table 5.23 showed that all the loadings of the measurement items on their 
latent variables were higher than any other cross-loadings, which confirmed adequate 
discriminant validity for further analysis. 
 
5.9.1.2.2 Fornell-Larcker Criterion (Square Root of AVE) 
The Fornell-Larcker criterion was a second method performed to test discriminant 
validity. According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), each construct’s AVE’s square root 
should be larger than to its squared correlations with other constructs in the model. The 
discriminant validity by Fornell-Larcker criterion is established if the AVE’s score is 



















Discriminant Validity Analysis (Fornell-Larcker Criterion) 
Construct CRP EDN PI POD PR TA TAU TF TK TR 
CRP 0.866          
EDN 0.375 0.792         
PI 0.375 0.677 0.846        
POD 0.292 0.603 0.530 0.916       
PR -0.040 0.354 0.310 0.402 0.736      
TA 0.534 0.477 0.483 0.350 0.183 0.729     
TAU 0.325 0.701 0.705 0.622 0.439 0.443 0.767    
TF 0.242 0.635 0.700 0.566 0.355 0.366 0.751 0.863   
TK 0.214 0.651 0.671 0.534 0.363 0.463 0.599 0.582 0.833  
TR 0.267 0.335 0.347 0.326 0.149 0.262 0.390 0.404 0.320 0.710 





Table 5.24 indicates that the diagonal values in the correlation matrix (AVE’s square 
root of the own construct) were greater than other column and row where they were 
located. Therefore, the outer model’s discriminant validity of this study was confirmed. 
As such, the outer model’s construct validity was established, and the subsequent 
hypotheses testing would be reliable and valid. 
 
5.10 Assessing the Structural Model (Inner Model) 
The structural model is assessed when construct’s measures reliability and validity have 
been confirmed. That is, the model’s predictive capabilities and the hypothesised 
relationship between constructs in the research model were examined. This includes 
analysing the variance explained (R2) of the endogenous constructs and the significance 
of the path coefficient estimates to establish theoretical model goodness (Chin, 2010). 
Also, whether the data support the hypothesised research model showed by R2 or 
coefficient of determination values and path coefficients (Chin, 1998a). Further, the 
effect size was used to test whether the change in an exogenous construct has a 
substantive effect on the endogenous constructs (Hair et al., 2016). The blindfolding 
procedure was also performed to calculate the predictive relevance capability. Finally, 
the Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA) was carried out to analyse the 
structural model’s importance of each latent variable of the construct and the 
performance of latent variables. 
 
5.10.1 Coefficient of Determination (R2)  
The R2 values represent the dependent variable’s variance that is explained by the 
independent variables in the research model. The values of R2 are between 0 and 1. The 





of variance explained.  The determination of acceptable R2 values relies on the research 
model complexity and the individual study’s disciplines (Hair et al., 2016). As a rule of 
thumb, Hair et al. (2011) recommended R2 values of 0.75, 0.50, or 0.25 respectively in 
the structural model for endogenous latent variables described as substantial, moderate 
or weak. The R2 values are shown in Table 5.25 to represent the direct effect of excise 
duty non-compliance and the indirect effect of probability of detection and tax agent. 
 
Table 5.25 
The Coefficient of Determination Values (R2)  
Endogenous Construct R2 
Excise Duty Non-compliance 0.630 
Excise Duty Non-compliance (Tax Agent) 0.646 
Excise Duty Non-compliance (Probability of Detection) 0.660 
 
In this study’s model, three endogenous constructs namely excise duty non-compliance, 
tax agent, and probability of detection showed R2 value of 0.63, 0.65, and 0.66 
respectively.  Based on the rule of thumb suggested by Hair et al. (2011) R2 values for 
this study showed a substantial values. This values represents the exogenous latent 
variables combined effect on the endogenous latent variable is substantial or the amount 
of variance in the endogenous constructs substantially explained by all of the exogenous 
constructs linked to it. 
 
5.10.2 Effect Size (f2) for Direct Relationship (Main Effect) 
The effect size was calculated to identify whether the changes in R2 had a substantive 
impact on a dependent latent variable. In the model, f2 was specified as the change in 
R2 in the endogenous construct when exogenous construct was retained or omitted in 





estimation. The formula to calculate the effect size is shown below following Hair et 
al. (2016): 
f2 = R2 included – R2 excluded 
                    1– R2 included 
 
In the equation, R2 included represents the value of R2 of the endogenous construct 
when the exogenous construct is included, and R2 excluded indicates the R2 value of the 
endogenous construct when an exogenous construct is omitted. The effect size for the 
direct relationship is shown in Table 5.26. 
 
Table 5.26 












Tax Rate 0.630 0.630 0.000 0.370 0.00 
Penalty Rate 0.630 0.629 0.001 0.370 0.00 
Tax Audit 0.630 0.613 0.017 0.370 0.05 
Tax Fairness 0.630 0.627 0.003 0.370 0.01 
Peer Influence 0.630 0.622 0.008 0.370 0.02 
Tax Knowledge 0.630 0.609 0.021 0.370 0.06 
Corruptions 0.630 0.625 0.005 0.370 0.01 
Tax Agent 0.630 0.628 0.002 0.370 0.01 
Probability of Detection 0.630 0.618 0.012 0.370 0.03 
 
 
According to Cohen’s (1988), the values of effect size are interpreted as follow: 0.02 
(small), 0.15 (medium), and 0.35 (large). Based on the scores in Table 5.26, the effects 
size ranged from small to or no effect. This indicates that the omitted construct from 
the model did not have a substantial impact on the endogenous construct. 
 
5.10.3 Effect Size (f2) for Probability of Detection and Tax Agent as Moderators 
The endogenous construct’s R2 value was evaluated by adding the moderating effect of 





interaction model R2i. The exogenous constructs were omitted one by one, and again 
the SmartPLS algorithm was run to get the main effect of the respective constructs. As 
suggested by Dawson (2014), the effect size of the moderators was calculated as 
follows: where R2i denotes the interaction value after the all exogenous constructs are 
added to the moderator-endogenous constructs. In this study, probability of detection 
and tax agent represented the endogenous constructs, where ‘i’ was the interaction 
model and ‘m’ was the main effect model. Table 5.27 and Table 5.28 show the effect 
sizes results after the moderating indirect interactions. 
f2= R2i – R2m 
    1 – R2i 
 
The exogenous constructs were retained and omitted one by one to assess whether a 
significant influence has in their respective endogenous constructs as shown in Table 
5.27 and Table 5.28. 
 
Table 5.27 






R2 Interaction - 





Tax Rate 0.660 0.660 0.000 0.340 0.00 
Penalty Rate 0.660 0.659 0.001 0.340 0.00 
Tax Audit 0.660 0.655 0.005 0.340 0.01 
Tax Fairness 0.660 0.658 0.002 0.340 0.01 
Peer Influence 0.660 0.660 0.000 0.340 0.00 
Tax Knowledge 0.660 0.654 0.006 0.340 0.02 










Effect Size for Tax Agent as Moderator (Endogenous Construct) 
 
 
Table 5.27 shows the probability of detection as an endogenous construct explained by 
the exogenous constructs and their effect sizes ranged between 0.00 and 0.01. Further, 
Table 5.28 shows the value of the effect size that ranged between 0.00 and 0.01 when 
tax agent was explained by the exogenous constructs. As a whole, the result indicated 
that the exogenous constructs in this research model either had small effect sizes or no 
effect on their endogenous construct. This result showed the endogenous construct 
when interacted with moderators did not have substantial impact when each of the 
exogenous construct omitted from the model. 
 
5.10.4 Path Coefficient and Hypotheses Testing 
Path coefficient in PLS-SEM structural model is used to assess the strength of the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. Path coefficients of the 
hypothesised relationships between the constructs are performed by bootstrapping or 
resampling techniques (Hair et al., 2016). 
 
5.10.5 Bootstrapping  
Bootstrapping is a well-known non-parametric approach for assessing direct and 





R2 Interaction - 





Tax Rate 0.646 0.646 0.000 0.354 0.00 
Penalty Rate 0.646 0.642 0.004 0.354 0.01 
Tax Audit 0.646 0.646 0.000 0.354 0.00 
Tax Fairness 0.646 0.645 0.001 0.354 0.00 
Peer Influence 0.646 0.644 0.002 0.354 0.01 
Tax Knowledge 0.646 0.646 0.000 0.354 0.00 





known as one of the resampling strategies meant for estimation and hypotheses testing. 
This procedure will generate empirical t-values used to evaluate the significance level 
of the coefficient in the research model (Hair et al., 2016). 
 
5.10.6 Path Coefficient and Hypotheses Testing for Direct Relationship (Direct 
Effect) 
The path coefficient results were obtained by performing PLS algorithm and 
bootstrapping with 600 bootstrap samples as suggested by Hair et al. (2016) which was 
bigger than the actual sample size of 500 to meet the condition. This study’s research 
model was run with all the variables to confirm the direct and indirect relationships 
between the independent, dependent, and moderator variables. Table 5.29 shows the 
results of the structural or inner model and Figure 5.5 illustrates the structural model 









































    P 
Values 
Decision 
H1a TR -> EDN      -0.011 0.029 0.378 0.353 Not Supported 
H2a PR -> EDN 0.027 0.039 0.690 0.245 Not Supported 
H3a TAU -> EDN 0.236 0.052 4.531 0.000*** Supported 
H4a TF -> EDN 0.086 0.046 1.886 0.030** Supported 
H5a PI -> EDN 0.149 0.067 2.220 0.013** Supported 
H6a TK -> EDN 0.225 0.051 4.396 0.000*** Supported 
H7a CRP -> EDN 0.105 0.038 2.769 0.003*** Supported 
Note: *** p<0.01, t=2.330; **p<0.05, t=1.645 
EDN: Excise Duty Non-compliance; TR: Tax Rate; PR: Penalty Rate; TAU: Tax Audit; 
TF: Tax Fairness; PI: Peer Influence; TK: Tax Knowledge; CRP: Corruption 
 
Table 5.29 shows that path coefficients are represented by β-values and significant 
results by t-values. The results were generated using the bootstrapping techniques to 
test H1a – H7a.  
 
The result of the structural model (inner model) showed a non-significant relationship 
between tax rate and excise duty non-compliance (β=-0.011, t=0.378, p>0.1), 
suggesting that H1a was not supported. H2a was also not supported as there was no 
significant relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance (β=0.027, 
t=0.690, p>0.1). However, H3a was supported as tax audit showed a positive 
relationship with excise duty non-compliance (β=0.236, t=4.531, p<0.01). Tax fairness 
also had a positive relationship with excise duty non-compliance (β=0.086, t=1.886, 
p<0.05). H5a, H6a, and H7a were also supported as excise duty non-compliance was 
positively influenced by peer influence (β=0.149, t=2.220, p<0.05), tax knowledge 





5.10.7 Path Coefficient and Hypotheses Testing for Moderating Effect 
(Interaction Effect) 
The moderating or interaction effect exists when a moderator variable influences the 
strength or nature of a predictor variable (independent variable) and the criterion 
variable (dependent variable) relationship (Dawson, 2014; Henseler & Fassott, 2010a). 
Furthermore, when the influence of an exogenous variable on an endogenous variable 
is contingent because of the existence of another variable caused the moderating effect 
(Hair et al., 2016). In this research model, probability of detection and tax agent were 
hypothesised to moderate between the independent and dependent variables. As shown 
in Table 5.30 and Table 5.31, the path coefficient results from bootstrapping showing 
β values and t-values obtained by adding the moderating effect of the dimension 
individually to the excise duty non-compliance as the dependent variable.  
 
According to Henseler and Chin (2010), in PLS-SEM there are four approaches to 
analysing the moderating effect. They are product indicator, two-stage approach, hybrid 
approach, and orthogonal approach. Since probability of detection and tax agent as 
moderators were continuous variables, the product indicator approach was employed 
for calculation method and mean-centred product term generation as suggested by 
Henseler and Fassott (2010a) and Hair et al. (2016).  Table 5.30 and Table 5.31 show 
the path coefficients of the proposed moderating effect of the individual dimension. To 
know whether there was moderation or not, the t-values were considered. The 





































H1b TR1 -> EDN  0.004 0.024 0.167 0.433 Not Supported 
H2b PR1 -> EDN -0.021 0.026 0.839 0.209 Not Supported 
H3b TAU1 -> EDN -0.075 0.032 2.234 0.010** Supported 
H4b TF1 -> EDN -0.045 0.030 1.616 0.068* Supported 
H5b PI1 -> EDN  0.009 0.035 0.247 0.403 Not Supported 
H6b TK1 -> EDN  0.067 0.024 2.749 0.003*** Supported 
H7b CRP1 -> EDN  0.015 0.027 0.578 0.285 Not Supported 
Note: ***p<0.01, t=2.330; **p<0.05, t=1.645; *p<0.1, t=1.280 
 
 
Table 5.30 shows that the moderating effects of the three hypothesised relationships 
(H3b, H4b, and H6b) were supported. H3b was supported (β= -0.075, t= 2.234, p<0.05), 
showing the negative relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance 
with the moderating effect of probability of detection. H4b was also supported (β= -
0.045, t= 1.616, p<0.05), exhibiting a moderating effect of probability of detection on 
tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance. H6b, which proposed that a positive 
relationship between tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance will be stronger 
when probability of detection is higher, was also supported (β=0.067, t=2.749, p<0.01). 
However, no moderation effect of probability of detection on the relationship between 
tax rate, penalty rate, peer influence, corruption and non-compliance [H1b (β= 0.004, 
t= 0.167, p>0.1), H2b (β=-0.021, t=0.839, p>0.1), H5b (β= 0.009, t=0.247, p>0.1) and 
H7b (β=0.015, t=0.578, p>0.1)]. 
 









































H1c TR2 -> EDN -0.003 0.039 0.088 0.465 Not supported 
H2c PR2 -> EDN -0.049 0.021 2.330 0.010*** Supported 
H3c TAU2 -> EDN -0.031 0.053 0.584 0.280 Not supported 
H4c TF2 -> EDN  0.051 0.047 1.082 0.140 Not Supported 
H5c PI2 -> EDN -0.061 0.056 1.092 0.138 Not Supported 
H6c TK2 -> EDN  0.009 0.035 0.251 0.401 Not Supported 
H7c CRP2 -> EDN -0.005 0.025 0.214 0.415 Not Supported 
Note: *p<0.01, t=2.33 
 
Table 5.31 shows that H2c (β=-0.049, t=2.330, p<0.01) was supported. A negative 
relationship between penalty rate on excise duty non-compliance was stronger with the 
influence of tax agent. However, H1c, H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c, and H7c were not 
supported. Tax agent did not moderate the relationship between tax rate (β=-0.003, 
t=0.088, p>0.1), tax audit (β=-0.031, t=0.584, p>0.1), tax fairness (β=0.051, t=1.082, 
p>0.1), peer influence (β=-0.061, t=1.092, p>0.1), tax knowledge (β=0.009, t=0.251, 
p>0.1), corruption (β=-0.005, t=0.214, p>0.1) and   excise duty non-compliance. 
 
5.10.8 Interaction Plot for Moderators 
According to Henseler and Fassott (2010b) “the idea of a moderating effect is that the 
slope of the independent variable is no longer constant, but depends linearly on the level 
of the moderator” (p.723). Hayes (2013) stated that using a graphic presentation enables 
easier interpretation of a moderation effect. Hair et al. (2016) also supported the use of 
slope plots to interpret moderation. Therefore, Dawson’s (2014) template for a 
moderating effect visualisation was adapted. The significant moderating path 





values of independent variables, moderators, and interaction effects were used to 
calculate and plot the graphical slopes of the moderators.  
 
5.10.8.1 Interaction Plot for Probability of Detection  
The slope plot indicates that the relationship between exogenous and endogenous 
constructs was different based on the high and low levels of the moderating effects 
represented by two lines (Hair et al., 2016). The effect of probability of detection was 
plotted for easier interpretation based on the path coefficient values derived with 
moderating effect as shown in Appendix D. The predicted values of an endogenous 
construct (excise duty non-compliance) with high and low values of moderator showed 
the predicted relationship between exogenous and endogenous constructs at different 
levels of a moderator construct (Hair et al., 2016). The relationship between 
endogenous and exogenous constructs with different level of moderators is shown in 
Figure 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. 
 
Note: POD: Probability of Detection; TAU: Tax Audit 
Figure 5.8 




































Figure 5.8 demonstrates a positive relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-
compliance with a high moderating effect slope (dotted line) being much flatter. Thus, 
tax audit became weaker for individuals who perceived a high level of probability of 
detection. On the other hand, for individuals who perceived a low level of probability 
of detection (solid line) the slope was much steeper. That is, with a low level of 
probability of detection, the relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-
compliance became stronger. The subsequent Figure 5.9 shows the moderating effect 
of probability of detection on tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance. 
 
 
Note: POD: Probability of Detection; TF: Tax Fairness 
Figure 5.9 
Moderating Effect of Probability of Detection on the Tax Fairness and Excise Duty 
Non-compliance Relationship 
 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the positive relationship between tax fairness and excise duty non-
compliance with a high probability of detection effect slope (dotted line) being much 



































between tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance was weak for individuals who 
perceived a high level of probability of detection. For low level of probability of 
detection (solid line), the slope was much steeper. Therefore, for individuals who 
perceived a low level of probability of detection, the relationship between tax fairness 
and excise duty non-compliance became stronger.  
 
 
Note: POD: Probability of Detection; TK: Tax Knowledge 
Figure 5.10 
Moderating Effect of Probability of Detection on the Tax Knowledge and Excise Duty 
Non-compliance Relationship 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the positive relationship between tax knowledge and excise duty 
non-compliance with probability of detection as a moderator. The high moderating 
effect is steeper than the low moderating effect. Therefore, for individuals who 
perceived a high level of probability of detection, the relationship between tax 
knowledge and excise duty non-compliance became stronger. The slope for the low 



































low level of probability of detection, the relationship between tax knowledge and excise 
duty non-compliance became weaker.  
 
5.10.8.2 Interaction Plot for Tax Agent 
The relationship between exogenous and endogenous constructs differs depending on 
a high or low level of moderator construct (tax agent). The interaction terms suggested 
that it will become more positive as a tax agent’s influence increases. The result of 
interaction terms for tax agent is based on the path coefficient values derived with 
moderating effect as shown in Appendix E and illustrated in Figure 5.11. 
 
 
Note: TA: Tax Agent; PR: Penalty Rate 
Figure 5.11 
Moderating Effect of Tax Agent on the Penalty Rate and Excise Duty Non-
compliance Relationship 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.11 the relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-



































was steeper. Hence, individuals whose tax agent had a low-level influence, the 
relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance was stronger (solid 
line). However, the slope was flatter when the influence of a tax agent was higher. That 
is, the relationship between penalty rate was weaker for individuals who had tax agents 
with a high-level influence. 
 
5.10.9 Assessing Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
A research model’s predictive validity confirmed by cross-validated redundancy is 
denoted by Q2. Q2 represents the reuse of sampling techniques developed by Geisser 
(1974) and Stone (1974). Also, according to Fornell and Cha (1994), the redundant 
communality values should be greater than zero for all endogenous variables to 
ascertain the predictive validity as shown by Q2 values in this study (Table 5.32). In 
SmartPLS, the blindfolding technique was applied to test the predictive relevance of 
endogenous constructs with the multiple or single items in a reflective measurement 
model (Hair et al., 2016). As a basis, predictive relevance scores of 0.02 are considered 
small, 0.15 medium, and 0.35 large (Hair et al., 2016).  
 
The sample reuse technique or blindfolding is  designed by excluding every dth data 
point for an endogenous construct’s indicator, and the data points are retained for 
parameters estimation (Chin, 1998b; Henseler et al., 2009; Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin, 
& Lauro, 2005).  This process requires omission distance ranging from 5 to 12 as 
recommended by Hair et al. (2016). In this study, the omission distance applied was 7, 
which indicates that the blindfolding technique will eliminate every seventh data point 
of the target construct’s indicator. This blindfolding process will continuously omit and 





variables (Hair et al., 2016). The higher the Q2 value, the higher the predictive 
relevance. The result is shown in Table 5.32. 
 
Table 5.32 
Construct Cross Validated Redundancy 
Endogenous Construct SSO SSE Q2 (=1-SSE/SSO) 
Excise Duty Non-compliance 2,500.00 1,531.87 0.387 
Tax Agent 2,500.00 1,510.01 0.396 
Probability of Detection 2,500.00 1,496.98 0.401 
 
 
Table 5.32 shows that the Q2 values ranged from 0.39 to 0.40, indicating that the 
research model had sufficient predictive relevance.  
 
5.11 Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA) 
The IPMA method is also known as ‘importance-performance matrix’, impact-
performance map’ or ‘priority map analysis’. It is carried out to analyse a structural 
model’s total effects (importance of predecessor construct in forming the target 
construct) and the average values of the latent variables (performance) (Hair et al., 
2016; Ringle & Sarstedt, 2016). The analysis was done by using excise duty non-
compliance, probability of detection, and tax agent as the target constructs or outcome 
variables (endogenous latent variable). The IPMA builds to identify the specific latent 
variables that are highly important to the outcome construct but has low performance 
need to be addressed and improved (Hair et al., 2016). In a structural model, IPMA 
relatively evaluates the importance scores obtained from the total effects of the 
estimated or predicted relationships for explaining the variance of the endogenous 
target constructs (Völckner, Sattler, Hennig-Thurau, & Ringle, 2010). The impact of 





particular endogenous latent variable (Hock, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2010). Subsequently, 
the results provided by IPMA’s analysis enable management to identify and improve 
high importance and low-performance latent variables in excise duty non-compliance 
study (Hock et al., 2010; Schloderer, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2014).  The total effect scores 
for latent variables were obtained from the path model estimation. Meanwhile, the 
index values (performance) was performed by the latent variables means of rescaling 
which ranges from 0 (lowest performance) to 100 (highest performance) (Anderson & 
Fornell, 2000). Table 5.33, 5.34 and 5.35 illustrate the scores of total effects and index 
values in the IPMA analysis. Figure 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 show the total effect and index 
values scores in a priority map. 
 
Table 5.33 
IPMA Results for Excise Duty Non-compliance as Target Construct 




Tax Rate (TR) -0.011 76.392 
Penalty Rate (PR)  0.027 68.420 
Tax Audit (TAU)  0.236 69.904 
Tax Fairness (TF)  0.086 70.823 
Peer Influence (PI)  0.149 67.850 
Tax Knowledge (TK)  0.225 72.804 
Corruption (CRP)  0.105 63.765 
Tax Agent (TA) 0.054 69.851 














Note: EDN: Excise Duty Non-compliance; CRP: Corruption; PI: Peer Influence; POD: 
Probability of Detection; PR: Penalty Rate; TA: Tax Agent; TAU: Tax Audit; TF: Tax 
Fairness; TK: Tax Knowledge; TR: Tax Rate 
Figure 5.12 
Priority Map for Excise Duty Non-compliance as Target Construct 
 
 
The IPMA result is shown in Table 5.33 and Figure 5.12, which indicated the total 
effects involved in the relationship between all the constructs and excise duty non-
compliance as the key target construct. Based on Table 5.33 and Figure 5.12, it can be 
concluded that tax audit and tax knowledge were very important in determining excise 
duty non-compliance due to their relatively higher importance values than other 
variables. The tax rate variable had little relevance because it had low importance even 
though the performance was relatively the highest compared to other constructs. Even 
though variables such as penalty rate, peer influence, probability of detection, tax agent, 
and tax fairness scored relatively high in performance, they had little relevance in 
influencing excise duty non-compliance. Also, the corruption variable was lower in 
performance than other variables and relatively high in importance compared to tax 





The result revealed that tax audit and tax knowledge showed intermediate importance 
and performance compared with other constructs in the model. Hence, to improve 
excise duty non-compliance, RMCD should focus on the performance of tax audit and 
tax knowledge. Moreover, attention should be given to enhancing the importance and 
performance of peer influence as this construct functions as a precursor to tax audit and 
tax knowledge. Table 5.34 and Figure 5.13 show the values and plots for the 
identification and determinants of high importance and low-performance variables for 
probability of detection as a target construct. 
 
Table 5.34 
IPMA Results for Probability of Detection as Target Construct 




Tax Rate -0.040 76.407 
Penalty Rate 0.035 68.444 
Tax Audit 0.180 69.901 
Tax Fairness 0.074 70.824 
Peer Influence 0.130 67.850 
Tax Knowledge 0.307 72.805 
Corruption 0.147 63.763 










The path modelling from the importance-performance analysis allows the detection of 
improvement for excise duty non-compliance with probability of detection as a 
moderator. This result can be used as a platform in identifying the important areas that 
RMCD management should focus on to reduce excise duty non-compliance. Table 5.34 
and Figure 5.13 show the graphical representation of each exogenous latent variable’s 
performance on probability of detection as an endogenous latent variable. As shown, if 
the index value of tax knowledge raises by a unit, the probability of detection should 
raise by 0.31 points with ceteris paribus evaluation of the scores (Ringle & Sarstedt, 
2016). The tax knowledge determinant was relatively high to increase the probability 
of detection based on its high value on importance.  Hence, further effort should be 
considered in expanding and maintaining this performance area.  Although tax audit, 
corruption, and peer influence total effects were significantly low, future actions for the 
high-performance level should be taken into account. On the other hand, tax fairness 
and penalty rate need to be substantially improved as a result of the current performance 
level. Tax rate had a negative value in its total effect because it was not significantly 
different from zero (Schloderer et al., 2014). Table 5.35 and Figure 5.14 show the 
values and plots for the identification and factors of high importance and low-
performance variables for tax agent as a target construct.    
 
Table 5.35 
IPMA Results for Tax Agent as Target Construct 




Tax Rate -0.036 76.405 
Penalty Rate 0.065 68.453 
Tax Audit 0.244 69.901 
Tax Fairness 0.063 70.824 
Peer Influence 0.161 67.850 
Tax Knowledge 0.185 72.804 
Corruption 0.139 63.763 







Priority Map for Tax Agent as Target Construct 
 
Table 5.35 and Figure 5.14 show the IPMA values and plots in the PLS analysis. The 
path coefficients calculated indicated that the exogenous latent variables influenced the 
total impact of excise duty non-compliance when tax agents were a moderator. From 
the importance-performance map, it can be concluded tax audit was the highest priority 
in reducing excise duty non-compliance with tax agent having a moderating effect. This 
is followed by tax knowledge, peer influence, and corruption. The four constructs 
showed the good importance and high performance. Hence, they should be emphasised 
in reducing excise duty non-compliance. Other factors such as penalty rate and tax 
fairness had shown high performance and marginally significant in contributing to the 
total effects of excise duty non-compliance. Therefore, the RMCD management could 
focus on them too. Even though tax rate had the highest performance but the total 
effect’s value was not significantly different from zero, indicated by a negative sign 







This chapter presented the results of the study. The data were checked for normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity which met the rule of thumb values. 
The measurement or outer model evaluated by using partial least squares structural 
equation modeling. This model evaluated to test the reliability and validity of the 
constructs. Indeed, this study has shown the analyses are in line with the rule of thumb 
of composite reliability, convergent validity, average variance extracted and 
discriminant validity Fornell-Larcker and Cross Loadings criterion. All the assessment 
criteria set by (Hair et al., 2016; Hair et al., 2011; Henseler et al., 2009) are met and 
exceeded which further enable for structural model asessment. The structural model 
was examined to test the direct relationship hypotheses.  Five out of seven hypotheses 
were accepted while two were rejected. For and indirect relationship of probability of 
detection out of seven, three hypotheses accepted and four are rejected. While for tax 
agent as moderator one hypothesis accepted out of seven. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) values of endogenous constructs for direct effect 0.63 and for 
moderating effect of tax agent and probability of detection were 0.65 and 0.66 
respectively showed the substantial values as suggested by Hair et al. (2011). The effect 
size, predictive relevance, total effects and performance also discussed for direct and 








CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This final chapter discusses the findings presented in chapter five as well as the 
implications and conclusions of this study. This chapter begins with a summary of the 
study to remind readers what the study was all about.  
 
6.2 Summary of the Study 
Tax non-compliance is one of the continuing problems faced by many tax authorities 
around the globe. However, many compliance studies focused on direct taxes like 
income and corporate taxes and a handful on indirect taxes, particularly in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, tax compliance studies tended to ignore subterranean activities, also 
known as underground economy, shadow economy, second economy and hidden 
economy where tax evasion is intentionally committed.  
 
Tax non-compliance by importers involving cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles is 
escalating annually. These three commodities fall under the Excise Duty Act (1976). 
Tax evasion on these commodities reached more than RM 1.8 billion for the year 2010-
2014. If tax non-compliance is not addressed, national development programmes will 
be affected significantly. To change the undesirable behaviour of taxpayers, a better 
understanding of beliefs and attitudes towards tax non-compliance is needed. 
Therefore, this study was carried out to answer three key research questions: (1) what 
is the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax 





by importers?; (2) to what extent the probability of detection has a significant 
moderating effect on the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, 
tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, corruption) with excise duty non-
compliance by importers?; and (3) to what extent tax agent has a significant moderating 
effect on the relationship between predictor variables (tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, 
tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge, corruption) with excise duty non-
compliance by importers? To answer the questions, the study used deterrence theory 
and the Fischer model.  
 
6.3 Discussion 
The discussion on the research findings is based on the research questions outlined 
earlier.  
 
6.3.1 First Research Question  
Hypotheses H1a to H7a pertained to the main effect (direct) relationship between 
importer’s tax non-compliance and tax rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer 
influence, tax knowledge, and corruption.  
 
6.3.1.1 Tax Rate and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
The effect of tax rate in tax non-compliance studies is still debatable. Some empirical 
research showed that higher tax rates led to higher compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 
1972; Fischer et al., 1992). Contrarily, other researchers found that higher tax rate 
motivated non-compliance behaviour (Mohd Yusof et al., 2014; Bouet & Roy, 2012; 
Kubo & Lwin, 2010; Mas’ud et al., 2014; Mishra et al., 2008). Nur-tegin (2008) stated 





However, in this study, the tax rates imposed on cigarettes, liquor, and imported 
vehicles did not affect tax non-compliance. That is, tax rate was not identified as one 
of the factors in reducing excise duty non-compliance. The result echoes that reported 
by Richardson (2006a) who found an insignificant relationship between tax rate and tax 
evasion in a cross-country analysis. A similar finding was reported by  Modugu, 
Eragbhe, and Izedonmi (2012). 
 
In this study, the tax rate was determined by Customs Duties Order (2012). However, 
deterrence theory and the Fischer model consider a progressive tax system in direct 
taxes. Excise duty as an indirect tax relies on the classification on which imported goods 
are categorised. The Malaysian government raises excise duty to reduce the 
consumption of cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles and simultaneously increase 
tax compliance. Since cigarettes, liquor, and imported vehicles are luxurious products, 
they reveal the social status of an individual. The consumption of these products 
generated from income effect (consumer’s discretionary income change based on 
increase or decrease of the goods and services demand) as well as substitution effect 
(an effect caused raised at the price based on the goods demanded by consumers). If the 
income effect is higher than the substitution effect, the higher tax rates will not affect 
tax non-compliance. The demand for the products relies on the disposable income of 
the consumer. Importers will increase the importation of cigarettes, liquor, and 
imported vehicles when there is an escalating demand from consumers regardless of 






6.3.1.2 Penalty Rate and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
This study hypothesised that penalty rate has a positive relationship with excise duty 
non-compliance. However, the result did not support the hypothesis. Penalty was found 
to be insignificantly related to excise duty non-compliance. The result is consistent with  
Cowell (2004) and Eide (2000) but contradicts Devos (2014a) and  Miskam et al. 
(2013), who showed a significant and positive relationship between penalty and tax 
non-compliance.  
 
Taxpayers are assumed to be “a perfectly moral, risk neutral or risk averse, utility 
maximising individual who chooses to evade tax whenever the expected gain exceeded 
the cost” (Milliron & Toy, 1988). In the RMCD context, penalty is not regarded as a 
deterrent to high-risk evaders. Specifically, those who have committed tax offences for 
a longer period, they assume that penalty is an unwanted investment. Persistent 
offenders tend to be less affected by penalty even though they have been arrested and 
penalised many times before (Anwar & Loughran, 2011). Therefore, punishment for 
offenders should be greater than the benefits gained for committing tax compliance 
offences.  
 
The finding of this study suggests that the effectiveness of penalty imposed by the 
RMCD relies on the moral perception of offenders. Offenders who view penalties as 
not being a serious deterrent will cause them to engage in offences.  
 
6.3.1.3 Tax Audit and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Tax audit is one of the main factors to increase the degree of tax compliance. This is in 





tax relies on the risk under an uncertainty condition (Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2015). 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics of this study provided strong evidence that excise 
duty non-compliance level would increase if tax audit is heightened. Furthermore, it is 
confirmed that “tax paying life span” contradict with later and early audits which have 
tendency to increase tax non-compliance by importers in excise duty (Kastlunger, 
Kirchler, Mittone, & Pitters, 2009). For a certain period, tax compliance will decrease 
if the audit is not performed. In this study, the hypothesis supported a significant and 
positive relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance.  
 
The study’s result is also consistent with several past empirical studies on tax audit and 
tax non-compliance behaviour (Dubin, 2007; Mohdali et al., 2014; Shanmugam, 2003;  
Snow & Warren, 2005b). The finding suggests that customs auditors should not treat 
importers as offenders unless they are proven guilty of tax non-compliance. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of customs auditors depends on their competency, 
accounting, communication, business, interpersonal, and auditing skills (Fatt & Khin, 
2012). Most importantly they need to be prominent in the Excise Act (1976). In line 
with this, auditors should be equipped with forensic accounting skills. When inspecting 
person/companies that import goods and services, the customs auditors should use the 
field audit as an avenue to interact with taxpayers to build trust and mutual respect and 
educate them. Customs auditors should have the ability to solve minor issues regarding 
tax audit over a telephone conversation. Moreover, customs auditors should carry out 







6.3.1.4 Tax Fairness and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
This study revealed that the higher the tax fairness was perceived, the higher the excise 
duty non-compliance, contrary to expectation. However, the finding is consistent with 
previous works (Gilligan & Richardson, 2005; Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008). 
 
The result suggests that excise duty is not imposed fairly on taxpayers even though they 
still comply with paying taxes. Interviews conducted with excise duty offenders 
revealed that customs officers did not assess the tax rate according to the law in 
determining the class of goods dutiable under the Excise Act (1976) based on the value, 
weight and measures. As a result, excise duties payment for similar goods imported is 
not standardised in various states in Malaysia. Furthermore, taxpayers have no rights to 
contest the customs officers’ decision on valuation, weight, and inspection. Leventhal 
(1980) stated that “procedures are considered fair if the following criteria are met: 
procedures should be consistent, accurate, free of errors, representative, ethical and 
correctable” (pp.42).  
 
Moreover, tax exemptions for the whole or any part excise duties granted under the 
Excise Act (1976) are not fairly distributed to eligible taxpayers. Tax authorities who 
fairly legislated decision-making rules enjoy more voluntary compliance (Feld & Frey, 
2007; Van Dijke, De Cremer, & Mayer, 2010; van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). Previous 
studies suggested that tax authorities and taxpayers built good relationships built due to 
the acceptance of the decision made by the tax authority, reflecting that trust has 
developed (Braithwaite, 2003; Murphy, 2004b). RMCD should enact procedural 





The Malaysian government should emphasise fairness in the allocation process. 
Offenders consider that the allocation is not fair when the cost and benefit are not fairly 
distributed. In the tax compliance perspective, the benefits perceived by offenders are 
in the form of public goods received weigh by the actual taxes paid in dutiable excise 
goods importation.  
 
6.3.1.5 Peer Influence and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Subjective norms refer to social pressure that influences an individual’s perception 
whether to comply or not to comply with tax laws (Ajzen, 1991). Important referents 
will determine how taxpayers should behave (Ajzen, 1991). The result of this study 
found that social pressure motivated taxpayers’ tax non-compliance behaviour. 
 
The finding of this study showed that peer influence or subjective norms were positively 
and significantly related to excise duty non-compliance. The finding corroborates the 
theory of reason action and theory of planned behaviour that propose that peer influence 
is one of the main factors in influencing behavioural intention and previous studies 
(Bobek et al., 2007; Borrego, Lopes, & Ferreira, 2013;  Kahle & White, 2004).  In 
excise duty non-compliance, peer influence involves importers and tax agents. These 
two groups affect importers’ tax compliance. Business partners (other importers) and 
tax agents are the people with whom the importers connect on a regular basis. Importers 
are more compliant when they perceive that others declare excise duty accurately, 
according to the tax law. Conversely, when importers perceive that these groups do not 






Tax agents also have the ability to influence importers’ decision to comply or not to 
comply. Being a representative of the importers, tax agents act to meet the importers’ 
expectation even though non-compliance can pose a dilemma to them. Therefore, tax 
agents are encouraged to creatively think of ways to solve importation business and 
while encouraging tax compliance among importers. 
 
6.3.1.6 Tax Knowledge and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Tax knowledge is an important factor that determines tax compliance (Eriksen & 
Fallan, 1996). Most studies emphasised customs declarations tax knowledge without 
considering the knowledge of tax evasion consequences. Therefore, this study included 
both types of knowledge to improve excise duty compliance. Importers should have 
knowledge on how to perform customs declaration accurately. Moreover, they must 
have sufficient knowledge of the excise duty non-compliance consequences. Excise 
duty defaulters will be penalised monetarily, imprisoned, and charged in court. As a 
result, excise duty non-compliance phenomenon will be reduced. However, importers’ 
declarations of goods are to maximise their expected utility by weighing the profits 
gained from successful evasion against the detection by customs officers and the 
consequences faced.  
 
This study revealed that tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance was positively 
and significantly related. The finding is consistent with past studies (e.g., Mei Tan & 
Chin-Fatt, 2000). The RMCD importation declaration requires many complex and 
technical procedures such as tariff classification, valuation, origin rules, and facilitation 
provided by other agencies especially at border such as port authorities, port operators, 





agents. This study revealed that sufficient importation knowledge was used to identify 
the loopholes to maximise the profit by paying less or evading excise duties. Tariff 
classification and valuation knowledge were used to manipulate the tax rate imposed. 
Hence, adequate importation knowledge induced unethical behaviour among importers. 
 
Importers’ adequate knowledge of importation also enabled them to produce double 
invoices, one from the local importers and the other from foreign exporters to save the 
per-unit cost of two invoices. Forged invoices are also used for customs declaration. 
Customs officers can detect the unlawful goods listed on invoices if they are 
experienced. Importers will conceal the documents for importation by altering the 
purchase order, altering the confirmation order, and declaring fewer goods than 
imported to attain lower tariff.  
 
Importers also misstate the country of origin listed to enjoy a lower tariff, anti-dumping 
laws, quotas, and embargoes. In some circumstances, goods are shipped to an 
intermediary country, which is stated as a country of origin even though the goods are 
not originated from there. Misdescription to alter classification is another fraud 
identified to lower or free tariff rate. To curb these activities, customs officers should 
have wide discretion to conduct inspections. 
 
6.3.1.7 Corruption and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Tax-interrelated corruption involves importers paying for two types of corrupt services: 
‘tax evasion’ and ‘preferred customer treatment’ such as cargo speedier clearance, 
licenses and rulings priority for processing and applications (Pashev, 2005). Importers 





customs requirements due to their monopoly power (Widdowson, 2013). Importers pay 
a bribe to customs officers to save opportunity and compliance cost, especially to 
acquire speed services or shortcut regulatory procedures on the importation process. 
The cost of paying a bribe is less than the benefit gained from tax evasion (Pashev, 
2005). Importers tend to engage in corruption when the customs administration is 
perceived to be ineffective, when the tax is burdensome, and when the price for corrupt 
services is low.  
 
On the relationship between corruption and excise duty non-compliance behaviour, the 
study found a positive and significant association. The result is consistent with previous 
literature on corruption and tax evasion (Dutt & Traca, 2010; Kaufmann & Wei, 2000; 
Parayno, 1999). The result of this study established the perception of corruption of 
customs officers. Customs officers’ involvement in corruption is related to the misuse 
of authority for individual profit. Corruption in this study differentiated extensive 
corruption from minor corruption. Extensive corruption is the involvement of higher 
rank officers for a higher volume of importation for monetary attainment whereas minor 
corruption involves lower rank officers at checking points who take a small amount of 
payment to facilitate the goods transactions. 
 
Customs officers are highly motivated to accept bribes if they are not satisfied with 
their salary status, monetary incentives policies and career enhancement fairness. 
Therefore, RMCD should focus on incentives of anticorruption rather than emphasise 
on deterrents. Customs officers’ corruptions are more prone at ‘hot spot places’ such as 
Penang Port in Penang, Port Kelang in Selangor and Pasir Gudang in Johor. Hence, 





Customs officers for corruption should be considered for severe punishment such as 
rank demotion or expelled from the department if the offence committed. This is to curb 
corruption among Customs officers and reduce the excise duty non-compliance. 
 
6.3.2 Second Research Question  
Probability of detection was defined as one of the enforcement strategies imposed by 
tax authorities to deter tax non-compliance behaviour. If probability of detection is not 
enforced strictly, it is unfair to those who pay taxes. In this study, two types of 
probability of detection were identified as suggested by  Fischer et al. (1992): ‘objective 
audit probability’ based on audit and ‘perceived detection probability’ affected by 
behaviour. Becker’s (1968) crime approach assumed taxpayers’ gambled by measuring 
unpredictable gain with successful non-compliance conversely with detection and 
sanctions. Taxpayers still choose to cheat the tax authority if the probability of 
detection, prosecution, and penalties is minimal (Loeffler, Sieg, MacDonald, Chirico, 
& Inman, 2016). The importers’ ultimate goal in the importation process is to maximise 
profit. This is achieved by anticipating the potential cost and benefit in monetary term. 
Therefore, probability of detection was introduced as a moderator. 
 
6.3.2.1 Probability of Detection Moderating Tax Audit and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Tax audit in customs involves the examination of a trader’s system, accounting records, 
and premises (Excise Act, 1976) to inspect intentional and unintentional compliance by 
verifying the amount of revenue legally due. Intentional non-compliance relates to the 
conduct or act to deliberately evade tax liabilities. Probability of detection proposed in 
deterrence theory by Becker (1968) and Fischer determined whether taxpayers are 





well as importers. Therefore, tax audit should be conducted carefully according to law 
to maximise importers’ compliance with minimal cost and interruptions (Gupta & 
Nagadevara, 2007). 
 
Tax audit was found to be related significantly and negative with excise duty non-
compliance with probability of detection as a moderator. As illustrated in figure 5.8, it 
indicates the relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance is positive. 
It is reliable for importers with a low level of probability of detection than to those with 
a high level of probability of detection. However, for the direct effect result, tax audit 
and excise duty non-compliance shows the significant and positive relationship. This 
relationship changed to negative with the inclusion of probability of detection as 
moderating effect. The result is consistent with past studies (Kumar & Nagadevara, 
2006; Shao, Zhao, & Chang, 2002).   
 
6.3.2.2 Probability of Detection Moderating Tax Fairness and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Tax fairness is one of the non-economic factor needed for better understanding of tax 
compliance and non-compliance (Wenzel, 2004b). Tax fairness was significantly and 
negatively related to excise duty non-compliance with probability of detection as 
moderator. The interactions slope analysis for this effect as illustrated in figure 5.9. This 
indicating tax fairness effect when importers perceived probability of detection is high 
and more accepting tax non-compliance. In contrast, the weak relationship of excise 
duty non-compliance was confirmed for importers who showed a low level of 






The rationale findings of this study revealed the importer's goal is to maximise profit 
by considering two options under uncertainty conditions. First, on being compliant with 
tax law with certain losses regarding excise duty paid. Second, on received material 
gain through tax non-compliance if not detected and faced sanctions if detected 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The rationale decision made by importers is to maximise 
expected utility. The result suggested that RMCD should ensure the benefit acquired 
from non-compliance is lower than acquired via compliance. The importer's 
compliance will be a rational choice if the RMCD finds balance between this two 
measures. It is concluded that the higher tax fairness and low level of probability of 
detection will deter importers non-compliance.  
 
6.3.2.3 Probability of Detection Moderating Tax Knowledge and Excise Duty 
Non-compliance 
Most of the prior literature highlighted that taxpayer’s knowledge related to the 
sensitivity or awareness on tax rules and regulations (Hasseldine, Holland, & Rijt, 
2012). This study examined whether the relationship between tax knowledge of tax law 
and excise duty non-compliance will influence importers compliance with probability 
of detection as moderator. Taxpayers emphasised on incentives and profit maximisation 
after adjusting the risk of detection consistent with Deterrence Theory (Oladipupo & 
Obazee, 2016). 
 
The result of this study is congruent with the prediction in hypotheses H6c that the 
positive relationship between tax knowledge with excise duty non-compliance will be 
stronger when probability of detection is high. Thus, the relationship between the tax 
knowledge and excise duty was positive for the main effect. Further, strengthen the 





This study recommended that probability of detection performed as an intermediary 
between tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance. Therefore, taxpayers with 
high tax knowledge were more likely to involve in excise duty non-compliance 
compared with low tax knowledge. The result in figure 5.10 shows those importers 
perceived the higher the probability of detection, with higher tax knowledge will 
motivate to excise duty non-compliance. Importers with high tax knowledge might 
change their behaviour. The enforcement factor such as increasing probability of 
detection might shape up importers behaviour and attitudes towards tax compliance. 
Harmonised Tariff Schedules Gazette by World Customs Organization and Customs 
Duties Order (2012) determine the excise duty payable. Therefore, higher tax 
knowledge on tariff might encourage importers fraudulently paid lower excise duties 
by altering the tariff codes (misclassification). Moreover, with the excise duty 
knowledge, importers will undervalue imported cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles 
to underpay excise duties (undervaluation of goods). Under the Deterrence Theory 
importers (taxpayers) assumed as ‘perfectly moral’, ‘risk neutral ‘and ‘risk-averse’ 
practising ‘cost-benefit’ approach whether to comply or not comply (Devos, 2014b).    
 
6.3.2.4 Probability of Detection Moderating Tax Rate and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Tax rate and probability of detection are two variables always emphasised in Deterrence 
Theory and Fischer’s model (1992). These theoretical models showed the level of 
compliance relies on the risk preferred by taxpayers’. In other words, taxpayers become 
criminals based on their non-compliance behaviour differ with the law. The decision of 
this behaviour determined by assessing cost and benefit (Becker,1968). Tax rate or 
tariff rate is a classification system under Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Goods are 





(misclassification importation fraud) practised by importers to falsify the descriptions 
of goods to pay taxes preferable to them. This caused the actual taxes owed not paid to 
RMCD.  
 
The empirical result appeared that tax rate and excise duty non-compliance insignificant 
and inconclusive with probability of detection as moderator. Further, both direct and 
indirect effects show statistically insignificant. These findings were in line with the 
study by Kirchler et al. (2008) when they established that underreporting and evasion 
have no effect on the tax rate.  As such probability of detection did not possess indirect 
effect for the perception and prediction of excise duty non-compliance. This could be 
tax rate do not correlate with the main effect as well as moderating effect and 
established the relationship (Walsh, Evanschitzky, & Wunderlich, 2008). 
 
The explanation for this result could be that importers will involve in concealing 
customs declarations with logical prediction as long as non-compliance is beneficial. 
This does not reflect higher or lower tax rate imposed on excise goods but only 
indicating importers behaviour (Smith & Kinsey, 1987). Probability of detection only 
virtually predicts importers behaviour on evading taxes.  
 
6.3.2.5 Probability of Detection Moderating Penalty Rate and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Probability of detection is law enforcement measures carried out to increase the 
anticipated cost of illegal goods transactions which reduces smuggling. Smuggling 
offences involved legal goods are traded illegally. There are few studies supported that 
probability of detection and penalty rate as main tax compliance determinant (Becker, 





The explanation for this finding could be the severity of the penalty is not a law 
enforcement strategy to reduce smuggling. This outcome is parallel to the finding of 
Varma and Doob (1998) when they confirmed that penalty is not meeting the deterrent 
objective and relies on cost and benefit when committing tax offences. In this study’s 
perspective, for the penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance the relationship was 
statistically insignificant and positive. However, the moderating effect of probability of 
detection on the influence of excise duty non-compliance behaviour is insignificant and 
negative. Therefore, whatever the enforcement measures applied by RMCD to deter 
non-compliance phenomenon. The perception of penalty rate and the probability of 
detection have a negative influence on excise duty non-compliance. 
 
The possible answer for this results was that penalty regarded as an effective deterrent 
factor if offenders are detained through enforcement strategies and prosecuted 
successfully. However, the offender will make the rational choices by comparing the 
offending cost with benefit cost from smuggling (non-compliance). Hence, judges have 
to impose higher penalty compared to the current penalty to deter from committing tax 
offences. To achieve this, requires the cross-border relationship for importation 
businesses. The main problem encountered by RMCD is a lack of information and co-
ordination from an export country which hampered the prosecution. The cooperation 
needed to verify the authenticity of documents such as invoice, bill of lading, packing 
list and country of origin. Therefore, the penalty does not emerge as an important factor 






6.3.2.6 Probability of Detection Moderating Peer Influence and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Social norm or peer influence playing an important role in regulating human behaviour 
on tax compliance (Battiston & Gamba, 2016). There are three classes of peer pressure 
grouped as ‘honesty’, ‘opportunity’ and ‘conformism’(Battiston & Gamba, 2016). The 
first class related to pressuring taxpayers who are more prone to avoid taxes to honest 
taxpayers. Secondly, consist of importers not personally emphasised on social norms 
choose to be compliant to fulfil tax agents honest preference in customs declarations. 
The ‘conformism’ referred to the perceive probability of audit lead to conditional 
cooperation to raise common behaviour in the community (Fellner, Sausgruber, & 
Traxler, 2013). 
 
The result from the analysis presents hypothesis H5c suggested that the positive 
relationship between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance will be stronger 
when probability of detection is high. The finding did not support H5b which indicates 
probability of detection not have a strong moderating effect on the influence of peer 
and excise duty non-compliance. This implies that probability of detection not affected 
the strength between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance. 
 
The finding is evidence that the self-interest importer’s goal is to optimise gain and did 
not drive to other group interest for tax non-compliance. In certain circumstances, 
individual will define them as an important person in shaping up peers belief in tax 
compliance behaviour. In this study’s perspective importers are not influenced by their 
perception that some other importers group or agents have better opportunities in 
minimising tax burden. This might not lead to intergroup injustice perception on 





Contrarily, importers pursue their interest when considering the consequences of 
probability of detection. 
 
6.3.2.7 Probability of Detection Moderating Corruption and Excise Duty Non-
compliance 
Importers have two choices whether to declare goods accurately and pay taxes or 
conduct illegal trade to pay fewer taxes or evade taxes completely. The decision will be 
made to maximise their utility of their conduct and likelihood being detected by RMCD 
and fined (Stefura, 2011). One of the common factor practised by importers to evade 
taxes is through smuggling. Smuggling involves transferring goods from export country 
to import country by violating tax law. The income generated through breaking the rules 
and regulations and relevant costs (Amir, Masron, & Ibrahim, 2010). This misbehaviour 
related to corruption between RMCD, tax agents and importers. There are two sides of 
corruption identified in RMCD namely ‘demand side’ and ‘supply side’. The demand 
side denotes corrupted taxpayers distort or concealed their tax responsibilities. 
Contrarily, supply-side related to the involvement of Customs officers with importers 
to hide their corrupted behaviour. 
 
The hypothesis H7b not supported or statistically insignificant that probability of 
detection will affect the relationship between corruption and excise duty non-
compliance. This demonstrates the strength of the relationship between corruption and 
excise duty non-compliance is not rely on probability of detection and moderation not 
occurs. In other words, probability of detection as the third variable did not affect the 







The possible interpretations for this result may be that there is a high probability of 
detection and severe punishment imposed by RMCD to curb corruption. Time to time 
internal audit and monitoring operations carried out at most of the importation ports 
such as North and South Port in Butterworth, Penang, North, South and West Port in 
Selangor, Pasir Gudang and Tanjung Pelepas Port in Johor. These ports are operating 
effectively due to the strong management and information system. Practically, the 
probability being detected, caught and punished imposed aggressively by RMCD. For 
instance, the customs ports were installed scanner machines to scan the containers 
plying in terminal gates. This machine has detection equipment and alarm 
communication system to detect illegal goods. Customs officers, importers and tax 
agents’ perception of severity of punishment for corruption indirectly influence 
compliance behaviour. 
 
6.3.3 Third Research Question 
Customs agent (tax agent) playing a role as an intermediary integrating importers 
(customers) and suppliers (exporters). They are involved in goods clearance at Customs 
ports and importers compliance with trade matters rely on them (West, 2010). Tax 
agents highly engaged by importers based on their technical knowledge on importation 
procedures. Hence, in this study’s context tax agent was introduced as moderating 
variable which anticipated could affect the association between exogenous and 
endogenous latent variables by strengthening the direction between the constructs in 
this study’s model. The relationship between exogenous latent variables with excise 
duty non-compliance differs with the involvement of tax agent and this relationship 
hypothesised as H1c-H7c. The coefficient of determination (R
2) value increased from 





showing the collaborative effect of exogenous constructs on an endogenous construct 
which confirmed the predictive capacity of this study’s model with tax agent as a third 
or moderator variable (Hair et al., 2016).  
 
Even though, there are a number of literature examined the consequences of the tax 
rate, penalty rate, tax audit, tax fairness, peer influence, tax knowledge and corruption 
as exogenous constructs with tax non-compliance as endogenous construct mainly on 
the direct relationship. As far as researcher’s concerned none of the studies tested tax 
agent as moderator. Therefore, the lack of tax agent studies as moderator restricted 
researcher to make a comparison to the current study’s findings with the previous 
studies. 
 
6.3.3.1 Tax Agent Moderating Penalty Rate and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Penalty rate is one of the components identified in Deterrence Theory and Fischer’s 
model (1992) that influence tax agents and importers compliance. Penalty rate towards 
excise duty non-compliance associated with severity of criminal and civil penalties to 
ensure individual compliance of tax responsibilities. Penalised non-compliance 
taxpayers’ was attributed to a common practice for the tax authorities to ensure tax 
compliance (Eek, Loukopoulos, Fujii, & Gärling, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
 
The hypotheses H2c predicted the positive relationship between penalty rate and excise 
duty non-compliance would be stronger and negative relationship will be weaker with 
tax agent involvement.  More precisely tax agent marked significant negative effect on 
the penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance relationship. This indicates the lower 





negative relationship between penalty rate and excise duty non-compliance as 
illustrated in figure 5.11. Therefore, the reliance of tax agents in customs declarations 
should be reduced to ensure excise duty’s compliance. If importers highly relied on tax 
agents for their importation procedures and goods clearance will induce to non-
compliance on excise duty. 
 
The enforcement effect on tax non-compliance indicates the stringent enforcement 
effect will decrease non-compliance (Davis, Hecht, & Perkins, 2003; Hanno & Violette, 
1996). Moreover, in Argentina Castro and Scartascini (2015) revealed that property tax 
payment relies on economic motives compared to non-economic motives by 
considering penalties and enforcement. As in this study’s findings, Perez-Truglia and 
Troiano (2015)  found penalties affected on the smaller amount debt repayment of 
taxpayers. Since many years RMCD relied on civil and criminal penalties as a key 
method applied in managing tax compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Rotunno & 
Vézina, 2012; Slemrod, 2007; Torgler, 2011). The perception of law and enforcement 
on tax compliance was earlier explored by Deterrence Theory to explain and predict 
taxpayers’ behaviour. Importers may accept tax agent’s recommendations irrespective 
whether conservative or aggressive tax planning. In this matter, if importers highly 
influenced by them will increase tax non-compliance with aggressive tax suggestions. 
However, it relies on importers risk preferences. Thus, Deterrence Theory by Becker 
(1968) contributes feasible justifications for the new findings in this study. 
 
Importers will be penalised upon conviction. When tax agents are more aggressive than 
importers, the hidden cost of penalties will be transferred to importers without their 





identified affecting importers intention to comply. RMCD as indirect tax administrator-
enforced the excise law. Provisions of section 71-79 of Excise Act (1976) stated that 
penalties imposed for the offences such as incorrect declarations, falsifying documents, 
illegal manufacturing of excise dutiable goods, selling liquor without a license, illegal 
possession of excise goods. Punishment to the offenders regarded as a lesson to the 
public not committing an excise duty offences with the strict effects and consequences. 
This is considered as one of the regulatory strategy to reduce tax non-compliance and 
as a control measure for the public to comply law as found in this study’s result 
(Langham, Paulsen, & Härtel, 2012).  
 
The penalty imposed for excise duty offences considered high to decrease tax non-
compliance phenomenon. For instance, under Section 74 of Excise Act (1976), the 
penalty on evasion of excise duty is not less than ten times the amount of the excise 
duty of RM50,000 for illegal importation.  While for illegal manufacture of dutiable 
goods is RM10,000. In line to this, according to section 81 of Excise Act (1976) failure 
to pay penalties and duties will cause imprisonment. Financial penalty and 
imprisonment are the best way to curb the tax evaders from recurring the offences in 
future. This statement was strongly supported by this study with tax agent’s 
involvement as intermediaries. 
 
If the legal punishment is severely and immediately enforced will prevent importers 
and tax agents committed in tax fraud. Therefore, penalty rate was presumed turned as 
a deterrence if could full filled five specific aspects to curb tax non-compliance (Morris, 
2010). Firstly on the tax complexity and their consequences as deterrence. Second, on 





collected timely. Third, on importers rationality as taxpayers weighing their economic 
cost with detection to determine the compliance level. Fourth, the effectiveness of 
penalty imposed by RMCD should be understood, and offenders are detained and 
penalised. Finally, on the determination of the penalty amount imposed to offenders.  
 
6.3.3.2 Tax Agent Moderating Tax Rate and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Tax rate is regarded as a vital phenomenon in understanding tax non-compliance 
behaviour. Most of the prior literature revealed that the influence of tax rate and tax 
non-compliance in theoretical prediction became the sensitive issue (Slemrod & 
Yitzhaki, 2002). In pioneering studies by Becker (1968) stated tax rate is an important 
determinant in tax non-compliance issue. However, it depends on the prediction of risk 
and punishment if the offence committed. Measuring tax non-compliance by tax rate 
became challenging task because of the difficulties to measure it, which is not directly 
observed. The indirect approach is needed to understand the behaviour of tax non-
compliance (Fisman & Wei, 2004). Therefore, tax agent was introduced as moderating 
variable in this study. However, there are various discrepancies on the significant level 
of the constructs in the study models. Some researchers found significant relationship 
while others found a non-significant relationship (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 
2003). Empirically, tax rate with tax agent as a moderating effect hypothesised as H1c 
in chapter four proved as not significant with excise duty non-compliance. 
 
This result marked that tax rate is not an influential factor as suggested in previous 
literature. Tax agent as an indirect effect (moderator) failed to support the positive 
relationship with tax rate to determine cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles 





rate and excise duty non-compliance. In this study’s context increasing or decreasing 
the tax rate with the influence of tax agent as preparer for customs declarations will not 
affect the importer's compliance behaviour.  
 
6.3.3.3 Tax Agent Moderating Tax Audit and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Most of the prior literature suggested tax audit will motivate taxpayers’ compliance 
(Dubin, 2007; Palil & Mustapha, 2011). These findings are in line with Deterrence 
Theory that tax audit could deter taxpayers’ tax non-compliance. However, it is a 
debatable issue regarding tax audit to deter non-compliance, some researchers 
recommended while others revealed had weak effects as in this study’s finding 
(Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Kirchler, 2007). This study examined the 
relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance with tax agent as 
moderator to understand whether can influence the importer's behaviour to comply with 
excise law. Tax audit measured by emphasised on the audit experience conducted by 
Customs Auditors and the frequency of the audit carried out by RMCD. 
 
It is revealed that the relationship between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance 
with tax agent as moderator was statistically insignificant and inconclusive and not 
supported hypotheses H3c. The result is reversed from the contention of other previous 
literature that tax audit might improve importers compliance. These findings 
recommended that tax audit of excise duty is not a key factor in determining excise duty 
compliance. Therefore, in this study’s context, tax audit performed by Customs 
Auditors not necessarily will influence compliance among importers with the 





The reasonable answer to account for this finding is the tax audit do not exist in tax 
agents mind when considering detection for wrongdoings in excise law. On the other 
hand, all the importation transactions documents related to tax computation, tariff code, 
tax rate and accounts records were kept by the importers. They will face the 
consequences such as monetary penalties and other costs when offence committed. 
Therefore, importers incur compliance cost for them to comply with tax responsibilities. 
Hence, in this study’s environment, tax agent as the third variable did not strengthen 
the relationship of tax audit and excise duty non-compliance (Namazi & Namazi, 2016). 
In another word, Tax agent also known as an interaction effect does not affect the 
strength of direct effect between tax audit and excise duty non-compliance (Henseler 
& Fassott, 2010a). 
 
6.3.3.4 Tax Agent Moderating Tax Fairness and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
The tax fairness was classified as another key factor in determining tax compliance 
among importers. In the Fischer’s’ model tax fairness variable categorised under 
attitude and perception construct. This is regarding the importers measured the benefits 
received from the government in return of the excise duty paid (Alm, Jackson, & 
McKee, 1992c). The effect on non-compliance behaviour relies on the presence of 
public necessities (Tan & Sawyer, 2003). Tax fairness in tax system was considered as 
more significant compared to penalty structure for generating taxpayers compliance 
(Tan & Sawyer, 2003). 
 
Tax agents represent more than seventy-five percent of Malaysian importers and have 
potential to influence directly or indirectly with importers compliance (RMCD Annual 





tax fairness and excise duty non-compliance with the influence of tax agent as 
moderator. The result from this study further identified whether tax agents influenced 
as intermediaries between RMCD and importers would improve the RMCD’s 
collections. Further to examine whether the fairness perceived by tax agents will induce 
importers compliance in excise duty. 
 
However, the findings from this study highlighted that the tax fairness is not a 
prominent factor influencing importers compliance with tax agent as intermediaries. 
The results also showed tax agents only act as an advisor to importers, non-salaried 
employees to RMCD, the third person to the importers and RMCD. They also are 
protectors of their tax declarations practices and finally have influences in the tax 
system. Tax agents are not tax payers; they are merely involved indirectly on behalf of 
importers to pay excise duty. Therefore, the perceived fairness in government spending 
on tax paid did not influence them to pay less tax. In reality, the real taxpayers are 
importers which influence tax fairness perceived with tax paid. Furthermore, this 
outcome suggested that tax agent does not indirectly affect the importer's behaviour on 
tax non-compliance based on tax fairness. Hence, tax agent did not strengthen the 
significant positive relationship between main effect but only produced an insignificant 
positive relationship with tax agent as moderator. Therefore, the moderation effect of 
tax agent not occurred (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). 
 
The aggressive tax planning of tax agents also affected importers fairness perception. 
The outcome from the interview conducted among importers indicated tax agents 
approaches was to minimised the tax amount paid with ambiguous tax legislation, 





aggressive tax planning based on tax fairness received caused importers are not prone 
to tax agents advice. This study’s finding contradicts with findings of Tan and Sawyer 
(2003) which indicate the fairness exchange is a strong influence with tax agents 
involvement in determining taxpayers’ compliance. 
 
6.3.3.5 Tax Agent Moderating Peer Influence and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Peer influence or subjective norm defined as individual’s referent others such as friends, 
family, close colleagues and business partners. It involves behaviour whether to agree 
or disagree of tax non-compliance. Fischer’s model (1992) highlighted peer influence 
in attitude and perception construct. Most of the prior literature applied Theory of 
Planned Behaviour when discussing the importance of peer influence or prediction of 
human social behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The empirical investigations supported that peer 
influence will lead to an assessment of individual’s intention to comply or not to comply 
with tax responsibilities based on the beliefs and feelings of others (Bobek & Hatfield, 
2003; Bobek, et al., 2007; Hanno & Violette, 1996). In this study’s context, the role of 
tax agent as moderating variable introduced to examine the strength or nature of the 
relationship between peer influence and excise duty non-compliance was hypothesised 
as H5c in chapter four.  
 
The empirical result from this study displayed insignificant negative relationship on tax 
agent’s intention to influence importers tax compliance. This in line with the findings 
by Hessing, Elffers and Weigel (1988)  identified no relationship between taxpayers 
compliance versus non-compliance decisions with perceived subjective norm of tax 
agents. The indirect influence is not strong regarding the ethical beliefs between 





duty non-compliance with peer influence predictor (Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 
2016). One of the feasible interpretation for this result could be the importer's 
aggressive return might incur high fees and more time. Clearly, it is revealed importers 
are motivated to hire tax agent with more conservative returns in declaring tax 
liabilities. As tax agent might be persuaded by importers regarding the way importers 
would like to represent in excise declarations. This finding also supported the interview 
results conducted with tax agents. They claimed that they are obligated to fulfil 
importers requirements as received payment for the service delivered. 
 
6.3.3.6 Tax Agent Moderating Tax Knowledge and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
In the Customs tax system structure, tax declarations are based on self-assessment via 
Customs Information System which will be replaced by U-customs soon. In line to this, 
importers are highly relying on tax agents to meet their tax responsibilities. Tax agents 
are substituting importers in tax compliance matters. Therefore, their advice in tax laws, 
the decision in tax planning and attitude will have an impact on importers tax 
compliance. Tax agents experiences and knowledge caused them emerged as an 
important person who can lead to taxpayers tax compliance (O'Donnell, Koch, & 
Boone, 2005; Park & Hyun, 2003). 
 
The structural results after bootstrapping to determine the significance effect moderator 
effect of tax agent emerged as an insignificant positive result not supported H6c. This 
finding indicates that the existence of tax agent on the relationship between tax 
knowledge and excise duty non-compliance did not strengthen the positive relationship. 
This is evidence that whatever the tax agents influence on importers will be, their 





compliance behaviour of importers. This finding is consistent with the result of  Hite 
and McGill (1992), they revealed tax agent is not the main consideration to cause the 
potential impact on taxpayers decision. 
 
The possible answer for this finding might be that even though tax agent has knowledge 
on customs declarations but Customs Assessments officer will determine whether to 
approve or disapprove the declarations. The Customs assessments officer has the 
discrete power to decide the customs declarations based on their knowledge and 
understanding of the goods descriptions. The present outcome is based on the interview 
conducted among importers indicated that they do not solely rely on tax agent to ensure 
they will not cheat by tax agent’s aggressive tax declarations. Therefore, importers 
attended the courses and seminars conducted by RMCD to improve tax knowledge. 
 
6.3.3.7 Tax Agent Moderating Corruption and Excise Duty Non-compliance 
Importation business requires interaction involves Customs Department either directly 
or indirectly through the third party like tax agents. Importers rely on tax agent to deal 
with RMCD’s officials. Customs tax agents only specialised dealing with RMCD’s 
officials. The agents and RMCD’s officials’ relationship might be developed over the 
years. This will lead to illegal payments to RMCD’s officials to alleviate tax complexity 
and trade facilities in excise goods importation. The common practices of Customs 
officials and tax agents corruption include creating false invoices, offering holiday trips, 
providing or sponsoring to the organisations recommended by Customs officials. 
 
The outcome of this study confirmed that corruption has an insignificant negative 





the main effect, the corruption and excise duty non-compliance established a significant 
and positive relationship. Tax agent as moderator shows the insignificant negative 
relationship. Therefore, this relationship did not influence the importer's tax non-
compliance behaviour as the finding from this study. This result indicates corruption is 
not a key factor for the tax agent in inducing Customs officials to involve in illegal trade 
transactions which lead to importers non-compliance. The path coefficient of 
corruption value showed insignificant negative value did not affect the excise duty non-
compliance variable based on tax agent as a third or moderating variable. There is no 
effect size for corruption with tax agent interaction which is not extreme moderating 
variable (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003).  
 
This analysis provides evidence that tax agent’s planning and tax transactions did not 
cause the importers non-compliance. This may be caused by RMCD’s stringent law 
enforcement which deter the tax agents to manipulate Customs assessment officers for 
the benefits of the importers as their clients. The RMCD’s tax policies efficiency in 
reducing the complex and bureaucratic procedures reduced face to face interactions of 
Customs Officers and tax agents in importation transactions. This will prevent the tax 
agents pay bribes to Customs Officers for ‘blind eye’ on customs operations to reduce 
import transactions process or for totally illegal transactions. Malaysian policy on 
import liberalisation such as World Trade Organizations Agreement on facilitation and 
an ASEAN Framework Agreement on the facilitation of goods in transit reduced 
malpractices in customs declarations such as double invoicing, misdescription, 







6.4 Implications of the Study 
The findings of the study have theoretical and practical implications. 
 
6.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
Most of the prior literature used Fischer’s model in direct tax context (Alabede, 2012b; 
Chau & Leung, 2009; O'Shaughnessy, 2014). Only Alshir’ah, Abdul-Jabbar, and 
Samsudin (2016) attempted to apply Deterrence Theory and Fischer’s model in the 
indirect tax context. The study was conducted to investigate sales tax compliance in the 
small and medium enterprise in Jordan. Therefore, this study further contributed to the 
literature by expanding Fisher’s model in indirect tax environment in Malaysia. The 
expansion of Fischer’s model incorporated with the development of new constructs 
including tax audit, tax knowledge, and corruption as the main effect. This study further 
analysed the potential effect of probability of detection and tax agents as moderators. 
 
6.4.1.1 Tax Audit Construct 
Tax audits are performed to monitor the licensee or companies administered under the 
Excise Act (1976). Therefore, tax audit was added in deterrence theory and the Fischer 
model (1992) as a significant determinant of excise duty non-compliance. This study 
provided evidence that tax audit had a significant and positive relationship with excise 
duty non-compliance for the direct effect but the relationship became negative when 
interacted with probability of detection as a moderator construct. The new variable 
might be useful for future researchers especially for those intending to carry out similar 







6.4.1.2 Tax Knowledge Construct 
This study also introduced tax knowledge as a new construct. Tax knowledge has been 
extensively used in direct and indirect taxes to ensure the accuracy of tax declarations. 
In this study, tax knowledge was added to identify the loophole in the excise duty tax 
system for non-compliance behaviour. The finding in this study indicated a significant 
and positive association between tax knowledge and excise duty non-compliance, 
which was further strengthened with probability of detection. The result showed that 
tax knowledge exerted a considerable influence on tax non-compliance behaviour. 
 
6.4.1.3 Corruption Construct 
The newly corruption construct was added to deterrence theory and the Fischer model 
to contribute to the existing tax non-compliance literature. This study revealed a 
positive and significant relationship between corruption and excise duty non-
compliance.  
 
6.4.1.4 Probability of Detection as Moderating Construct 
Deterrence theory and the Fischer model propose probability of detection as the main 
effect to examine tax compliance. This study considered probability of detection as a 
moderating variable.  
 
6.4.1.5 Tax agent as Moderating Construct 
This study also introduced tax agent who is an authorised agent under Section 90 of 
Customs Act (1967) in the model. Tax agents presumably advise importers to be 
compliant with customs declarations and are aware of the penalties imposed. The 





detection led to this result. This study contributes to tax research in the importance of 
tax agents as a moderator.  
 
6.4.1.6 Excise Duty Study 
Miskam et al.’s (2013) study were the only one in Malaysia that investigated excise 
duty by using secondary data from the RMCD, the Ministry of Finance, the Malaysian 
International Trade and Industry, the Statistical Department of Malaysia, and the 
Malaysian Automotive Association. There is a scarcity of research on indirect tax non-
compliance, especially studies that used actual tax non-compliance data. This study 
contributes to the literature by examining excise duty offenders’ perceptions and the 
impact of non-compliance phenomenon.  
 
This study is also among a few studies that focused on importers. In comparison, other 
tax compliance studies emphasised individual taxpayers and tax agents. Under the 
Excise Act (1976), importation involves trades across borders and importers are the 
taxpayers. The excise duty levied on the imported goods and transported across state 
border involves tax for the services provided by the RMCD. Importers need to make 
declarations through self-assessment and are required to file accurate declarations and 
provide adequate supporting documents and tax calculation to claim the goods from the 
port. This study provides an understanding of importers which was neglected in indirect 
taxes studies.  
 
6.4.1.7 Importers (Taxpayers) Tax Non-compliance Model 
Prior studies applied deterrence theory and the Fischer model to direct tax non-





indirect tax non-compliance environment. Economic factors (tax rate, penalty rate, tax 
audit, probability of detection) and non-economic factors (tax fairness, peer influence, 
tax knowledge, corruption, and tax agent) were incorporated in the research model. The 
integration of deterrence theory and the Fischer model provide a better understanding 
of importers’ tax non-compliance as shown in Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.1 




























Importers (taxpayers) Tax Non-compliance Model for Tax Agent as Moderator 
 
6.4.2 Practical Contributions and Policy Implications 
The findings have implications for the RMCD as the indirect tax authority and policy 
makers. 
 
6.4.2.1 Implications for Custom’s Policy 
Most tax authorities use traditional enforcement methods such as tax rate, audit and 
penalties to ensure tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007). However, such sanctions may 
develop a negative attitude of taxpayers towards the tax authority. Moreover, prior tax 
literature revealed minimal support for punishment in improving compliance. In certain 
cases, enforcement strategies that solely rely on punishments could exacerbate 
situations. This study found that the significant role of tax fairness, tax knowledge, 
corruption and peer influence (subjective norms) in tax non-compliance, suggesting 
that the RMCD should have an in-depth understanding of importers’ motives, 










The RMCD should ensure customs assessment officers are competent in handling 
complex trade flows resulting from globalisation. They should be knowledgeable, 
open-minded and courteous with the flow of goods expansion, information technology, 
capital and people. Apart from legal trade, these will induce more illegal trade on the 
integrated market and borderless good flows. As evidence in this study importers used 
tax knowledge to identify loopholes in Customs procedures to evade excise duty. 
RMCD should prepare assessment officers to face challenges such as the growth of 
trade quantities caused more transactions have to process by Customs. This will 
increase the work task with the existing or lower resources. Placing fresh graduates as 
assessment officer could have a negative impact on the credibility of RMCD due to 
their lack of knowledge and uncertainty when processing Custom forms. 
 
The Customs assessment officers also need to know the reduced tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in trade liberalisation especially on imposing exemptions and tariff reductions. 
This is applicable when processing Customs importation forms.  A good understanding 
of rules of origin in the supply chain from the import countries is needed. The trade 
trends are developing which involves many participants’ countries in merchandise 
trade. The significant change in trade structure escalating the merchandise trade around 
the globe. Further, the export components of total merchandise have grown. The 
exchange of significant parts of goods needed as an intermediate input for importers. 
This type of structure requires many Custom authorities to handle. Therefore, RMCD 
should consider the cooperation of other countries Customs authorities around the globe 






The responses from importers indicate that RMCD did not consider their view or 
judgment Customs declarations. Fairness in Customs declarations is required by 
considering their view pertaining classification, valuation, weight, measures and 
examination of goods under excise act. If the importers believed their opinion accepted 
in dispute process are more willing to accept the decision or result made by RMCD 
even though not favourable to importers (Tyler, 2010). 
 
The emergence of worldwide crime networks escalates the smuggling activities. This 
syndicate is sharing the information among them. This situation is worsening with the 
weak cooperation among other Customs authorities cause the problem to detect and 
prevent smuggling activities among the law enforcement agencies. Hence. RMCD 
should foster the collaboration with other country’s authorities. This will reduce the 
long delays and disruptions of trade flows caused by massive cargo inspections by 
Customs. RMCD should balance between reducing the risk to prevent smuggling by 
weighing the cost by unpredictable delays in goods supply chain. 
 
6.4.2.2 Customs Officers’ Integrity 
The empirical evidence indicated that corruption is an important factor in encouraging 
importers to comply voluntarily. The findings from the survey revealed that corruption 
needs to be rectified by the RMCD. The RMCD should improve inspections at 
vulnerable zones to address corruption such as the origin of goods assessment, 
classification and valuation, cargo inspections, drawback and exemption facilities, 
audit, trans-shipment operations, passenger inspections, and license issuance and 






RMCD should reform the system in cargo processing ports by simplifying the 
importation procedures at corruption vulnerable ports. The RMCD also should limit the 
face-to-face interactions with customs officers and importers to reduce the opportunity 
for customs officers to deal illegally with importers. The RMCD should also reform 
and modernise the customs procedures by setting up a one-stop border post at every 
port for border management collaboration. This strategy should be implemented 
because importation procedures involve other governmental agencies such as the 
agriculture and agro-based department, the chemistry department, and the road 
transport department for excise goods clearance. 
 
Customs administration should pay attention to improving Customs officers’ salary to 
improve their life standard. Most of the Customs officers are paid with low salary and 
faced high-risk working conditions tempted to increase their income via informal means 
are escalating. Customs officers would support wholeheartedly any reform and 
modernization systems if their employment conditions improved. 
 
6.4.2.3 Publish and Disseminate Customs Activities 
The RMCD enforce the law by imposing criminal and civil sanctions. Hence, 
developing awareness of tax crime and its impact on the society, in the long run, should 
be implemented as an ongoing strategy. Currently, those who committed an offence are 
banned from leaving the country, given summonses, imprisoned, and declared 
bankrupt. These offences and their punishments end up mostly in law reference 
journals. The strict law enforcements are not effectively publicised. Hence, most 






The awareness program and all the activities conducted by RMCD could be 
disseminated effectively by creating ‘Facebook’ account with importers with the 
growth of smart phone users. This will enable to gain the confidence of taxpayers that 
Customs has transformed to the new era of ‘Digital Customs’. The assurance of this 
program’s success will be achieved by placing the well trained and competent desk 
officers. Every state are responsible for updating current issues pertaining RMCD such 
as computerised Customs clearance system, the exchange of information by an 
electronic system, available websites to interact with information and promote 
transparency. The importer's ambiguity on classification and evaluation can be rectified 
by sending a messenger to get an immediate response to ensure error free declarations. 
Furthermore, RMCD could use web tutorial on YouTube regarding the proper 
processes for Customs declarations to educate the importers. This will ensure the 
effectiveness and quality of services administered by RMCD to improve the compliance 
level of importers. 
 
6.4.2.4 Code and Conduct for Importers  
This study’s findings indicate the professional standard for importers is required in 
promoting tax compliance. Importers are taxpayers generate income to RMCD. 
However, currently, most of the awareness program on tax rules and regulations are 
delivered to Customs agents which were stated under Section 90 of Customs Act 
(1967). None of the provisions of Customs Act (1967) stated on requirements to be 
qualified importers. Therefore, RMCD should embrace the standard professional level 
of importers as traders. A harmonised Customs practices across the countries requires 
importers advance knowledge on the declaration, classification, current tax rate, cargo 





for importers to strengthen the import procedures and facilitate the goods movement 
across the country’s borders. RMCD should initiate providing training and support to 
ensure importers produce required entry documents for importation and other 
supporting information. Currently, importers rely solely on tax agent (Customs agents) 
as intermediaries to assist them on tax laws. 
 
This study also suggested risk assessment based on importers and their company should 
be extended and included to identify risk importers. The deterrence variables such as 
penalty rate and tax audit could be considered for previous compliance achievement 
and preparation for future voluntary compliance. Importers business records, other 
criminal records and financial transactions report conducted by special task force unit 
comprising of auditors, import expert, and industry expert formed for compliance 
assessment. Based on this report the corrective measures or actions could be carried out 
to improve compliance level.  
 
6.4.2.5 Implications for International Organizations 
Customs administrator’s strength and capability enhanced by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) known as Customs Co-operation Council. WCO is an 
intergovernmental organisation established in 1952. The tax compliance at WCO level 
could be promoted by revising the international trade standard and convention via an 
agreement with World Trade Organization (WTO) by simplifying the trade documents, 
interpret the border procedure and computerised the documents processed at 
international border level. The international customs law need to establish a standard 





country’s legal system. This is to ensure the trade facilitation to be cost effective, fair 
to all taxpayers’ and free from corruption.  
 
Based on ‘Digital Customs’ era WCO should develop risk management strategy by 
weighing the data security, privacy and fair. The risk assessment should cover import, 
export, and cargo trans-shipment in the wider framework by including deterrence and 
socio-psychology elements. Hence, this study could be used as a platform on describing 
deterrence and socio-psychology aspects to ensure tax compliance. This study showed 
the relevancy for WCO to accommodate socio-psychology factors which describe the 
behaviour of the risk assessment management. Moreover, WCO could identify the 
importers and tax agents’ behaviour and attitude as a competent practice model for risk 
assessment. This method will be more efficient in managing import and export 
procedures which are entirely conducted by a human being at borders. 
 
A higher growth of illegal trade in conflict customs ports by organised crime not only 
could be solved with severe sanctions as this study’s findings. WCO should promote 
more bilateral relationship not only with other Customs authorities but also with 
importers. This is based on escalating usage of cross-border e-commerce which is 
highly welcomed by importers for the fast delivery. However, this will cause 
international trade supplies are exposed to illegal trade activities. Therefore, the WCO 
safety framework on a standard to secure and facilitate global trade should include non-
economic factors as revealed in this study to have proper and better knowledge of global 
trade procedures and policies. Therefore, WCO enables to promote tax compliance 






6.4.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are some key limitations of the present study. The use of self-reported survey 
like other compliance studies may not represent the actual behaviour of respondents 
(van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). This limitation occurs especially when information is 
sought on tax sensitive and embarrassing issues.  
 
Another limitation for the survey research is on non-response bias. The questionnaires 
were distributed to 600 respondents throughout Malaysia. Only 500 are useable 
responses received resulting 83.33% of response rate. The incomplete responses caused 
non-response bias which was rectified by estimation as discussed in chapter five. It was 
expected the sensitive and personal questions would be deterred from participating in 
this survey. They are more concerned whether the author will able to link the responses 
back to their companies. However, all the practical measures by comparing early 
respondents with late respondents were taken to ensure non-response bias is not a 
problem. 
 
Further, respondents answered the questions differently based on their interpretation 
and understanding. Even though the reasonable measures were made to ensure the 
wordings was precise and simple. This might lead the respondents’ misinterpretations. 
Despite the disadvantages in self-reported survey contributes to both conceptual and 
practical advantages of respondent's participation in social sciences (Harrison, 






6.4.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
The model proposed in this study has a potential to offer good explanations of importers 
non-compliance in Malaysia as evidenced by the findings. Hence, the model could be 
replicated to other indirect taxes such as import tax and goods and services tax or value 
added tax. Future research should consider additional variables to extend the research 
model such as tax morale, the complexity of tax law, and practitioners’ attitude. These 
variables are non-economic variables that are purported to play an increasingly 
important role in non-compliance. 
 
Future research should also explore mixed methodology to interpret complex non-
compliance behaviour. The mixed methodology enables future researchers to solicit 
embarrassing, sensitive and incriminating information issues like tax fairness and 
corruption.  
 
As tax rate was not found to be an influential factor in determining tax non-compliance, 
future research may wish to investigate the relationship again. Such investigation will 
provide insights into how to manage tax rate to motivate compliance. 
 
The importers as taxpayers’ highly influenced by tax agents to determine their 
compliance motive. Future research needs to consider tax agents as a key factor. This 
could be an expansion of the tax non-compliance scope to assess the relationship and 
understand tax agents’ roles as intermediaries. This study’s outcome could be regarded 







Tax non-compliance remains a complex challenge for tax authorities, policy makers 
and researchers. Even though many strategies have been developed and carried out, tax 
non-compliance has not been fully solved. Optimum compliance could be achieved by 
addressing different aspects of non-compliance. This study provides empirical evidence 
by integrating economic, social and psychological determinants of non-compliance. It 
offers additional insight into the relationship between importers, tax agent, and 
numerous tax compliance determinants. The findings offer an understanding for the 
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SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
BAHAGIAN A: MAKLUMAT DEMOGRAFI 
In this section you are provided with questions related to your background. For each question, 
please tick (/) the answer that represents you. 
(Dalam bahagian ini dibekalkan soalan yang berkaitan dengan latar belakang anda. Bagi 
setiap jawapan tandakan (/) yang mewakili diri anda) 
 
1. Gender (Jantina) 
         Male (Lelaki)                                                              Female (Perempuan) 
 
2. Race (Bangsa) 
 
         Malay (Melayu)                            Cina (Chinese)                       Indian (India) 
                      Others (Lain-lain)            Please Specify (Sila  nyatakan)   
______________________ 
 
3. Age (Umur) 
                                                                
        20 - 29                          30 - 39                        40 - 49                    50 - 59 
                     60 and above   
                      
4. Highest level of education (Tahap Pengajian Tertinggi) 
                      SPM                                    Diploma / STPM                        Degree (Ijazah) 
                      Others (specify)________ 
                     (Lain-lain, nyatakan) 
 
5. Nature of Goods Imported (Jenis barangan yang diimport) 
Cigarettes (Rokok)            Liquor (Arak)            Import Vehicles (Impot                                   
                                                                             Kenderaan)     
 
6. Please state your current position in the firm (for example :Probationary Manager, 
Assistant Manager, Manager, Senior Manager, Partner, etc) 
(Sila nyatakan jawatan anda sekarang di firma ( Contohnya :Pengurus Percubaan, 







SECTION B: EXCISE DUTY NON-COMPLIANCE 
BAHAGIAN B: KETIDAKPATUHAN DUTI EKSAIS 
 
Please read the following statements or questions and respond by circling the number that best 
describes your opinion. 1, indicates that you are extremely unlikely to perform the behaviour, 
whereas 7, indicates that it is likely that you will perform the behaviour. 
Sila baca pernyataan atau soalan seperti di bawah dan jawab dengan cara membulatkan 
nombor yang menyatakan pendapat anda. 1 menunjukkan anda sangat tidak setuju untuk 
bertindak mengikut sikap tersebut manakala, 7 menunjukkan anda sangat bersetuju  bertindak 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
EXCISE DUTY NON-COMPLIANCE 
1. I pay excise duty as required by the Excise Regulations because of 
a sense of responsibility. 
(Saya membayar duti eksais seperti yang dikehendaki dalam 
Peraturan-peraturan Eksais kerana rasa tanggungjawab). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It is NOT everyone’s responsibility to pay the correct amount of 
excise duty. 
(BUKAN menjadi tanggungjawab semua orang untuk membayar 
jumlah duti eksais yang betul). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am paying excise duty as required by the Excise Regulations 
because I do not know exactly how to evade these taxes.  
(Saya membayar duti eksais berdasarkan Peraturan-peraturan 
Eksais kerana saya tidak tahu bagaimana caranya untuk mengelak 
cukai-cukai ini). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. There is no problem in under declaring the value of goods in 
Customs declaration. 
(Adalah tidak menjadi masalah jika membuat pengikraran dengan 
merendahkan nilai barangan dalam pengikraran Kastam). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I pay my excise duty as required by Excise Regulations after 
considering into how I could legally save taxes. 
(Saya membayar duti eksais seperti yang dikehendaki oleh 
Peraturan-peraturan Eksais selepas mengambil kira cara untuk 
menjimatkan cukai selaras dengan undang-undang). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. If everyone paid the correct amount of excise duty we would receive 
better public facilities. 
(Jika semua orang membayar duti eksais yang betul, kita akan 
menerima kemudahan awam yang lebih baik). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I ensure the excise duty declarations are correct because I fear that 
my reputation would be ruined if I were to get caught for not 
following the Excise Regulations. 
(Saya memastikan pengikraran duti eksais dibuat dengan betul 
kerana saya bimbang nama baik saya akan tercemar jika saya 
ditangkap kerana tidak mengikut Peraturan-Peraturan Eksais). 






SECTION C: TAX SYSTEM STRUCTURE 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Under-reporting the excise duty declaration is not ethical for me. 
(Pengikraran dengan merendahkan nilai dalam pengikraran duti 
eksais adalah tidak beretika bagi saya). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I will attend a course which informs me about the current 
possibilities for reducing tax. 
(Saya akan menghadiri kursus yang memberi tunjuk ajar mengenai  
kecendurangan mengurangkankan cukai). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 TAX RATE / KADAR CUKAI        
1. The current tax rates imposed for cigarettes, liquor and imported 
vehicles are too high. So it is not really cheating when you find 
ways to pay less tax than you suppose to. 
(Kadar cukai semasa yang dikenakan keatas rokok, arak dan 
kenderaaan import adalah sangat tinggi. Maka tidak menjadi 
penipuan jika dapat mencari jalan untuk kurang bayar cukai dari 
yang sepatutnya). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The amount of excise duty paid are too high for cigarettes, liquor 
and imported vehicles. 
(Amaun duti eksais yang dibayar adalah sangat tinggi keatas 
rokok, arak dan kenderaan import). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The higher the tax rate for cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles, 
the higher the price will be. 
(Semakin tinggi kadar cukai bagi rokok, minuman keras dan 
kenderaan diimport, semakin tinggi harga akan naik). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The high excise duty rates for cigarettes, liquor and imported 
vehicles will increase the cost for importation. 
(Kadar cukai yang tinggi keatas rokok, minuman keras dan 
kenderaan diimport akan menyebabkan peningkatan dalam kos 
pengimportan). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The high excise duty rates imposed for cigarettes, liquor and 
imported vehicles motivates smuggling activities. 
(Kadar tinggi duti eksais yang dikenakan keatas rokok, arak dan 













 PENALTY RATE / KADAR PENALTI        
 One of the importers X declared as electrical goods in Customs 
form. From the information received, 2 containers were detected as 
containing liquor but declared as electrical goods. The total amount 
of tax evaded was RM400 million. RMCD investigated him and 
penalised with a compound of RM10,000 and paid the total amount 
owed to RMCD. 
(Seorang pengimport X telah mengikrar dagangannya dalam 
borang kastam sebagai   barangan  elektrik. Hasil maklumat yang 
diterima,  didapati 2 buah kontena berisi arak telah diikrar sebagai 
barangan elektrik.  Jumlah  cukai yang telah dielak  adalah 
sejumlah RM400 juta. KDRM telah membuat siasatan dan 
mengenakan kompaun sebanyak RM10,000 dan membayar  cukai 
yang terhutang kepada KDRM). 
 
       
1. Importer X deserves the harsher punishment 
(Pengimport X patut menerima hukuman yang lebih berat.). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. X should be personally responsible for receiving the penalty. 
(X sepatutnya bertanggungjawab secara  peribadi untuk 
menerima penalti). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. X knew the probable consequences of his / her evasion. 
(X menyedari akan akibat daripada pengelakkan cukai). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. X should ignore the penalty and take the risk of being caught and 
prosecuted in Court. 
(X sepatnya mengabaikan penalti dan menghadapi risiko 
ditangkap dan didakwa di Mahkamah). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I pay taxes as required by the Excise Regulations because the 
punishments for tax evasion are very severe. 
(Saya membayar cukai sepertimana yang dikehendaki Peraturan-
Peraturan Eksais  kerana hukuman melarikan cukai adalah 
berat). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 TAX AUDIT / AUDIT CUKAI        
1. I pay taxes as required by the Excise Regulations because 
Customs Department often carries out tax audits. 
(Saya membayar cukai seperti yang dikehendaki oleh Peraturan-
Peraturan  Eksais kerana Jabatan Kastam kerap menjalankan 
audit). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I accepted decisions made by Customs Auditors even if I disagreed 
with them. 
(Saya menerima keputusan yang dibuat oleh Juruaudit Kastam 
walaupun saya tidak bersetuju dengan mereka). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The Audit findings are accurate and clear. 
(Penemuan Audit adalah tepat dan jelas). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am confident that the Customs Auditors will not reveal my 
confidential business information to others. 






SECTION D: ATTITUDE AND PERCEPTION 






     Strongly Agree 
(Sangat Setuju) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
(Saya yakin Juruaudit Kastam tidak akan mendedahkan 
maklumat sulit perniagaan saya pada orang lain). 
5. Customs Auditors are more interested to find fault and penalised 
the company for the wrong doings, than helping the company to do 
the right things. 
(Juruaudit Kastam lebih berminat untuk mencari kesalahan dan 
menghukum syarikat bagi kesalahan yang dilakukan daripada 
membantu syarikat melakukan perkara yang betul). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 TAX FAIRNESS / KEADILAN CUKAI        
1. Generally, I feel that excise duty is fair tax. 
(Pada umumnya, saya rasa duti eksais adalah adil). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I believe that excise duty tax system is a fair system that the 
government uses to collect revenue. 
(Saya percaya bahawa sistem duti eksais  adalah jenis sistem  
cukai yang adil,  yang digunakan oleh Kerajaan untuk mengutip 
cukai).  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. From the excise duty that I paid, I get enough return in the form of 
public services. 
(Daripada duti eksais yang saya bayar, saya mendapat pulangan 
yang baik  dalam bentuk kemudahan awam). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Customs Officers tries to be fair when making their decisions on 
excise duty assessments. 
(Pegawai Kastam cuba berlaku secara adil apabila membuat 
keputusan tentang taksiran duti eksais). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. The Customs Officers respect the taxpayer’s rights as a citizen. 
(Pegawai Kastam menghormati hak-hak pembayar cukai sebagai 
warganegara). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. The government is NOT being transparent in spending taxpayer’s 
money. 
(Kerajaan TIDAK bersikap telus dalam membelanjakan duit 
pembayar cukai). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I believe that the Malaysian government is spending public fund 
wisely. 
(Saya percaya bahawa Kerajaan Malaysia membelanjakan dana 
awam secara berhemah). 
 
 







SECTION E: TAX KNOWLEDGE 






     Strongly Agree 
(Sangat Setuju) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 PEER INFLUENCE / PENGARUH RAKAN SEBAYA        
8. Most people who are important to me think that I should declare 
all my imported goods accurately. 
(Kebanyakan orang yang mustahak kepada saya berpendapat 
bahawa saya sepatutnya membuat pengikraran dengan tepat 
kesemua barangan yang diimport). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. In general, I want to do what most people who are important to me 
think that I should do with regard to excise duty. 
(Pada amnya, Saya nak buat apa yang kebanyakan orang yang 
mustahak bagi saya berfikir apa yang sepatutnya saya buat 
berhubung dengan duti eksais). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Most people who are important to me would not declare their goods 
accurately when importing goods. 
(Kebanyakan orang yang mustahak bagi saya tidak  membuat 
pengikraran yang betul apabila mengimport barangan). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I would be deterred from under-reporting if I believe that I will lose 
respect of most people who are important to me. 
Saya akan dihalang daripada membuat pengikraran, 
merendahkan nilai sekiranya saya percaya akan hilang rasa 
hormat dikalangan orang yang penting bagi saya). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I usually make decisions to pay taxes based on my friends’ 
experiences or suggestions. 
(Biasanya saya membuat keputusan untuk membayar cukai 
berdasarkan pengalaman atau cadangan kawan-kawan). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. I am aware of the current tax rate of taxes imposed for the cigarettes, 
vehicles and liquor when doing importation. 
(Saya sedar tentang kadar cukai terkini yang dikenakan keatas 
rokok, kenderaan dan arak semasa membuat pengimportan). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The license issued to the taxpayers’ under Excise Act 1976 should 
be renewed yearly or every 2 years. 
(Lesen yang dikeluarkan dibawah Akta Eksais 1976 seharusnya 
diperbaharui setiap tahun atau 2 tahun sekali). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. In my opinion, I know all the procedures required for cigarettes, 
vehicles and liquor importation. 
(Pada pendapat saya, saya mengetahui segala prosedur yang 
diperlukan bagi pengimportan rokok, kenderaan dan arak). 







SECTION F: CORRUPTION 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. As far as I am concern, non-compliant taxpayers can be imprisoned 
if found guilty of evading tax. 
(Setakat yang saya tahu, pembayar cukai yang tidak mematuhi boleh 
dipenjarakan jika didapati bersalah mengelak cukai). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Similar to other criminal offences, I believe that individuals can also 
be prosecuted for not complying with the Excise Act 1976. 
(Seperti kesalahan jenayah yang lain, saya percaya bahawa individu 
juga akan dihadapkan ke mahkamah jika tidak mematuhi Akta 
Eksais 1976). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. All imported goods will be seizure if there is reasonable cause that 
the goods were connected to offence that has been committed against 
the Excise Duty Act 1976. 
(Semua barang-barang yang diimport akan dirampas sekiranya ada 
alasan munasabah bahawa barang-barang tersebut bersabit dengan 
kesalahan yang telah dilakukan dibawah Akta Eksais 1976). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Customs Officers can search without warrant in any premises and 
vehicles if they have reasonable cause to believe that goods are 
conceal or deposited goods therein against the Excise Act 1976. 
(Pegawai Kastam boleh menggeledah tanpa waran mana-mana 
premis atau kenderaan jika mempunyai sebab yang munasabah 
barang-barang disembunyikan atau disimpan  bertentangan dengan 
Akta Eksais 1976). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Personal payments to Customs Officers are required to “get things 
done”. 
(Bayaran individu kepada pegawai-pegawai Kastam adalah 
diperlukan untuk “melaksanakan sesuatu perkara”). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Businesses generally engage in various types of corruption in order 
to compete effectively. 
(Perniagaan biasanya terlibat dalam pelbagai jenis rasuah untuk 
bersaing dengan berkesan). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Engaging in various types of corruption is a normal part of doing 
business in Malaysia. 
(Penglibatan dalam pelbagai jenis rasuah adalah perkara biasa 
dalam menjalankan perniagaan di Malaysia). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Provide “gifts-in-kind” as a method for improving the responsiveness 
of Customs Officers. 






SECTION G: PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
  
(Memberi “hadiah berupa barangan” adalah satu kaedah untuk 
meningkatkan reaksi bertindak Pegawai-pegawai Kastam). 
 
5. Bribery to the Customs Officer is one of the most important 
considerations when doing importation business. 
(Rasuah adalah salah satu pertimbangan yang paling penting 
apabila menjalankan perniagaan impot). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Engaging in corruption is one of the ways to get things done. 
(Penglibatan dalam rasuah adalah salah satu cara untuk melakukan  
sesuatu). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Firms which do not engage in corruption will be at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to firms that do. 
(Firma-firma yang tidak terlibat dalam rasuah akan berada dalam 
situasi persaingan yang lemah berbanding dengan firma-firma yang 
terlibat dalam rasuah). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Providing “commissions” is one of the, method for enhancing / 
maintaining your relationship with Customs Officers. 
(Memberi ‘komisen’ adalah salah satu kaedah untuk meningkatkan / 
mengekalkan hubungan anda dengan Pegawai-pegawai Kastam). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. It is worth paying small tax penalties rather than paying the actual 
taxes because the likelihood of being caught is minimal. 
(Adakah berbaloi membayar penalti cukai yang rendah daripada 
membayar cukai sebenar kerana kemungkinan untuk ditangkap 
adalah minimum). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The RMCD rarely finds out if someone has under-declared his tax by 
intentionally mis-classifying the tariff code to pay less excise duty. 
(KDRM jarang dapat mengesan mereka yang membuat pengikraran 
rendah cukai dengan sengaja menggunakan kod tarif yang salah 
untuk kurang bayar duti eksais). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. It is unlikely for taxpayers to be discovered and punished by the 
RMCD if they evaded excise duties. 
(Agak mustahil berkemungkinan pembayar cukai dikesan dan 
dihukum oleh KDRM jika mereka mengelak duti eksais). 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Customs Officers will detect if your firm has not kept the importation 
documents as required in the Excise Act 1967. 






SECTION H: TAX AGENTS 
BAHAGIAN H: AGEN CUKAI 
1. Did your company employ tax agents to handle tax matters’? (Tick the appropriate 
answer) 
(Adakah syarikat anda melantik agen cukai untuk menguruskan hal-hal  
percukaian?) (Tandakan jawapan yang sesuai) 
               Yes  (Ya)                                                                    No  (Tidak)   
                                    
            If “No” please stop here. (Jika “Tidak” sila berhenti di sini) 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(Pegawai Kastam akan dapat mengesan jika syarikat anda tidak 
menyimpan dokumen pengimportan mengikut keperluan Akta Eksais 
1976). 
 
5. I ensure the tax declaration is correct because there is a high 
probability that I may get caught if I did not follow the Excise 
Regulations. 
(Saya memastikan pengikraran cukai adalah betul kerana 
kebarangkalian untuk ditangkap adalah tinggi jika saya tidak 
mengikut Peraturan-peraturan Eksais). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I believe that the probabilities of being detected by RMCD for not 
declaring the exact amount of taxes are low. 
(Saya percaya kemungkinan untuk dikesan oleh KDRM dalam 
membuat pengikraran cukai yang rendah  adalah rendah). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My tax agent is a very honest person. 
(Agen cukai saya adalah orang yang sangat jujur). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My tax agents helps me to interpret ambiguous or grey areas of the 
tax law in my favour. 
(Ejen cukai saya membantu mentafsir undang-undang cukai yang 
samar-samar bagi memihak saya). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I have a tax agent who is clever in the way he / she arranges my 
affairs to minimize tax. 
(Saya mempunyai agen cukai yang pandai  menguruskan hal-ehwal 
cukai untuk mengurangkannya). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My tax agent has suggested complicated schemes that I could get 
into to avoid tax. 
(Agen cukai saya mencadangkan skim yang rumit bagi 
membolehkan saya mengelakkan cukai). 








































6. My tax agent have good relationship with Customs Officers. 
(Agen cukai saya mempunyai hubungan yang baik dengan Pegawai 
Kastam). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7.   My tax agent is an agent authorized by RMCD. 
(Agen cukai saya adalah agen yang telah ditauliahkan oleh 
KDRM). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. My tax agent has attended and has pass the Customs Agent Basic 
Course conducted by RMCD. 
(Agen cukai saya telah menghadiri dan telah lulus Kursus Asas 
Agen Kastam yang diadakan oleh KDRM). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. My tax agent is aware of the Customs Regulatory requirements and 
is very compliant with them.  
(Agen cukai saya memang sedar akan keperluan Peraturan 
Perkastaman dan adalah seorang yang akur dengannya. 






Data Collection Approval Letter From  











































































Path Coefficient Values for Probability of Detection Interaction Plot 
 
 
Hypothesized Effect Path Coefficient (β Value) 
CRP -> EDN 0.147 
CRP1 -> EDN 0.015 
PI -> EDN 0.130 
PI1 -> EDN 0.009 
POD -> EDN 0.160 
PR -> EDN 0.035 
PR1 -> EDN -0.021 
TA -> EDN 0.051 
TAU -> EDN 0.180 
TAU1 -> EDN -0.075 
TF -> EDN 0.074 
TF1 -> EDN -0.045 
TK -> EDN 0.307 
TK1 -> EDN 0.067 
TR -> EDN -0.040 












Path Coefficient Values for Tax Agent Interaction Plot 
 
 
Hypothesized Effect Path Coefficient (β Value) 
CRP -> EDN 0.139 
CRP2 -> EDN -0.005 
PI -> EDN 0.161 
PI2 -> EDN -0.061 
POD -> EDN 0.134 
PR -> EDN 0.065 
PR2 -> EDN -0.049 
TA -> EDN 0.066 
TAU -> EDN 0.244 
TAU 2 -> EDN -0.031 
TF -> EDN 0.063 
TF2 -> EDN 0.051 
TK -> EDN 0.185 
TK2 -> EDN 0.009 
TR -> EDN -0.036 
TR2 -> EDN -0.003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
